



ENEMO HANDBOOK
for Election Observation

ENEMO HANDBOOK

for Election Observation

EUROPEAN
NETWORK
OF ELECTION
MONITORING
ORGANIZATIONS



ENEMO HANDBOOK for Election Observation

Publisher:

European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations ENEMO
Blvd. Josip Broz 23A
email: info@enemo.eu
www.enemo.eu

Editors:

Zlatko Vujovic
Pierre Peytier

Authors:

Pierre Peytier
Zlatko Vujovic
Kristina Kostelac
Teodora Gilic

Circulation:

200

Podgorica, August 2022.



This ENEMO Handbook for Election Observation was financially supported by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The content of the document is the sole responsibility of ENEMO and does not necessarily represent the position of the donor.

TABLE OF CONTENT

| | |
|---|-----------|
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | 10 |
| PREFACE BY THE PRESIDENT OF ENEMO | 11 |
| PART I - INTRODUCTION | 13 |
| <hr/> | |
| CHAPTER I | |
| ABOUT ENEMO AND ABOUT THIS HANDBOOK | 14 |
| <hr/> | |
| 1.1. The work of ENEMO | 14 |
| 1.2. Members of ENEMO | 16 |
| 1.3. Observed elections | 18 |
| 1.4. Diversity of member organizations | 18 |
| 1.5. Expertise | 18 |
| 1.6. Endorsement of Global Principles | 19 |
| 1.7. Impartiality and objectivity of IEOMs | 19 |
| 1.8. Structure and governance of ENEMO | 19 |
| 1.9. For whom this Handbook was designed and how to use it | 20 |
| 1.9.1. Structure | 20 |
| 1.9.2. Using this Handbook | 21 |
| CHAPTER II | |
| THE IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVING ELECTIONS | 23 |
| <hr/> | |
| 2.1. Definition and purpose of election observation | 24 |
| 2.2. The role of international election observers | 25 |
| 2.3. The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers | 27 |
| 2.3.1. The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation | 27 |
| 2.3.2. The Code of Conduct for International Observers | 29 |
| CHAPTER III | |
| INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTIONS | 33 |
| <hr/> | |
| 3.1. Defining international election standards | 33 |
| 3.1.1. Key analytical framework principles | 34 |
| 3.2. Key international documents | 36 |
| 3.2.1. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)..... | 37 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 3.2.2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and General Comment n°25 to the ICCPR | 37 |
| 3.2.3. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) | 38 |
| 3.2.4. The OSCE Copenhagen Document (1990) | 39 |
| 3.2.5. The Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (2002) | 40 |
| 3.3. Distinguishing international standards from best practices in democratic elections | 42 |
| 3.4. Domestic (national) legal framework | 43 |
| 3.5. Applying international standards to assess the electoral process | 44 |
| 3.5.1. How to use international standards in the assessment process | 44 |
| 3.5.2. Reading the texts and understanding the framework of international human rights | 45 |
| 3.5.3. Identifying relevant international standards when considering the observed election | 45 |
| 3.5.4. Referring to international standards in the analysis | 46 |
| PART II - METHODOLOGY USED IN ASSESSING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS | 53 |

CHAPTER IV

| | |
|---|-----------|
| UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS | 54 |
| 4.1. Electoral systems | 54 |
| 4.1.1. Plurality/Majority systems | 55 |
| 4.1.1.1. First Past The Post (FPTP) | 56 |
| 4.1.1.2. Two Round System (TRS) | 57 |
| 4.1.1.3. Alternative Vote (AV) | 58 |
| 4.1.1.4. Block Vote (BV) | 59 |
| 4.1.1.5. Party Block Vote (PBV) | 60 |
| 4.1.2. Proportional Systems | 61 |
| 4.1.2.1. List Proportional Representation (List PR) | 62 |
| 4.1.2.2. Single Transferable Vote (STV) | 64 |
| 4.1.3. Mixed Systems | 65 |
| 4.1.3.1. Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) | 65 |
| 4.1.3.2. Parallel system (PS) | 66 |
| 4.1.4. Other electoral systems | 67 |
| 4.1.4.1. Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) | 67 |
| 4.1.4.2. Limited Vote (LV) | 67 |
| 4.1.4.3. Borda Count (BC) | 68 |
| 4.1.4.4. Supplementary Vote (SV) | 68 |
| 4.2. Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) | 69 |
| 4.2.1. Independent model | 69 |
| 4.2.2. Governmental model | 70 |
| 4.2.3. Mixed model | 70 |
| 4.2.4. Guiding principles for EMBs | 71 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| CHAPTER V | |
| OBSERVER REPORTING | 75 |
| <hr/> | |
| 5.1. Observer Reporting | 75 |
| 5.1.1. LTO reporting | 75 |
| 5.1.2. STO reporting | 77 |
| 5.2. Guidelines for report writing | 78 |
| 5.3. Principles for reporting | 79 |
| | |
| CHAPTER VI | |
| ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION REPORTING | 82 |
| <hr/> | |
| 6.1. Interim Reports | 83 |
| 6.1.1. Purpose and principles of interim reports | 83 |
| 6.1.2. Preparation and writing of interim reports | 84 |
| 6.2. Statements of preliminary findings and conclusions | 85 |
| 6.2.1. Purpose and principles of the preliminary statement | 86 |
| 6.2.2. Preparation and writing of the preliminary statement | 87 |
| 6.3. Final Reports | 88 |
| 6.3.1. Purpose and principles of the Final Report | 89 |
| 6.3.2. Preparation of the Final Report | 89 |
| 6.3.3. Recommendations | 90 |
| | |
| CHAPTER VII | |
| CONDUCTING MEETINGS AND INTERVIEWS | 93 |
| <hr/> | |
| 7.1. Meetings and interviews | 93 |
| 7.1.1. Organizing and holding meetings with local stakeholders | 93 |
| 7.1.2. Key groups of interlocutors | 96 |
| 7.2. Presenting ENEMO's mission, goals and work to stakeholders | 101 |
| 7.3. Interview techniques | 102 |
| 7.4. Frequently asked questions about ENEMO | 103 |
| | |
| PART III - ASSESSING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS | 107 |
| <hr/> | |
| CHAPTER VIII | |
| STRUCTURE OF AN ENEMO IEOM | 108 |
| <hr/> | |
| 8.1. Types and scale of IEOMs carried out by ENEMO | 108 |
| 8.1.1. Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) | 108 |
| 8.1.1.1. General description | 108 |
| 8.1.1.2. Methodology of a NAM | 108 |
| 8.1.2. Election Observation Mission (EOM) | 110 |
| 8.1.2.1. General description | 110 |
| 8.1.2.2. EOM Methodology | 111 |
| 8.1.3. Limited Election Observation Missions (LEOM) | 112 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 8.1.3.1. General description | 112 |
| 8.1.3.2. Methodology for conducting an LEOM | 113 |
| 8.1.4. Expert Election Observation Mission (EEOM) | 114 |
| 8.1.4.1. General description | 114 |
| 8.1.4.2. Methodology for conducting an EEOM | 115 |
| 8.2. Core Team (CT): positions, key tasks and responsibilities | 115 |
| 8.2.1. Head of Mission | 115 |
| 8.2.2. Deputy Head of Mission (DHoM) | 117 |
| 8.2.3. Election Analyst | 118 |
| 8.2.4. Legal Analyst | 119 |
| 8.2.5. Political Analyst | 120 |
| 8.2.6. Media Analyst | 121 |
| 8.2.7. Data Analyst | 122 |
| 8.2.8. Long Term Observer Coordinator | 123 |
| 8.2.9. Short Term Observers Coordinator | 125 |
| 8.2.10. Press Officer | 126 |
| 8.2.11. Security Officer | 127 |
| 8.2.12. Logistics Officer | 129 |
| 8.2.13. Financial officer | 130 |
| 8.2.14. Junior Financial Officer | 131 |
| 8.3. Long Term Observer (LTO) | 132 |
| 8.4. Short Term Observer (STO) | 133 |
| 8.5. Local support staff | 134 |
| 8.5.1. Local legal expert | 134 |
| 8.5.2. Assistant/Interpreter to the Core Team | 135 |
| 8.5.3. Assistant/Interpreter to observers | 135 |
| 8.5.4. Driver | 136 |

CHAPTER IX

STRUCTURE OF AN ENEMO IEOM **138**

| | |
|--|-----|
| 9.1. Recruitment of observers and national staff | 138 |
| 9.1.1. Selection and deployment of core team (CT) members | 139 |
| 9.1.2. Selection and deployment of long-term observers (LTOs) | 140 |
| 9.1.3. Selection and deployment of short-term observers (STOs) | 141 |
| 9.1.4. Selection of national staff positions | 141 |
| 9.2. Briefing of observers | 142 |
| 9.2.1. Briefing of LTOs | 142 |
| 9.2.1. Briefing of STOs | 143 |
| 9.3. Debriefing of observers | 143 |
| 9.3.1. Debriefing of STOs | 143 |
| 9.3.2. Debriefing of LTOs | 143 |

CHAPTER X

OBSERVING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD

145

| | |
|---|-----|
| 10.1. Political Background | 145 |
| 10.2. Legal framework and electoral system | 146 |
| 10.2.1. Legal framework | 146 |
| 10.2.2. Electoral System | 148 |
| 10.3. Election management bodies | 150 |
| 10.4. Voter Registration | 155 |
| 10.5. Registration of candidates and political parties | 161 |
| 10.6. Electoral campaign and campaign finance | 164 |
| 10.6.1. Electoral campaign | 164 |
| 10.6.2. Campaign finance | 168 |
| 10.7. Media | 172 |
| 10.7.1. Media and electoral campaigning | 172 |
| 10.7.1.1. Media environment | 172 |
| 10.7.1.2. Media regulations | 173 |
| 10.7.1.3. Media oversight bodies | 174 |
| 10.7.1.4. Online media and elections | 174 |
| 10.7.2. Assessing media and elections | 176 |
| 10.7.3. Monitoring social media | 178 |
| 10.7.3.1. Definition of Crowd Tangle | 178 |
| 10.7.3.2. Monitoring of online activity of actors | 181 |
| 10.7.4. Reporting and assessment of social media influence on the electoral campaign | 186 |
| 10.8. Participation of women | 187 |
| 10.9. Participation of minorities | 189 |
| 10.10. Inclusion of people living with disabilities (PWDs) | 190 |
| 10.11. Complaints and appeals | 191 |
| 10.11.1. Right to legal remedy and principles | 192 |
| 10.11.2. Procedures and time frames for complaints | 192 |

CHAPTER XI

OBSERVING THE ELECTION DAY

196

| | |
|---|-----|
| 11.1. Opening and set-up of polling stations | 196 |
| 11.2. Voting | 198 |
| 11.2.1. Standard voting principles and procedures | 198 |
| 11.2.2. Special voting procedures and new voting technologies | 200 |
| 11.3. Closing and Counting | 202 |
| 11.4. Transfer of electoral materials | 204 |
| 11.5. Election day complaints | 205 |
| 11.6. Preliminary turnout and preliminary results | 206 |
| 11.7. Assessment of the Election Day environment | 206 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| CHAPTER XII | |
| OBSERVING THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD | 209 |
| <hr/> | |
| 12.1. LTOs role in the post-election period | 209 |
| 12.2. CTs role in the post-election period | 210 |
| 12.2.1. Assessing the announcement of results | 210 |
| 12.2.2. Assessing the complaints and appeals process | 211 |
| 12.2.3. Assessing post-election developments | 213 |
| | |
| CHAPTER XIII | |
| CLOSING THE IEOM | 215 |
| <hr/> | |
| 13.1. Final meetings | 215 |
| 13.2. Debriefings and departure from the country | 216 |
| 13.3. Evaluation of the mission | 216 |
| | |
| CHAPTER XIV | |
| DOES IT END HERE? | 219 |
| <hr/> | |
| 14.1. Following up on ENEMO recommendations | 219 |
| 14.2. Electoral reform and advocacy activities | 220 |
| 14.3. Understanding democracy from a broader perspective | 221 |
| | |
| PART IV - ENEMO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES | 225 |
| <hr/> | |
| CHAPTER XV | |
| IEOM EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION | 226 |
| <hr/> | |
| 15.1. Communication within the mission (internal communication) | 226 |
| 15.1.1. Communication within the Core Team | 226 |
| 15.1.2. Communication between the Core Team and the LTOs | 227 |
| 15.1.3. Communication between the Core Team and member organization(s)/Network | 227 |
| 15.1.4. Communication of the Head of Mission with the CEO and the Governing Board | 227 |
| 15.1.5. Communication of the Core Team with STOs | 227 |
| 15.1.6. Communication between LTOs and STOs | 228 |
| 15.1.7. Code of ethics | 228 |
| 15.2. Representing ENEMO (external communication) | 229 |
| 15.2.1. Relations with the host country | 229 |
| 15.2.2. External communications and ensuring the visibility of the mission and donors | 230 |
| 15.2.2.1. Communication strategy | 230 |
| 15.2.2.2. Communication with the donors | 230 |
| 15.2.3. External communication tools and channels | 231 |
| 15.2.3.1. Press release and press conference | 231 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 15.2.3.2. ENEMO web page and social media networks | 231 |
| 15.2.4. Publication and broadcasting of reports and statements | 232 |
| 15.2.4.1. Interim report and preliminary statement press conference and press release | 232 |
| 15.2.4.2. Final report event and press release | 232 |
| 15.2.5. Interviews and interacting with media | 233 |

CHAPTER XVI

IEOM EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION 235

| | |
|--|-----|
| 16.1. Logistical activities | 235 |
| 16.1.1. Pre-deployment activities | 235 |
| 16.1.2. Activities in the host country | 236 |
| 16.1.3. Pre-closure activities | 236 |
| 16.2. Financial procedures | 237 |
| 16.2.1. Contractual arrangements with the Core team, LTOs and STOs | 237 |
| 16.2.1.1. Contractual arrangements with Core team | 237 |
| 16.2.1.2. Contractual arrangements with LTOs | 237 |
| 16.2.1.3. Contractual arrangements with STOs | 238 |
| 16.2.1.4. Calculating fuel consumption - ENEMO logbook | 238 |
| 16.2.2. Brief overview on which costs ENEMO cover for its observers | 239 |
| 16.2.2.1. Financial, administrative, and logistic reconciliation – closure of the mission - LTOs’ and STOs’ obligations | 239 |

CHAPTER XVII

SECURITY 241

| | |
|---|-----|
| 17.1. Security procedures | 241 |
| 17.2. General instructions | 242 |
| 17.3. Instructions for travel by vehicle | 243 |
| 17.4. General incident management guide | 243 |
| 17.5. If a member of your team is injured | 243 |
| 17.6. In case of a security problem or accident, take the following steps | 244 |
| 17.7. Evacuation plan | 244 |

ANNEX 1. Glossary 245

ANNEX 2. Bibliography and useful links 270

Acknowledgements

ENEMO would like to thank all of the member organizations and their representatives. Throughout the years, nominated members have contributed to the Network's growth. Through their experience and work in ENEMO international election observation missions, they have greatly contributed to the content of this Handbook for Election Observation.

ENEMO would like to thank the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for the financial support to the development and creation of this Handbook through the "Building capacity of ENEMO Core Team members and Long-Term observers" project. ENEMO would also like to express its gratitude to those who contributed to writing, reviewing, commenting and further advising on the content to ensure its quality.

PREFACE

by the President of ENEMO



In 2021, ENEMO celebrated its twenty years since its creation. Over these twenty years, our Network has grown and expanded into becoming one of the leading international election observation organizations in the world.

Aside from nearly forty international election observation missions deployed, ENEMO has thrived by offering a unique organizational positioning. On one hand, it utilizes internationally recognized electoral standards, democratic benchmarks, and methodology. On the other hand, it is composed of a diverse array of domestic civil society activists who are human rights defenders and election experts in their own countries.

These factors have created extraordinary value by bringing together the grass-roots interests of civil society – namely the political rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens – with the need of societies and states to respect their international engagements by fulfilling crucial democratic criteria. The belief that only a functioning democracy can address citizens’ hopes and enable them to exercise their rights is what has brought our organizations together observing elections for two decades.

Over the years, ENEMO has gathered a considerable amount of experience, in a large part thanks to the member organizations and their representatives. Therefore, it is only appropriate for ENEMO to offer this Handbook for election observation to enrich the experience of professionals nominated to ENEMO international election observation missions, in this case the Core Team members and the Long-Term observers. Also, we are confident that mission members engaged in the missions will be able to transmit from the knowledge gained through this Handbook and their experience in the missions to their organizations in their home countries.

Indeed, having a standardized manual on the implementation of these international missions is an extremely useful tool for mission members. It is the result of several years of thinking into giving back to those who have put effort and care into developing what ENEMO is today. In that sense, this Handbook is both an essential tool to improve the quality of observation and reports, but also a piece of ENEMO’s history, which the reader can be proud of.

As the President of ENEMO, I see this both as an accomplishment and the starting point for further capacity building of our organization. This Handbook should be seen as a milestone, opening the door to other complementary activities such as trainings, professional exchanges, and raising the expertise of our members.

I would therefore like to congratulate you and wish you a productive reading of this Handbook. I would also like to thank both newcomers and experienced observers within ENEMO, for your engagement, interest, and for contributing to the success of our Network.

Last but not least, on behalf of ENEMO, I would like to express our deepest gratitude to the donor organizations who have supported us over the years, in particular the National Democratic Institute which supported the “Building capacity of ENEMO Core Team members and Long-Term observers” project leading to the development of this Handbook. I would personally like to thank Ian Woodward, NDI Resident Country Director Ukraine for his support and for seeing the value of increasing ENEMO’s organizational capacity; and Mark Stevens, NDI Consultant, for his precious inputs, comments, and guidance to ENEMO experts throughout the writing process.

This Handbook will be of great use to you, and my encouragement in ENEMO international election observation missions!

Sincerely,

Ana Mihajlovic,
President of ENEMO



INTRODUCTION

PART I





CHAPTER I

ABOUT ENEMO AND ABOUT THIS HANDBOOK

The main mission of ENEMO is to promote democratic governance as a set of values and principles that should be followed for greater participation, equality, security and human development. ENEMO collaborates with national governments and other actors to rebuild public confidence and restore peace and the rule of law in post-conflict nations and transitional democracies throughout the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Democracy provides an environment that respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in which the freely expressed will of people is exercised. People have a say in decisions and can hold decision-makers to account. Women and men have equal rights and all people are free from discrimination. ENEMO seeks to prevent and avoid destabilization of the situation and violations of the law during elections. Ensuring compliance with basic voting principles is what ENEMO observers have the most trouble with. ENEMO observers have to make sure that in each observed country the right to vote and be elected, and principles such as transparency, inclusiveness and fairness, are well respected.

1.1. The work of ENEMO

The main activity of ENEMO consists in assessing electoral processes and the political environment by deploying international election observation missions, and offering accurate and impartial observation reports. ENEMO's observation missions use international benchmarks and standards for democratic elections, and the host country's legal framework, to evaluate the electoral process. ENEMO and all of its member organizations have endorsed the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the 2012 Declaration of Global Principles for Non-partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations. Each ENEMO observer signs the Code of Conduct

for International Election Observers prior to the start of a mission, which means that they must do everything in compliance with international principles.

ENEMO observers make sure that each observed election is conducted in compliance with international principles of transparency, inclusiveness and fairness. At the end of each mission ENEMO gives recommendations to parliaments, political parties and the media in order to make sure that what we consider was done poorly is improved by the next elections. The improvement of electoral processes, with greater transparency of the governments and their accountability to the citizens, as well as respect of basic human rights and freedoms, is the main aim of ENEMO.

We often hear about free and fair elections, but what does that actually mean? In any state the authority of the government can only derive from the will of the people as expressed in genuine, free and fair elections held at regular intervals on the basis of universal, equal and secret suffrage. ENEMO acknowledges and endorses the fundamental principles relating to periodic free and fair elections that have been recognized by states in universal and regional human rights instruments, including the right of everyone to take part in the government of his or her country directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives, to vote in such elections by secret ballot, to have an equal opportunity to become a candidate for election and to put forward his or her political views, individually or in association with others,

Transparency is essential to the electoral process because it eliminates the appearance of impropriety and limits the possibility of electoral fraud. Transparent procedures promote public confidence and trust in the electoral system. ENEMO observers should make sure that everyone has the right to vote and the right to be elected (in compliance with the domestic law), and that everyone is provided with impartial election information and can express political opinions without interference or intimidation.

Election preparations, for the most part, are regulated by election laws and regulations. In a transparent process, open communications are established with interested political parties, organizations and NGOs. Election preparations should be conducted in a timely manner in order to meet election deadlines. A calendar of election events should be drawn up and distributed to all political stakeholders. Election preparations include: voter registration, candidate eligibility and ballot access, election districts and boundaries, ballot design and layout, election worker training, voter and civic education, and NGO and domestic observer participation.

Inclusiveness is one of the most important principles that must be respected in all elections, and two fundamental aims are to avoid discrimination on the basis of a voter's disability and to make all aspects of the election process accessible to people with disabilities, and ensuring that individuals who are part of multiple marginalized identities are not pushed to the sidelines. This can include marginalized groups from national minorities, women, youth and others.

1.2. Members of ENEMO

All member organizations of ENEMO have significant experience in observing elections in the countries where they are registered, and they are knowledgeable about the different problems affecting not only their countries but also different countries whose organizations are part of this network. Most importantly of all, they have gathered under this network to stand and work together in ensuring that the overall electoral process is monitored and closely reviewed.

ENEMO MEMBER ORGANISATIONS:

ALBANIA

- KRIIK Albania Association
- Society for Democratic Culture (SDC)

ARMENIA

- Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center (TIAC)

AZERBAIJAN

- Election Monitoring and Democratic Studies Center (EMDS)

BELARUS

- Belarusian Helsinki Committee (BHC)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

- Center for Civic Initiatives (CCI)

CROATIA

- Gong

GEORGIA

- International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

KAZAKHSTAN

- Foundation for Support of Civic Initiatives (FSCI)

KOSOVO


- Kosovo Democratic Institute (KDI)

KYRGYZSTAN

- Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society

MOLDOVA

- Promo-LEX Association



MONTENEGRO

- Center for Democratic Transition (CDT)
- Center for Monitoring and Research (CeMI)

NORTH MACEDONIA

- Citizens Association MOST

POLAND

- Political Accountability Foundation

RUSSIA*

- The Movement for Defence of Voters' Rights "GOLOS"

SERBIA

- Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID)
- Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA)


SLOVAKIA

- Obcianske Oko

UKRAINE

- Committee of Ukrainian Voters (CVU)
- Civil Network "OPORA"

*Upon the request of 'GOLOS', the organization suspended its membership within ENEMO.



1.3. Observed elections

To date, ENEMO has organized 39 international election observation missions to 11 countries: Serbia 2022, presidential and early parliamentary elections; Hungary 2022, parliamentary elections; Kosovo 2021, local elections; Georgia 2021, local elections; Moldova 2021, early parliamentary elections; Albania 2021, parliamentary elections; Serbia 2020, parliamentary elections; Montenegro 2020, parliamentary elections; Moldova 2020, presidential elections; Ukraine 2020, local elections; Moldova 2019, local elections; Ukraine 2019, early parliamentary elections; Ukraine 2019, presidential elections; Moldova 2018–19, parliamentary elections; Armenia 2018, early parliamentary elections; Moldova 2016, presidential elections; Ukraine 2015, regular local elections; Ukraine 2014, parliamentary elections; Ukraine 2014, presidential elections; Ukraine 2013 – rerun of parliamentary elections 2012 in five DECes; Kosovo 2013, local elections, first round; Ukraine 2012, parliamentary elections; Kosovo 2011, rerun of parliamentary elections; Kosovo 2010, parliamentary elections; Kyrgyzstan 2010, parliamentary elections; Ukraine 2010, presidential elections, second round; Ukraine 2010, presidential elections, first round; Kosovo 2009, local elections; Moldova 2009, parliamentary elections; Georgia 2008, presidential elections; Kyrgyzstan 2007, parliamentary elections; Ukraine 2007, parliamentary elections; Ukraine 2006, local elections in Poltava, Kirovograd and Chernihiv; Ukraine 2006, parliamentary elections; Kazakhstan 2005, presidential elections; Albania 2005, parliamentary elections; Kyrgyzstan 2005, presidential elections; Kyrgyzstan 2005, parliamentary elections; Ukraine 2004, presidential elections.

1.4. Diversity of member organizations

ENEMO operates in a wider European area, with its members coming from a range of countries including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, North Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Poland. Over the years, the network has established internal rules and procedures consistent with international standards regarding international election monitoring. Full-scale missions are composed of a core team (CT), long-term observers (LTOs) and short-term observers (STOs), who together provide an opportunity for ENEMO's leadership to collect reliable information about every aspect of a particular election process (see Chapter 8 on additional mission formats).

All member organizations are summoned at least once a year for the **General Assembly** with the aim of discussing important issues related to the work of ENEMO.

1.5. Expertise

ENEMO member organizations engage a wide pool of individuals that are broadly recognized as election and civil society experts, both on a country level and internationally. Zlatko Vujovic, Executive Director of ENEMO, and Olga Aivazovska, Head of the Board of the Civil Network OPORA, are members of the Board of Directors of the Global Network of

Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM). GNDEM is the only global association of election monitoring organizations and comprises 251 member organizations from 89 countries and territories, and regional network members from Africa, Asia, Europe and Eurasia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East/North Africa.

1.6. Endorsement of Global Principles

These principles are part of ENEMO's core values and are endorsed by staff and observers of each mission. In addition, ENEMO's policies and procedures ensure that the international election observation missions (IEOMs) are performed under the principles of impartiality and objectiveness.


1.7. Impartiality and objectivity of IEOMs

These principles are part of ENEMO's core values and are endorsed by all of its members providing observation mission staff and observers. In addition, ENEMO's policies and procedures are safeguards ensuring that all IEOMs are performed under the principles of impartiality and objectiveness.

1.8. Structure and governance of ENEMO

The Governing Board is the main governing body of the network and comprises five member organizations elected for a two-year term through the General Assembly. All member organizations are summoned once a year for the General Assembly with the aim of discussing important issues related to the work of ENEMO. The President of ENEMO is elected by the General Assembly for a 2-year term to chair the Governing Board, and acts as the fifth Governing Board member.

Additionally, in line with ENEMO's rules and procedures, ENEMO has a Chief Executive Office (CEO) based in Podgorica, Montenegro, which is responsible for implementing the strategic plans adopted by the Governing Board and the Assembly, preparing and administering projects and monitoring their implementation, managing ENEMO funds, and fundraising for IEOMs and institutional funds.



The General Assembly is composed of all ENEMO Members. Members are represented at the Assembly by their liaison officer.

The President of ENEMO and Governing Board are the main governing body of the Network comprising five member organizations elected for a two-year term through the General Assembly.

The Chief Executive Office (CEO) and Executive Director are responsible for implementing all the acts and regulations adopted by the Governing Board and the General Assembly.

1.9. For whom this Handbook was designed and how to use it

This Handbook for Election Observation was designed with an aim to enhance the preparedness of **Core Team members** and **Long-Term Observers** engaged in ENEMO IEOMs. Mission participants are therefore encouraged to thoroughly read the included content.

The end goal is to improve mission participants' level of knowledge and understanding of IEOM structure, operations and functioning, methodology, procedures and deliverables. ENEMO seeks to streamline IEOM performance and ensure quality standards across missions to further develop the Network, the capacity of its member organizations, and the professionalism of individual experts and observers.

1.9.1. Structure

This Handbook is structured around four main parts, as follows:

- **PART I: Introduction**
- **PART II: Methodology used in assessing the electoral process**
- **PART III: Assessing the electoral process**
- **PART IV: ENEMO policies and procedures**

Introduction: the first part contains introductory content designed to help mission member familiarize themselves with key notions regarding ENEMO and its role, but also about what international election observation is about and how international standards function as a basis for assessing an electoral process.

Methodology used in assessing the electoral process: the second part is constructed around the idea of giving Core Team members and observers the necessary tools and knowledge about how to observe elections in line with ENEMO's methodology. Readers will find information about the different types of electoral systems and election management bodies to better understand how elections are organized and conducted, but also the types of reports which the Core Team produces, how to collect data and formulate an analysis, the role of LTOs in the missions, and how to conduct meetings with interlocutors.

Assessing the electoral process: the third part is designed to provide a more in-depth but also practical overview of how IEOMs are implemented and what needs to be observed during the process. This includes the various types of observation missions which ENEMO deploys, along with their scale and composition. It details the functions of each respective mission member, how they are selected, and how a mission should be implemented from a practical standpoint. In-depth information is provided on which aspects of the process should be observed and assessed in order for both CT analysts and LTOs to report. This ranges from the pre-election period, to Election Day, to the post-election period. Last but not least, it puts into perspective these elements and provides insight on the mission's focus.

ENEMO policies and procedures: the fourth and final part contains standardized provisions on internal and external communication of the mission, how to ensure ENEMO's visibility, financial and logistical procedures to follow during the mission, as well as crucial security measures which are indispensable to keep all mission members safe.

1.9.2. Using this Handbook

Rather than a merely theoretical medium, mission members are encouraged to consider this Handbook for Election Observation as the essential framework which they should familiarize themselves before the mission. It can also be used as a practical toolkit during the mission's implementation, providing an important reference point to possible questions and help clarify experts' and observers' work, tasks, obligations, etc.

This document also contains a significant amount of knowledge regarding specific concepts and aspects of the electoral process, some of which are quite advanced. Newcomers should see this as an opportunity to learn something new, while more seasoned mission members can use this opportunity to perfect their knowledge and hone their understanding. Newer observers should not feel intimidated by the more complex sections, which they will understand with time and practice. More experienced observers can use sections which they are already familiar with as a way to refresh their knowledge since the previous mission. In time, the goal is for the content of this Handbook to become second-nature to all mission participants.

This Handbook was therefore designed to be useful for all Core Team members and LTOs - regardless of the experience level, the goal is that every reader can get something out of it.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter I – About ENEMO and its work

- What is ENEMO?
- What are the key principles which ENEMO is based upon?
- What is the geographical area which ENEMO covers?
- How many organizations does ENEMO count?
- What is the structure and internal governance system of ENEMO?
- What are the roles of the Central Executive Office (CEO) and Executive Director?
- What are the roles of the President of ENEMO and the Governing Board?
- What is the role of the General Assembly of ENEMO?



CHAPTER II

THE IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVING ELECTIONS

Elections constitute a fundamental part of democratic governance. Elections enable voters to select leaders while holding them accountable for their performance in office. Accountability can be undermined when elected leaders do not care whether they are reelected, or when one political party or coalition is so dominant that there is practically no choice for voters among alternative candidates or parties.

Requiring leaders to submit to genuine, regular and periodic elections helps solve the issue of succession in leadership, and therefore contributes to the continuity of democracy. Elections can also serve as a platform to discuss public issues, policy orientations, and facilitate the expression of public opinion. This is especially true where the process is competitive and therefore forces candidates or parties to evidence their results and submit their future intentions to public scrutiny.

Elections can also provide for the political education for citizens, and ensure the accountability of democratic governments to the will of the people. They also serve to legitimize the acts and decisions of those who wield power, which is also the case to some extent even with elections that are noncompetitive.

In general, voting gives people the opportunity to express partisanship and their political sensibilities. Even the act of not voting can reflect the expression of some people's disenfranchisement from the political community.

Whether held under authoritarian or democratic regimes, elections can have considerable effects on the political environment. Elections and electoral campaigns which precede them are often large-scale events accompanied by coverage which call attention to the importance of participation.

Regardless of the national, regional, or local context the key function of elections is to

ensure the legitimacy of public office holders, or on the contrary allow voters to dispose of unwanted rulers. In order for this to occur, elections require to be inclusive and ensure participation.

2.1. Definition and purpose of election observation

Elections are today considered as the main legitimizing factor of representative democracy. They provide citizens a way to hold their leaders accountable by voting contestants in to (or out of) office. By engaging citizens to the polls, they have an opportunity to express their political will by casting their ballot.

However, it is a common mistake to focus only on Election Day specifically. Elections are in fact a process built around numerous stages and aspects, and public confidence in each step of the electoral process is fundamental to the integrity of the election. In order for citizens to engage in elections, understand them, evaluate them and, ultimately, accept the process and results as representing their will, information about the process and election data must be open and transparent.

Elections should be genuine, credible and held in line with collectively accepted principles and rules. Genuine and credible elections are those which respect key concepts of inclusiveness, competitiveness, transparency, and accountability.

The crucial role of international election observation is to assess whether an election is in line with international standards and the domestic electoral legislation, highlight specific recommendations for improvement, and demonstrate the support of the international community for genuine democratic elections in the observed country. The goal of international observation is to deliver a message whether elections were conducted freely, fairly, and transparently, with processes and outcomes which can be assessed as reflecting the will of the voters overall. As a result, international election observation can play a highly positive role in promoting public confidence in an election.

Over the past thirty years or so, international nonpartisan citizen election monitoring has globally thrived. Nowadays, it collectively mobilizes hundreds of thousands of citizens around the world engaging in democratic development as international election observers. Many of these observation organizations have taken the form of international networks, which is the case of organizations such as ENEMO.

International election observation is the monitoring of an election by one or more independent organizations, usually from another country, institution, intergovernmental or non-governmental organization. Their purpose is primarily to assess the conduct of an election process on the basis of international election standards and domestic legislation.

The legal, ethical and technical fundamentals of international observation are defined in the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, developed in a multi-organization process initiated by the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division, NDI

and The Carter Center. The Declaration of Principles, launched at the United Nations in 2005, has been formally endorsed by more than 45 of the leading international observation organizations and recognized with appreciation by the UN General Assembly for contributing to harmonizing the practice of international observation.

2.2. The role of international election observers and ENEMO IEOMs

International election observers can play a fundamental role in promoting open election practices and principles as a means of enhancing public confidence in genuine democratic elections. While the varying conditions of specific countries may be more or less conducive to free and fair elections, international election observers can comment on the transparency of the electoral process and analyze electoral data from various credible sources.

By deploying IEOMs, observers are responsible for gathering data, analyzing it, and providing an assessment of an electoral process. Based on that assessment, they provide recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of future elections to bring them more in line with a country's international commitments. The fundamental aspects which an IEOM should cover and analyze are:

- Whether citizens have genuine opportunities to participate in government, directly and/or through freely chosen representatives;
- Whether there is clarity, predictability and consistency among electoral related laws as well as impartial and uniform application of legal provisions;
- Whether equal suffrage is ensured ("equality of the vote"), in relation to the proportion of voters with representatives and prevention of discrimination in the delimitation of electoral boundaries;
- Whether the election administration is impartial, effective and transparent in conducting the organizing and holding of elections;
- Whether the electoral process enjoys the confidence of the public, and whether the process is conducted transparently;
- Whether eligible citizens have a genuine opportunity to exercise the right to vote, while preventing ineligible people from voting and blocking multiple voting;
- Whether voters are sufficiently informed about voter registration, voting options and voting procedures to provide a genuine opportunity for exercising the right to vote and to make an informed choice among electoral contestants;
- Whether political pluralism and freedom of political association are ensured;
- Whether there is a genuine opportunity to exercise the right to stand for election and proper conditions for candidacy and listing on the ballot;
- Whether there is fair and equitable treatment of electoral contestants and that voters receive sufficient, accurate information about electoral contestants and about issues that are relevant to the election, in order for them to make an informed choice;
- Whether those running for office or other ballot initiatives are free and have fair conditions to organize, disseminate information and seek citizens' support, and ensure that voters are able to learn about those who are running in the election. Additionally, they should be able to make their choice free from intimidation, harassment, threat of

retribution and other forms of pressure;

- Whether all eligible voters have a genuine opportunity to freely cast a secret ballot, that illegal voting is prevented, the will of the voters is respected, fraud is prevented and transparency provides a basis for public confidence in the electoral process;
- Whether the right to legal remedy, due process, equality before the law, equal protection of the law and effective redress are provided, and that there is public confidence in the impartiality and competence of the bodies reviewing electoral complaints and appeals.

Generally, the main objectives of election observation are:

- To determine whether elections were generally genuine, free and fair, where appropriate;
- To deter fraud;
- To enhance public confidence in the electoral process;
- To strengthen respect for human rights;
- To contribute to resolution of conflict.

According to ENEMO's own policies and procedures, the goal of an IEOM is to contribute towards increasing the level of transparency, freeness and fairness of the elections. This is done through monitoring and reporting on the crucial aspects of the elections by implementing the best practices and standards for international observation of elections.

This is in line with ENEMO's mission, referring to the manifestation of the free will of the people to elect and the opportunity to be elected. As the cornerstone of democracy, pluralist and transparent election processes give an added value to the democratic surrounding and development of one country.

Additional objectives of an IEOM are securing and providing relevant information on the quality of the electoral process and its compliance with national legislation and international standards; raising awareness among the domestic and international community regarding the quality of the election process in the targeted country; and creating international community pressure on stakeholders, which leads toward more free and fair elections.

The presence of an international IEOM in the pre-election period, at the polling stations on election day, as well as after closing of the polling stations creates additional space for the domestic monitors who, through well-coordinated effort, have more access to the particularities of the elections process.

ENEMO has endorsed the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and all ENEMO missions are conducted and implemented in compliance with the principles and standards set in this declaration (see below).

In addition, international election observation missions should:

- Establish communication with all electoral contestants in the process, including representatives of political parties and candidates who may have information concerning the integrity of the election process;

- Collect and analyze information provided by them concerning the nature of the process;
- Independently and impartially evaluate such information;
- Evaluate as an important aspect of international election observation whether electoral contestants are afforded access on a nondiscriminatory basis to verify the integrity of all elements and stages of the election process;
- International election observation missions should in their recommendations advocate for possible improvements and policies for bringing the electoral environment and legislation more in line with international standards.

2.3. The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers

2.3.1. The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation

The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers form the framework shared by all major organizations engaged in observation. Adopted in 2005 at the United Nations (U.N.) the Declaration sets forth guidelines for the conduct of professional and impartial observation. Initially, 22 nongovernmental (e.g., The Carter Center, National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)) and intergovernmental (e.g., UN Electoral Assistance Division, Organization of American States (OAS), Council of Europe (CoE)) organizations endorsed the Declaration of Principles and accompanying Code of Conduct. Since then, the Declaration of Principles community has grown to 49 organizations.

The Declaration of Principles defines three components of international election observation, carried out as “organized efforts of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations”:

- (1) “The systematic, comprehensive, and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, process, and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment;
- (2) The impartial and professional analysis of such information; and
- (3) The drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis.”

Observers, in other words, are responsible for gathering data, analyzing it, and providing an assessment of an electoral process. Based on that assessment, they provide recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of future elections to bring them better into alignment with a country’s international commitments. The observers who carry out this work, according to the Declaration of Principles, must be “free from any political, economic, or other conflicts of interest,” that would influence their ability to conduct an assessment impartially. This precludes citizens of a country from participating in observation missions there that are, by definition, international. It also rules out the

possibility of a mission accepting funds or support from a host government and requires transparency regarding sources of funding.

In addition to demonstrating international interest in and support for elections that meet international standards, observation amplifies the efforts of civil society and citizen observer organizations to improve the electoral process and can lend credibility to their findings. The watchful presence of observers also can discourage electoral stakeholders from engaging in violence and can promote instead public confidence in the process (as warranted) and political participation. Finally, it aims to enhance international understanding of elections and their context by making key electoral data and mission reports publicly accessible.

The organizations that endorse this Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers pledge to cooperate with each other in conducting international election observation missions. International election observation can be conducted, for example, by: individual international election observer missions; ad hoc joint international election observation missions; or coordinated international election observation missions. In all circumstances, the endorsing organizations pledge to work together to maximize the contribution of their international election observation missions.

International election observation evaluates pre-election, election-day and post-election periods through comprehensive, long-term observation, employing a variety of techniques. As part of these efforts, specialized observation missions may examine limited pre-election or post-election issues and specific processes (such as, delimitation of election districts, voter registration, use of electronic technologies and functioning of electoral complaint mechanisms). Stand-alone, specialized observation missions may also be employed, as long as such missions make clear public statements that their activities and conclusions are limited in scope and that they draw no conclusions about the overall election process based on such limited activities. All observer missions must make concerted efforts to place the Election Day into its context and not to over-emphasize the importance of Election Day observations. International election observation examines conditions relating to the right to vote and to be elected, including, among other things, discrimination or other obstacles that hinder participation in electoral processes based on political or other opinion, gender, race, colour, ethnicity, language, religion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, such as physical disabilities.

The findings of international election observation missions provide a factual common point of reference for all persons interested in the elections, including the electoral contestants. This can be particularly valuable in the context of disputed elections, where impartial and accurate findings can help to mitigate the potential for conflicts.

The full Declaration can be found at:

https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1923_declaration_102705_0.pdf

2.3.2. The Code of Conduct for International Observers

International election observation is widely accepted around the world. It is conducted by intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations and associations in order to provide an impartial and accurate assessment of the nature of election processes for the benefit of the population of the country where the election is held and for the benefit of the international community. Much therefore depends on ensuring the integrity of international election observation, and all who are part of this international election observation mission, including long-term and short-term observers, members of assessment delegations, specialized observation teams and leaders of the mission, must subscribe to and follow this Code of Conduct.

Respect Sovereignty and International Human Rights

Elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The rights of citizens to vote and to be elected at periodic, genuine elections are internationally recognized human rights, and they require the exercise of a number of fundamental rights and freedoms. Election observers must respect the sovereignty of the host country, as well as the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people.

Respect the Laws of the Country and the Authority of Electoral Bodies

Observers must respect the laws of the host country and the authority of the bodies charged with administering the electoral process. Observers must follow any lawful instruction from the country's governmental, security and electoral authorities. Observers also must maintain a respectful attitude toward electoral officials and other national authorities. Observers must note if laws, regulations or the actions of state and/or electoral officials unduly burden or obstruct the exercise of election-related rights guaranteed by law, constitution or applicable international instruments.

Respect the Integrity of the International Election Observation Mission

Observers must respect and protect the integrity of the international election observation mission. This includes following this Code of Conduct, any written instructions (such as a terms of reference, directives and guidelines) and any verbal instructions from the observation mission's leadership. Observers must: attend all of the observation mission's required briefings, trainings and debriefings; become familiar with the election law, regulations and other relevant laws as directed by the observation mission; and carefully adhere to the methodologies employed by the observation mission. Observers also must report to the leadership of the observation mission any conflicts of interest they may have and any improper behavior they see conducted by other observers that are part of the mission.

Maintain Strict Political Impartiality at All Times

Observers must maintain strict political impartiality at all times, including leisure time in the host country. They must not express or exhibit any bias or preference in relation to national authorities, political parties, candidates, referenda issues or in relation to any contentious issues in the election process. Observers also must not conduct any activity that could be reasonably perceived as favoring or providing partisan gain for any political competitor in the host country, such as wearing or displaying any partisan symbols, colors, banners or accepting anything of value from political competitors.

Do Not Obstruct Election Processes

Observers must not obstruct any element of the election process, including pre-election processes, voting, counting and tabulation of results and processes transpiring after Election Day. Observers may bring irregularities, fraud or significant problems to the attention of election officials on the spot, unless this is prohibited by law, and must do so in a non-obstructive manner. Observers may ask questions of election officials, political party representatives and other observers inside polling stations and may answer questions about their own activities, as long as observers do not obstruct the election process. In answering questions observers should not seek to direct the election process. Observers may ask and answer questions of voters but may not ask them to tell for whom or what party or referendum position they voted.

Provide Appropriate Identification

Observers must display identification provided by the election observation mission, as well as identification required by national authorities, and must present it to electoral officials and other interested national authorities when requested.

Maintain Accuracy of Observations and Professionalism in Drawing Conclusions

Observers must ensure that all of their observations are accurate. Observations must be comprehensive, noting positive as well as negative factors, distinguishing between significant and insignificant factors and identifying patterns that could have an important impact on the integrity of the election process. Observers' judgments must be based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis, distinguishing subjective factors from objective evidence. Observers must base all conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence and not draw conclusions prematurely. Observers also must keep a well-documented record of where they observed, the observations made and other relevant information as required by the election observation mission and must turn in such documentation to the mission.

Refrain from Making Comments to the Public or the Media before the Mission Speaks

Observers must refrain from making any personal comments about their observations or conclusions to the news media or members of the public before the election observation mission makes a statement, unless specifically instructed otherwise by the observation

mission's leadership. Observers may explain the nature of the observation mission; its activities and other matters deemed appropriate by the observation mission and should refer the media or other interested persons to those individuals designated by the observation mission.

Cooperate with Other Election Observers

Observers must be aware of other election observation missions, both international and domestic, and cooperate with them as instructed by the leadership of the election observation mission.

Maintain Proper Personal Behavior

Observers must maintain proper personal behavior and respect others, including exhibiting sensitivity for host-country cultures and customs, exercise sound judgment in personal interactions and observe the highest level of professional conduct at all times, including leisure time.

Violations of This Code of Conduct

In a case of the violation of this Code of Conduct, the election observation mission shall conduct an inquiry into the matter. If a serious violation is found to have occurred, the observer concerned may have their observer accreditation withdrawn or be dismissed from the election observation mission. The authority for such determinations rests solely with the leadership of the election observation mission.

In addition to this Code of Conduct, all mission members are required in their contracts to sign the following pledge:

I have read and understood the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers that was provided to me by the international election observation mission. I hereby pledge that I will follow the Code of Conduct and that all of my activities as an election observer will be conducted completely in accordance with it. I have no conflicts of interest, political, economic nor other, that will interfere with my ability to be an impartial election observer and to follow the Code of Conduct.

I will maintain strict political impartiality at all times. I will make my judgments based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis, distinguishing subjective factors from objective evidence, and I will base all of my conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence.

I will not obstruct the election process. I will respect the national laws and the authority of election officials and will maintain a respectful attitude toward electoral and other national authorities. I will respect and promote the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of the country. I will maintain proper personal behavior and respect others,

including exhibiting sensitivity for host-country cultures and customs, exercise sound judgment in personal interactions and observe the highest level of professional conduct at all times, including leisure time.

I will protect the integrity of the international election observation mission and will follow the instructions of the observation mission. I will attend all briefings, trainings and debriefings required by the election observation mission and will cooperate in the production of its statements and reports as requested. I will refrain from making personal comments, observations or conclusions to the news media or the public before the election observation mission makes a statement, unless specifically instructed otherwise by the observation mission's leadership.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter II – The importance of observing elections

- What is an IEOM?
- Why is it important to observe elections?
- Generally, how do IEOMs operate and what do they observe?
- What is the role of international election observers?
- Which are ENEMO's main objectives through deploying IEOMs?
- What is the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and why is it relevant?
- What is the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers and why is it relevant?



CHAPTER III

INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTIONS

3.1. Defining international election standards

The terminology used when referring to “international election standards and good practices” encompasses a set of provisions found in different types of documents. They are instruments establishing legal and political commitments to meet specific election standards, with the aim of respecting political rights and fundamental freedoms.

These standards are enshrined in a number of international (universal) and regional documents.

Generally when it comes to elections, international standards are related to:

The right and opportunity, without any distinction or unreasonable restrictions, for citizens to participate in government and public affairs through elections meeting the following criteria. They:

- > are **periodic**
- > are **genuine**
- > respect the principle of **universal and equal suffrage**
- > include the **right to stand for election**
- > include the **right to vote**
- > include the right to a **secret ballot**
- > provide **freedom for voters to express their will**

- > **freedom of expression**
- > **freedom of assembly**
- > **freedom of association**
- > **freedom from discrimination**
- > **freedom of movement**
- > **right to an effective legal remedy**

3.1.1. Key analytical framework principles

This chapter offers a general overview of some of the main key standards and correlated documents. However, in order to understand how these documents relate to international principles and good practices, it is equally important to understand what these principles are. The value of international standards resides in their application, more so than their theoretical merit. CT analysts and observers should therefore understand how to connect these principles and standards with crucial aspects of the electoral process.

Below is a table illustrating key aspects covered by international standards. These should always be kept in mind as reference points in the course of the mission's observation, and may be the object of analysis in the mission's reports – especially when particular aspects of the process are at odds with these fundamental principles.

Table 1: Key principles and analytical framework

| Principles/areas covered by standards | Analytical framework |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| ✓ Periodic elections | Elections should be held at reasonable intervals and with respect to established dates and timelines, term limits and constitutional deadlines to ensure the authority and legitimacy of government continues to be based on the free expression of the voters' will. |
| ✓ Genuine elections | The electoral process should be administered in a fair and impartial manner, in accordance with the established laws and procedures. Additionally, in order to be genuine, the election should be truly competitive, providing a real choice for voters. |
| ✓ Universal suffrage | Voting rights should be granted to all eligible adult citizens. Any limitations on the exercise of such rights must be based on objective and reasonable criteria. |
| ✓ Equal suffrage | The electoral system should ensure the principle of one-person one-vote. This means that votes should have equal weight, to the best extent possible. This principle is particularly important when it comes to the delimitation of electoral boundaries. |
| ✓ Right to stand for election | All individuals, parties or groups intending to stand for election should be free to do so without discrimination, with an open and transparent registration process. A pluralistic environment is a pre-requisite for democratic elections. |

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| ✓ | Right and opportunity to vote | Citizens eligible to vote should be offered reasonable opportunity to do so through an effective and adequate system of voter registration. The provision of accessible polling places is also an important metric to measure this right. |
| ✓ | Secrecy of the vote | Voters should be free to cast their ballot in secret, while voters requiring assistance should be helped in an appropriate manner. |
| ✓ | Free expression of the will of voters | Voters should be free to express their will, without undue influence or intimidation and votes should be counted and reported accurately. |
| ✓ | Women's participation | Equal rights of men and women when it comes to enjoying all civil and political rights should be ensured. Special provisions may also be considered to help promote women's participation and engagement. |
| ✓ | Right to an effective legal remedy | In case a person or party feels their rights have been encroached on, they should be able to seek a timely and effective legal remedy. This principle should apply to all aspects of the electoral process. |
| ✓ | Equal treatment and non-discrimination | All citizens should be treated equally without distinction when it comes to their electoral rights. This applies also to persons living with disabilities, for whom special provisions may be required. |
| ✓ | Freedom of association | Individuals or groups should be free to associate and form a political party, while there should be reasonable and transparent legal and administrative provisions in that regard. The right to freedom of association is essential for the ensuring electoral rights. |
| ✓ | Freedom of expression | Contestants should be free to promote their political messages to voters, while voters should be free to receive political and election-related information without undue restrictions or obstruction. In particular, state-owned media has an obligation to provide balanced and unbiased coverage, with access to all contestants. |
| ✓ | Freedom of movement | Freedom of movement for parties and voters during the campaign and voting periods are both essential for exercising electoral rights. |
| ✓ | Freedom of assembly | Citizens and electoral contestants should be free to assemble for campaign meetings without obstacle, and on the basis of equal treatment. |
| ✓ | Transparency | Management of the electoral process, including the counting and tabulation of results, should be transparent in order to ensure accountability and trust. |
| ✓ | Use of state resources | State resources should not be used to the undue benefit of any political party, including the party in power. In particular, the State and party should not be merged. This relates also to election coverage provided by state-owned media. |
| ✓ | Non-violence | The electoral process should not be marred by violence, in order to ensure that all voters and electoral contestants can exercise their electoral rights free from intimidation, pressure or harm. |

3.2. Key international documents

International election standards are a general set of principles and guidelines aimed at ensuring democratic elections. Some of the most important instruments are:

- > United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
- > European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950)
- > The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966)
- > The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission (2002)
- > Copenhagen Document (1990)
- > Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)
- > Convention Against Corruption (2003)
- > Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006)
- > Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)
- > Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1999)

The general areas covered by international election standards that are mentioned in Section 1 are therefore subject to a number of international (universal) and regional documents. From the perspective of their binding force on states, these standards and practices include:

- > **legally binding treaties** (for instance, the ICCPR, the ECHR)
- > **soft law**, such as politically binding commitments including the 1990 Copenhagen Document from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), interpretative documents such as the ICCPR's General Comment 25 and international good practice such as the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters (Code of Good Practice)

Based on previous practice, experience and review of the most often used standards in ENEMO reports, there are at least **five documents** that mission members should absolutely familiarize themselves with when it comes to assessing the electoral process (also mentioned in the last section of this chapter):

- > **1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights**
- > **1966 ICCPR Article 25 and General Comment no. 25**
- > **1979 CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women**
- > **1990 Copenhagen Document (OSCE)**
- > **2002 Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters**

3.2.1. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)

Following World War II, widespread international support for addressing human rights issues led to the idea of a comprehensive and legally binding international human rights treaty. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the first step in the process and was adopted in 1948 by the UN General Assembly. The UDHR was a milestone, albeit a non-binding treaty, but it had the merit of establishing a list of universal individual rights and protections from states. It was also relevant in addressing the issue of political participation, by conceptualizing it as a universal human right. This also encompasses freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and freedom of movement. Although general in its approach and definitions, it created grounds for an international mutual agreement on the importance of fundamental human and political rights.

In particular, the UDHR was the first international document to consecrate **the Right to participate in Government and Public Affairs and other key fundamental freedoms**, mainly in Article 21:

« (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. [...] (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections that shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures. »

Link to the full document:

<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>

3.2.2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and General Comment n° 25 to the ICCPR

International human rights related to political participation was further consecrated and enshrined within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is legally binding under international law on all states having ratified this treaty.

The ICCPR builds on the fundamentals stipulated in the UDHR, particularly when it comes to political participation rights by detailing requirements associated with elections. Elections are defined as a key part of this right. ENEMO mission members should therefore bear in mind that the fundamental elements of the right to political participation are enshrined in these two documents: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ICCPR, Article 25:

« Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any distinction [...] and

without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in their country. »

In addition to the ICCPR, the General Comment n°25 to the ICCPR is a key supplementary document. General Comment n°25 specifically offers insight on the right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service, which is enshrined in Article 25 of the ICCPR. Observers will find valuable precisions on the content of Article 25 of the ICCPR, which is particularly relevant when it comes to election observation.

General Comment n°34 to the ICCPR is also an important document, although it focuses more on general aspects related to freedom of opinion and freedom of expression.

Link to the full document (ICCPR):

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>

Link to the full document (General Comment n°25):

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/a/19154.pdf>

The two excerpts (articles) above from the UDHR and the ICCPR are supplemented by articles that further relate to political participation rights generally and to the electoral environment specifically, as listed in the table below.

Table 2: Fundamental freedoms and political rights in elections according to the UDHR and ICCPR

| | Freedom of opinion, freedom of expression | Freedom of peaceful assembly | Freedom of association | Freedom of movement | Freedom from discrimination | Right to an effective legal remedy |
|-------|---|------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| UDHR | Article 19 | Article 20 | Article 20 | Article 13 | Article 2 | Article 8 |
| ICCPR | Article 19 | Article 21 | Article 22 | Article 12 | Article 2 | Article 2 |

3.2.3. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly. It is often referred to as a key international document for women's rights. It provides definitions for what constitutes discrimination against women, and a set of guidelines for states to tackle such forms of discrimination.

The CEDAW defines discrimination against women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex that has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”.

Through ratification of the CEDAW, states commit to undertaking a series of steps and measures to end discrimination against women in all forms, which includes:

- incorporating the principle of equality of men and women in their legal system, abolishing all discriminatory laws and adopting appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women
- establishing tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective protection of women against discrimination
- ensuring the elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by people, organizations or enterprises

Observers and analysts will find this international standard useful, particularly when it comes to report sections or aspects related to candidate registration and women candidates, women voters, representation of women in EMBs, gender inclusiveness, etc.

Link to the full document:

<https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm>

3.2.4. The OSCE Copenhagen Document (1990)

The Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE – most often referred to as “the 1990 CSCE/OSCE Copenhagen Document” – outlines several human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to peaceful assembly and demonstration, the right for one to enjoy their property peacefully, etc. It also introduces key provisions regarding the rights of national minorities and broadens the scope of human rights issues to election-related commitments.

In particular, citizen election observation is enshrined in paragraph 8, which stipulates that “the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process”.

Among other important provisions, the Copenhagen Document represents an essential commitment by OSCE member states, reaffirming democracy as an inherent component of the rule of law. It includes relevant articles related to the importance of political pluralism, separation between the state and political parties, but also a list of specific commitments to:

- Hold free elections at reasonable intervals
- Permit all seats in at least one chamber of the legislature to be popularly elected
- Guarantee universal and equal suffrage

- Respect the right of citizens to seek office
- Respect the right to establish political parties and ensure that parties can compete on the basis of equal treatment before the law and by the authorities
- Ensure that political campaigning can be conducted in an open and fair atmosphere without administrative action, violence, intimidation or fear of retribution against candidates, parties or voters
- Ensure unimpeded media access on a non-discriminatory basis
- Ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot and that they are counted and reported honestly, with the results made public
- Ensure that candidates who receive the number of votes necessary to be elected are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in office until their term expires

Link to the full document:

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/c/14304.pdf>

3.2.5. The Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (2002)

Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe was set up to defend human rights, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, while developing international agreements to standardize member countries' practice and promoting European values across different cultures. Among the key points from the corpus of documents from the CE are the following:

First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 3 Right to free elections:

« The high contracting parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions that will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of legislature. »

Recommendation on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (2003), Article 1 Public and private support to political parties

«The state and its citizens are both entitled to support political parties.

The state should provide support to political parties. State support should be limited to reasonable contributions. State support may be financial.

Objective, fair and reasonable criteria should be applied regarding the distribution of state support.»

Additionally, one of the crucial instruments at the disposal of the Council of Europe is the European Commission for Democracy through Law, most often referred to as **the Venice Commission**. The VC is composed of independent experts experienced in democratic

institutions, recognized for their work on the rule of law, or other prominent legal and political science academics, as well as supreme or constitutional court judges, national members of parliament and senior public officials. The VC's primary task is to assist and advise countries on issues pertaining to constitutional matters and rule of law.

The Venice Commission has consecrated some of the most often referred to standards, in particular in one of the most frequently referred to documents when it comes to international standards and elections: the **Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters**.

Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (2002) (extract)

« Principles of Europe's electoral heritage

The five principles underlying Europe's electoral heritage are universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage. Additionally, elections should be held at regular intervals.

1. Universal suffrage

Universal suffrage guarantees all eligible citizens the right to vote and to stand for election and the opportunity to exercise these rights.

2. Equal suffrage

This entails:

Equal voting rights: each voter has in principle one vote; where the electoral system provides voters with more than one vote, each voter has the same number of votes.

Equal voting power: seats must be evenly distributed between the constituencies.

Equality of opportunity must be guaranteed for parties and candidates alike. This requires a neutral attitude on the part of state authorities, in particular with regard to:

- The election campaign
- Coverage by the media, particularly by the publicly owned media
- Public funding of parties' campaigns

Representation of national minorities

- Parties representing national minorities must be permitted.
- Special rules guaranteeing national minorities reserved seats or providing for exceptions to the normal seat allocation criteria for parties representing national minorities (for instance, exemption from a quorum requirement) do not in principle run counter to equal suffrage.
- Neither candidates nor voters must find themselves obliged to reveal their membership of a national minority.

Equal representation of the sexes

Legal rules requiring a minimum percentage of people of each gender among candidates should not be considered to be contrary to the principle of equal suffrage if they have a constitutional basis.

3. Free suffrage
 - Freedom of voters to form an opinion
 - Freedom of voters to express their wishes and action to combat electoral fraud
4. Secret suffrage
 - For the voter, secrecy of voting is not only a right but also a duty, non-compliance with which must be punishable by disqualification of any ballot paper whose content is disclosed.
 - Voting must be individual. Family voting and any other form of control by one voter over the vote of another must be prohibited.
 - The list of people actually voting should not be published.
 - The violation of secret suffrage should be sanctioned.
5. Direct suffrage

The following must be elected by direct suffrage:

- At least one chamber of the national parliament
- Subnational legislative bodies
- Local councils »

Link to the full document:

[https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2002\)023rev2-cor-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2002)023rev2-cor-e)

3.3. Distinguishing international standards from best practices in democratic elections

In the course of their international mission assessments, ENEMO experts often refer to “best practices in democratic elections”. What do these terms stand for?

Best practices in this sense refer to practices that, although not always necessarily enshrined in international or regional documents, are considered to improve the electoral process and/or facilitate democratic opportunities. They are no less essential to the electoral process, as they can truly affect its quality from a democratic standpoint.

Some examples of best practices include (but are not limited to):

- > The **general atmosphere** under which elections are held is ideally peaceful, free from any form of voter intimidation or violence, and offers an environment suitable for parties and candidates to conduct their election campaigns and for voters to vote
- > The election administration operates in an **effective, independent and impartial** manner
- > Election management bodies are **accountable** and generally **professional**;
- > The process is generally **transparent**
- > There is equal access for political entities and candidates to state resources when running in elections
- > There is access to **balanced and equal coverage** in the media for electoral contestants, especially state-owned or public media
- > The public is well informed regarding the conduct of elections, particularly via **voter education** outlets and programmes

As can be seen from the above list, these remain crucial aspects of the electoral process, although they may or may not be specifically or explicitly enshrined in international documents. **These aspects therefore also qualify as “best practices” rather than only international standards, but should also be referred to in mission reports and statements when possible.** They should, however, be used with caution as they are often understood by electoral experts but may not be universally recognized in cases when they do not necessarily refer to legally binding international instruments.

3.4. Domestic (national) legal framework

It should be noted that in addition to assessing the compliance of an electoral process with international standards and best practices, ENEMO missions also assess compliance with the national legal framework for elections. The extent to which domestic (national) laws comply with international standards for elections is also therefore a key dimension of ENEMO mission assessments.

In particular, the mission should:

- Assess the extent to which national legislation is in line with international standards. This is important, as it is a precondition to properly formulating recommendations in the final report, for proposing changes where there are potential gaps or loopholes in the legal framework.
- Assess the conduct of elections according to the national legislation, which means measuring whether the process was conducted in line with the laws of the observed country, while keeping in mind the assessment of whether or not the process complied with international standards.
- Provide constructive criticism of the process based on the evidence of shortcomings in the legal framework and/or international standards, and formulate recommendations

for bringing the process more in line with these international standards and best practices.

3.5. Applying international standards to assess the electoral process

ENEMO IEOMs apply international standards for elections and best practice for democratic elections in order to formulate their assessment of the electoral process. Through the missions' reports and statements, ENEMO IEOMs seek to clearly assess where international standards have been met, and where the process has fallen short of meeting those standards.

All mission members are advised to familiarize themselves with international standards for elections and human rights, and if necessary to read them once more or to consult them again in advance before conducting an assessment. Core team analysts writing reports and statements are expected to measure the various aspects of the electoral process for compliance with the domestic legislation and international standards.

3.5.1. How to use international standards in the assessment

There are at least **three reasons** justifying the importance of using international standards when reporting:

- Assessing an electoral process is complex and multilevelled, requiring analysis of political, legal, technical and contextual factors. Analysing issues, potential risks and problems requires a solid basis to argue general or specific points. International standards help in that they contain benchmarks and a frame of reference for examining the electoral process.
- They minimize space for unwanted potentially subjective interpretations, whether by the writer or the reader of the reports, since the provisions of these standards pre-exist the assessment. This also limits the risk of individual misjudgments or omitting key points.
- Because the standards are known and generally agreed in advance, stakeholders, whether domestic or international, know that the electoral process should be implemented on that basis and that these standards will be used to assess the election. This creates a framework where all those involved in the process have the same reference points available.

As a result, when using international standards to analyse the electoral process, findings and assessments are likely to be more comprehensive, sound and reliable. Their use also helps clarify or support a specific aspect of the analysis and may increase the credibility of the assessment. They should always be seen as a tool to better communicate the rationale behind a particular point of the report.

To efficiently use international standards, the following steps are recommended to analysts.

3.5.2. Reading the texts and understanding the framework of international human rights

International law and norms can at times be confusing and overwhelming for non-lawyers and laymen. However, in many of the texts, in fact, only selected articles are of particular importance and relevance to analysing the electoral process. Once mission members are familiar with the key articles, they will automatically know which articles to check and refer to. Some standards, however, do require reading in greater depth, and it is recommended that mission members start with reading the texts. They will additionally find that numerous reference materials, comments and explanations of these standards are available online (especially compendiums of human right norms and the right to participate through elections).

In particular, the five standards presented above are of high importance as they are the ones most often referred to in ENEMO reports:

- **1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights**
- **1966 ICCPR Article 25 and General Comment no. 25**
- **1979 CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women**
- **1990 Copenhagen Document (OSCE)**
- **2002 Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters**

3.5.3. Identifying relevant international standards when considering the observed election

When preparing a report or statement, the first key step is to identify the international commitments that have been made by the observed country. This will make it possible to determine what its obligations are, and CT analysts can examine all essential aspects of the electoral process in regard to these international commitments and the respective standard, as well as other international standards.

It is advisable to research the country where the IEOM is deployed and find which commitments have been made by the country, in order to know which of these commitments are binding politically and legally. These are the commitments that should be referred to in the assessment of the electoral process. This research can be done by verifying online treaty databases and going through the treaties that apply to elections or aspects of the electoral process.

The next step is to identify the aspects of the electoral process that require consideration in

the assessment. Different analysts writing different sections of the report will be interested in different areas of the electoral process. It is important to verify if international standards relating to an area of analysis are being respected overall or are being encroached upon (or if there is a risk that they may be breached in the observed elections). The structure of reports provides a good indication of what areas and aspects of the electoral process should be focused on.

3.5.4. Referring to international standards in the analysis

The next step consists in analysing areas of non-compliance with international standards and hierarchizing them. Most serious breaches should be considered in order of priority. The idea is to apply the standard to its respective finding from the CT or LTOs in the report. It is very important to bear in mind that international standards have value only if they are applied to the reality of the observed process. Therefore, carefully and objectively assessing facts is a crucial prerequisite to actually applying the standard for the purpose of the analysis.

It is equally important to understand that there may be aggravating factors, or on the contrary mitigating circumstances, as to why a standard has been breached, which requires additional explanation and nuances.

Examples of aggravating factors include when the country already has an established track record of conducting democratic elections, if the issue in question recurs every election, if the problem is caused by deliberate political action, etc. On the other hand, examples of mitigating circumstances include post-revolution or post-conflict elections, problems caused by inadvertence rather than deliberate intention to commit fraud, if the issue is addressed openly and transparently, etc.

The purpose of the standard itself is to measure whether any finding indicates that an aspect of the electoral process is at odds with the standard or, on the contrary, that it is in line with it. Whenever applying an international standard to a finding, or using the standard to argue a point in the report, the reference should be specific. Simply writing that an election or an aspect of the electoral process “does not meet international standards” is insufficient and does not make the point more credible. The analyst should mention in particular which commitment is breached and explain why. The relevant obligation should be spelled out and mentioned (citing the reference) either in the text or in the footnotes.

Example: *“Due to overly restrictive conditions, the requirements for registering as an independent candidate fall short of a number of international standards and best practices, including Guideline I 1.3 (ii) of the 2002 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission and Paragraph 15 of the 1996 UNHCR General Comment no. 25 to Art. 25 of the ICCPR.”*

It is important to be specific regarding which international standards are legally binding. Although the standard itself can have value even without ratification of the respective

treaty (they are recognized as an international reference), the ones that are legally binding are more powerful since the country has chosen to commit to its obligations.

Example: *“Shortcomings in the legal framework resulted in a failure to provide for universal and equal suffrage as required in Article 25 paragraphs (a) and (b) of the 1966 ICCPR (ratified by <insert country name> on <insert date of ratification>).”*

If necessary, the precise text of the article/paragraphs can be detailed as a footnote.

Example: *«(Footnote number) “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”»*

As mentioned above, even without treaty ratification, the international standard may still be referred to. For instance, UN General Assembly decisions and resolutions have a normative value, and its importance becomes even greater if the state in question voted in favor of the resolution. Additionally, even without ratification, the standard may still be used as an example of a good practice applied by other countries. Good practice can be referred to when it has been assessed as bringing domestic electoral legislations more in line with international standards.

Below is a non-exhaustive list of key international standards that may be referred to (and should accordingly be referenced in report footnotes) when analysing the legal framework or reflecting upon the mission’s findings. Other international standards may also be used, as long as they are properly referenced.

Table 3: Non-exhaustive list of useful international standards

| YEAR | STANDARD* | INSTITUTION | Specific Articles to pay attention to | Links |
|------|--|-------------|---|---|
| 1948 | Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) | UN | Articles ,19 ,12 ,8 20, and 21 | https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ |
| 1950 | European Convention on Human Rights | ECHR | In particular, articles mentioned under section I | https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf |
| 2000 | Protocol No.12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms | ECHR | | https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/177 |

| | | | | |
|------|---|--------------------------|---|---|
| 1966 | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) | UN GA | In particular articles ,17 ,14 25 ,22 ,21 ,19 ,18, and 27 | https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx |
| 1984 | General Comment No. 13 on Article 14 of the ICCPR | UNHRC | | https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/4093/file/UN_Equality_before_courts_General_Comment_1984_13.pdf |
| 1996 | General Comment no. 25 to Art. 25 of the ICCPR | UNHRC | | https://www.equalrightstrust.org/sites/www.equalrightstrust.org/files/ertdocs//general20%comment2025%.pdf |
| 2011 | General Comment No. 34 | UNHRC | | https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf |
| 1990 | Copenhagen Document (Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE) | OSCE | In particular, paragraphs 3 to 11 and ,31 ,30 ,26 35 ,33 ,32 and 40 | https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304?download=true |
| 1999 | Istanbul Summit Declaration | OSCE | | https://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true |
| 1999 | Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms | UN | | https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/rightandresponsibility.aspx |
| 2002 | Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters | Venice Commission | | https://rm.coe.int/090000168092af01 |
| 2001 | Guidelines on the Financing of Political Parties | Venice Commission | | https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/CoEGuidelines3.aspx |
| 2008 | Code of Good Practice in the field of Political Parties | Venice Commission | | https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(-002(2009e |

| | | | | |
|--------------------|--|--------------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| 2016 | “Joint Guidelines for Preventing and Responding to the Misuse of Administrative Resources during Electoral Processes” | Venice Commission | | https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/227506?download=true |
| 2009 | Additional Protocol to the European Charter of Local Self-Government on the Right to Participate in the Affairs of a Local Authority | Council of Europe | | https://rm.coe.int/168008482a |
| (Creation in 1999) | Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) | Council of Europe | Various available reports | https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco |
| 2003 | Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) | UN | | https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ |
| 2005 | Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers | UN | | https://www.osce.org/odihr/16935?download=true |
| 2013 | Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization | UN General Assembly Resolution | | https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/827187 |
| 1992 | Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities | UN | | https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Minorities.aspx |

| | | | | |
|------|---|------|--|---|
| 1966 | International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) | UN | | https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume20%I/Chapter20%IV/IV2-.en.pdf |
| 1952 | Convention on the Political Rights of Women (CPRW) | UNTC | | https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVI11-&chapter=16&clang=_en |
| 1979 | Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) | UN | | https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cedaw.aspx |
| 1975 | Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons | UN | | https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RightsOfDisabledPersons.aspx |
| 2006 | Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) | | | https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html |

**Standards highlighted in bold are the ones which are used and referenced most often, based on general practice and comprehensive review of past ENEMO reports and statements.*

Further reading:

- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), “International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for reviewing the legal framework of elections”, 2002: <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/international-electoral-standards-guidelines-for-reviewing-the-legal-framework-of-elections.pdf>
- Council of Europe, Handbook for Civil Society Organizations, “Using International Election Standards”, 2016: <https://rm.coe.int/16806c791a>
- Election Observation and Democratic Support (EODS), “Compendium of International Standards for Elections”, Publication Office of the European Union, 2016: <https://www.eods.eu/library/Compendium-EN-N-PDF.pdf>

Useful links:

- United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commission (UNCHR): <https://www.ohchr.org/en/elections>
- OSCE Office for Democratic and Human Rights (ODIHR): <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/66040>
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES): <https://www.ifes.org/>
- Election standards at the Carter Center: <https://eos.cartercenter.org/>

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter III – International electoral standards and best practices in elections

- When it comes to elections, what are international standards related to?
- What are the key principles and areas covered by international standards?
- What are the key international instruments and documents which set forth international standards?
- What is the main difference between international standards and best practices in elections?
- What is the domestic legal framework for elections and how should it be assessed?
- How should international standards be used when assessing the electoral process?



**METHODOLOGY USED IN
ASSESSING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS**

PART II



CHAPTER IV

UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

4.1. Electoral systems

There are different definitions of electoral systems. In this Handbook we will define elections as a “set of laws and party rules governing electoral competition between and within the parties” (Cox 1997, 38). Cox’s definition is broader than other definitions and allows us to have insight too into electoral competition within parties.

In the theory of electoral systems, authors are not in agreement about the choice of typology. Different authors have given preference to different typologies. Typologies gained special significance at the beginning of discussions on the political effects of electoral systems. All typologies are based on dichotomy majority versus proportional system. At the same time, these principles define two major groups of electoral systems.


With the development of electoral systems and electoral engineering, today’s map of electoral systems in the world differs significantly from the period before the fall of communist regimes in Europe. The third wave of democratization opened a space for wider experimentation in the field of designing electoral systems. This resulted in the creation of new challenges when it comes to creating a comprehensive typology that would be able to cover all active electoral systems in the world today. One of the last attempts to create a comprehensive typology came from a study conducted by a group of authors gathered from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)¹. In this ENEMO handbook we will use their typology used in the second revised edition of Electoral System

¹ The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an international organization based in Stockholm whose goal is to promote democracy. IDEA brings together the most eminent experts in the field of democratization and election-related issues. IDEA is the publisher of numerous publications and the holder of a series of researches that deal with election issues. IDEA provides many researchers with access to rich databases, some of which are also available online. IDEA also has observer status at the United Nations.

Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, published in 2005, which divides electoral systems into four categories: (1) majority/plurality systems; (2) proportional representation systems; (3) mixed systems; and (4) other systems.

Within the plurality/majority systems, this group of authors distinguish: (1) first past the post (FPTP); (2) the alternative vote (AV); (3) block vote (BV); (4) party block vote (PBV); and (5) two-round system (TRS). The group of proportional representation systems includes: (1) the list PR; and (2) the single transferable vote (STV). The group of mixed systems includes: (1) the mixed-member proportional (MMP); and (2) the parallel system (PS). The last group, called “other systems”, includes systems that due to their specificity could not be included in any of these three groups. These are: (1) the single non-transferable vote (SNTV); (2) the limited vote; and (3) the Borda count (BC).

Figure 1: The electoral system families (IDEA's typology)



Source: Andrew Reynolds et al., Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2005, page 28.

We opted for IDEA's typology because it probably best corresponds to the current situation in the design of electoral systems, as the other typologies followed the situation in the then valid electoral systems. The nineteenth century was marked by the majority electoral system, and the end of this century saw the struggle for the introduction of a proportional electoral system, which would allow adequate representation of a wider circle of people with the right to vote. The twentieth century, in the world of electoral systems, was dominated by proportional electoral systems, and its end was marked by a wave of introductions of systems that combine elements of majority and proportional systems – mixed-member systems.

4.1.1. Plurality/majority systems

Unlike some typologies, this typology treats systems of relative and absolute majority as a single category. Starting from this division, we define the majority system as a system in which a candidate or a list can win, even though it has not won the absolute support of the voters. For this reason, we call these systems “relative majority systems”; in contrast, majority systems require an absolute majority, which can be reached in different ways.

The purpose of majority systems is to ensure a stable and accountable government, not a fair representation of the political parties running in the elections. Therefore, such elections lead to greater representation of the strongest party in parliament, which does not correspond to the percentage of votes won. Majority systems are based on territorial representation, as opposed to proportional ones, which distribute seats following the proportion of votes won.

4.1.1.1. First past the post (FPTP)

In theory, and especially among the public, the best-known majority system is the relative majority system, which, when we talk about European countries, is used only in the UK. Outside the United Kingdom, this system is a component of the mixed proportional member system used in Germany and Italy², but also as an exception in some countries that use the proportional system (Greece, Denmark in the European elections, Finland, Slovenia and Spain). The main feature of this system is that the country is divided into constituencies in which only one member of parliament is elected, in one round. Since no more than one representative is elected in each constituency, and only one round is held, it is sufficient to win a relative majority to secure a seat on the representative body for which the elections are being held.

In the UK, as well as in the USA, such an electoral system leads to the creation of a party system with two dominant parties, which is characterized by the existence of a stable government. However, a stable government is not always a product of this system. In unconsolidated democracies, it is very common for an election winner to look for partners to form a government. In India, the largest country in which democratic elections are held, “with over 67 million voters in the last parliamentary elections in 2004” (2005: 166), one of the important factors that has made this country stable, despite the existence of strong diversity on national and religious issues, is the electoral system, which at the cost of disproportion eliminates the most radical elements in the society. Although it is an example of a country in which the majority system is applied, the effects of this electoral system on the party system differ significantly compared to traditional majority systems, in that the electoral system in India secures several reserved seats for members of certain castes and tribes, categories that traditionally have not been favoured in Indian society. While one of the features of majority systems is favouring the two “strongest players” over the other participants, allowing the winner stable, absolute power, India is an exception to this rule. The history of Indian elections tells us that the first period of parliamentarism was characterized by the existence of only one dominant party, i.e., a multiparty system with one dominant party³. The domination of the Congress Party ended in 1977, followed by a period in which there was a struggle between one party and, on the other hand, the coalition. The current

2 Although Italy uses a party list system, there is one single-member constituency in the Valle d’Aosta area that uses a relative majority system.

3 Blondel “distinguishes between a bipartisan system in which the division of seats in parliament roughly corresponds to a ratio of 55–45, a system of two and a half parties to a ratio of 45–40–15, a multiparty system with a dominant party to a ratio of 45–20–20–15–10–10 and a multiparty system without a dominant party to a ratio of 25–25–25–15–10” (Vujović, Komar, 2006: 195).

situation is reflected in the struggle of the two major coalitions for victory in the elections.

The advantage of this system is reflected in its simplicity, both during the voting and then when the seats are allocated. It also provides the opportunity to choose a candidate, not a party, which, along with the territorial principle of representation, makes the connection between voters and representatives strong, and on the other hand makes members of parliament less dependent on the party.

When we talk about its shortcomings, one of its characteristics, which has received the most criticism, is the high disproportion between the votes won and the distributed seats. Such disproportion and favouring of the big ones prevent parties with less support from fighting for parliamentary status and the number of seats corresponding to the percentage of support received.

4.1.1.2. Two-round system (TRS)

Today, France is the only EU member state that uses TRS. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, this country was not alone in using this system. Among the countries that have “gone through a two-round phase of parliamentary elections, on the way from relative majority to proportional systems, are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Switzerland (in some cases using multi-seat constituencies)” (Farell, 2001: 51). Five EU members, meanwhile, have opted for proportional systems and abandoned majority ones. Lithuania and Hungary use this system as part of their mixed systems. This type of electoral system is much more popular in post-communist countries, including the countries that once made up the Soviet Union, such as Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. A similar situation occurs with the former states of the former Yugoslavia, with this system being used by Serbia, Croatia and North Macedonia. According to a review conducted by IDEA, which covers the period up to November 2004, there were 22 territories in the world that used this system to elect members of parliament, or the lower house if it is a bicameral structure. This figure represents 11.1% of the total number of countries, with a population of over 409 million, representing 8.3% of the total world population. A significant percentage of countries that use this system cannot boast a high degree of democratic freedom, and for some we can say that they are ruled by undemocratic regimes. Examples of such countries include Iran, Belarus, Cuba, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Mauritania, Togo, Mali, etc. France is the only country that uses this system and meets the strict conditions of stable democracies.

We distinguish between TRS in which (1) an absolute majority is required to win in the first round and a relative majority in the second round, and (2) a certain relative majority is required to win in both the first and second rounds. “The first round differs from the second in that in order to win, it is necessary to fulfil the threshold: in addition to the majority of votes, the winner must receive the minimum number of votes required by law, or in the elections must participate the legally required minimum number of voters” (Kasapović,

2003: 73). In most cases, for a candidate to be elected as a member of parliament, it is necessary to win an absolute majority. If in the first round no candidate won a seat, the two top-ranked candidates enter the second round leading to the final voting. Constituencies in this system are single-seat. In the case of France, which is the most prominent example of a TRS, each candidate who wins more than an eighth, or 12.5% of the vote, enters the second round. Thus, it may happen that in the French single-seat units, in the second round, more than one candidate for the same seat may appear. In the second round, an absolute majority is not required, as in some other two-round majority systems, in which only the two top-ranked candidates from the first round enter the second round. The winner is the one who wins a simple majority. In addition to the above cases, it is possible that in the second round, if none of the candidates won an absolute majority in the first round, three candidates will enter. Such a situation exists in Vojvodina, an autonomous province within Serbia. "In the second round, there are three candidates who reached the largest, but insufficient number of votes in the first round. In the second round of voting, the candidate who won the largest number of votes compared to each of the remaining two candidates was elected, so a relative majority of voters is sufficient for the election in the second round" (Pajvančić, 2003: 86). By introducing this subtype of the two-round majority system, the authoritarian leader in power, Milošević, gave the candidate of the ruling coalition an advantage over the two opposition candidates of the coalition that was then divided, which allowed the ruling Socialists to come to office with less than absolute support. In the 2000 elections, the same system, due to the unification of the Serbian opposition, led to the catastrophic defeat of the ruling party, which was significantly more convincing in relation to the difference in the percentage of votes won between the government and the opposition.

The majority vote system on two ballots allows voters to re-express their preference in the second round by supporting the same candidate, on the condition they run in the second round, or possibly change their minds and vote for another candidate. Parties and voters can change their election strategy in relation to the results achieved in the previous round. This is especially true when it comes to using this system in presidential elections. "Research has shown that the system in France produces the most disproportionate results among Western democracies, and that in new democracies it tends to fragment the party system" (Reynolds, Reilly, Ellis, 2005: 53).

4.1.1.3. Alternative vote (AV)

The alternative vote system provides for preferential voting in a single-member unit. Voters rank representatives by preference. In order to win, candidates have to win more than 50% of the "fallen" votes. Votes are counted according to the first choice. If no candidate wins 50% of the votes in the first ballot, the candidate with the fewest first-preference votes is eliminated and his/her votes are distributed to the other candidates based on the second ballot. This system is used in only three countries. The best known is Australia, and it is

also employed in Fiji and Papua New Guinea⁴. “The idea of introducing an alternative vote came from the perceived tendency for voters to be reluctant to accept central party dominance in relation to the selection of candidates on electoral lists. Its critics point to a threat to party discipline, although such a practice, according to Butler, has not been noticed, e.g., in the Australian Senate and the Irish Dáil, where a system of preferential voting is in place” (Pavićević, 1997: 47).

One of the main advantages of the alternative vote system is that it enables the accumulation of votes of different candidates and, through such accumulation, a combination of different interests. This system enables voters who have voted for candidates who do not have a chance of winning to influence, through another preference, the choice of the winner, without giving up their first choice. The alternative vote system enables the expansion of the election platform, because the candidates are fighting not only for their permanent voters but also for those voters whose second choice they may be. This stimulates a politics of broader consensus, and through such an election system, candidates with legitimacy based on broader support are reached.

However, what is most criticized about this system is that it requires a high level of education, in a way more broadly defined voter literacy and, as a result, there could be problems in using it in societies in which a significant proportion of the electorate cannot meet the requirements for its application. Also, the complexity and speed of processing the results requires a high degree of patience on the part of voters and their trust in the electoral process, which some countries do not have, and therefore the use of this system in some countries could lead to political instability.

4.1.1.4. Block vote (BV)

When, instead of single-seat elections, elections are held in multi-seat constituencies, where the relative majority system is used, where voters have as many votes as the number of representatives that are elected, then it is a block vote system. However, it should be noted that there is a similarity between BV and the limited vote system. What makes the block vote system different is that the voter has the number of votes corresponding to the number of seats distributed in the constituency, while in the limited vote system the voter has more than one but fewer votes than the total number of seats distributed in the constituency. The block vote system usually allows voters to vote according to their preferences, regardless of whether candidates are from different parties. This system is applied in 15 countries, with just over 32 million inhabitants, representing only 0.6% of the world's population. So, this is a small number of countries with even smaller representation in the world population. The block vote system is used in countries that do not have strong democratic capacities, and it is interesting to note that none of the

4 Both countries, like Australia, were former British colonies. With the acquisition of independence, British influence did not disappear but was partially transferred to Australia, which for some time even occupied Papua New Guinea. Political influence is reflected, among other things, in the choice of electoral system, so these countries form a small group of countries that use this electoral system.

countries that fall into the category of new democracies have opted for this system. In addition to being unattractive to new democracies, the countries that have used it are opting for other systems, as evidenced by the examples of Jordan (1989), Mongolia (1992), the Philippines and Thailand (1997). The anomaly of this system is most clearly observed in the example of Mauritius: namely, if the voters give strong support to one party, the block vote system will significantly favour that party, leading in some cases to the elimination of the opposition⁵.

In contrast to the stated negative feature, the positive side of this system is that it allows the voter to express his/her preference for an individual candidate, while at the same time making the role of parties more important than in the systems of single-member constituencies.

4.1.1.5. Party block vote (PBV)

When in the block voting system party lists instead of individual candidates are offered to vote for, then it is about the so-called “party block vote system”. Representatives are elected in multi-seat units, so that the voter can distribute one vote, which is available to him, to party lists and not exclusively to individual candidates. The difference is that in the block vote system voters can give votes, the number of which is equal to the number of seats distributed in that constituency, to candidates belonging to different parties, while in the party block vote system they are directed to vote only in one of the offered party lists. The difference in relation to the relative majority system is that in the party block vote system the distribution of seats is done in multi-seat, not single-seat, constituencies, and that the voter has one vote at his disposal, which he can give to the party list and not to an individual candidate. The list that wins the most votes wins all seats in the constituency in which the elections were held. In order to win the seat, it is necessary for the winning list to win a relative, not an absolute, majority.

The negative effects of this system are similar to those of the relative majority system and are reflected primarily in the possible high disproportion in relation to other electoral systems. On the other hand, the party block vote system enables the representation of minorities and other under-represented groups to be provided through the list, while using the majority method.

⁵ “In Mauritius, in 1982 and 1995, before the elections, the opposition party won all the seats in parliament, with only 64% and 65% of the electorate, respectively. This has caused serious problems in the functioning of the parliamentary system, which is based on the concept of government and opposition” (Reynolds, Riley, Ellis, 2005: 44).

4.1.2. Proportional systems

Proportional systems are based on the principle of fair political representation. After the domination of majority systems, at the beginning of the development of representative democracy, the twentieth century was marked by the domination of proportional systems, which is strongly manifested even today. The proportional system was first used in Belgium in 1899, then in Finland in 1906 and Sweden in 1907, but today it is used in the member states of the European Union for the national elections in 22 out of 27 countries, while for the elections for the European Parliament it is used by all members. Proportional representation represents a principle according to which party representation in the parliament should correspond to their share of votes, or more precisely the percentage of seats is equal to the percentage of votes received. Within proportional systems, we distinguish between List PR system and the single transferable vote system.

The origin of the system of proportional representation is linked to the names Thomas Hare⁶, Victor D'Hondt⁷, Eduard Hagenbach-Bischoff⁸ and Sainte-Laguë⁹. Although these scientists made a very strong contribution to the conception and modelling of this system, they were only part of a movement that was very strong in the second half of the nineteenth century. The second half of the nineteenth century was characterized by the formation of numerous associations that advocated the introduction of a system of proportional representation. "Associations that promoted electoral reform were formed: in Switzerland, the Association Réformiste de Genève in 1885, and in Belgium, the Association Réformiste pour l'Adoption de la Représentation Proportionnelle in 1881 (Victor D'Hondt was one of the founders). The efforts of these groups culminated in a conference in Antwerp in 1885, at which the relative merits of electoral systems, recently divided between Thomas Hare (SPPG) and Victor D'Hondt (SPL), were discussed. D'Hondt's proposal, which involved a system of electoral lists, was chosen as the most appropriate" (Farell, 2001: 70). The division that emerged then, and which later crystallized through two types of proportional

6 Thomas Hare (1806–1891) is one of the founders of the system of proportional representation, i.e., the single transferable vote system. The nature of Hare's work before engaging in electoral affairs made him aware of a few social problems that the current political system in the United Kingdom could not solve, so it motivated him to start looking for alternatives to the current systemic settings. Thomas Hare sought to create a more representative parliament, a parliament in which different social and national structures would have their representatives. Although he dealt with various issues related to electoral issues, the most significant contribution he made was the creation of one of the ways of distributing seats in the proportional system, which is still named after him. Hare's quota arises when the number of votes is divided by the number of seats distributed in that constituency (number of votes/number of seats). This solution initiated the creation of a series of different quotas that used the same matrix, and with slight changes they achieved different results. Hare is credited with contributing to laying the foundations of the single transferable vote system, the Anglo-Saxon version of the proportional representation system.

7 Victor D'Hondt (1841–1901) was a Belgian lawyer, professor of civil law and mathematician who invented one of the most widely used ways of allocating seats in a system of proportional representation. D'Hondt was one of the key scholars and advocates of the introduction of proportional representation, as well as the founder of the party list system, the continental (European) version of proportional representation.

8 Eduard Hagenbach-Bischoff (1833–1910) was a Swiss physicist and advocate of reforms that would lead to election results that would largely reflect the electoral will. The method of Hagenbach-Bischoff is very similar to Hare's quota in its mathematical expression. The difference is that the number by which the votes of the voters in that constituency are divided has been increased by 1, in relation to Hare's quota (number of votes/number of seats + 1). Using the Hagenbach-Bischoff method, a larger number of seats are distributed in the first round of distribution than with Hare's quota.

9 Jean André Sainte-Laguë was a successful and well-known mathematician. In the theory of elections, he is known for his work published in 1911, which introduced a new method of distributing votes, which we now call the "Sainte-Laguë method". By presenting this mathematical series, Sainte-Laguë made a strong contribution to increasing the degree of proportionality in the process of converting votes into seats. In the United States, this method is known as the "Webster method".

systems, has remained today in the form of the existence of a single transferable vote system and a party list system.

Pressures to introduce a proportional system were strongest in those countries characterized by ethnic diversity, so strong ethnic communities sought models that would allow them adequate representation in representative bodies. Belgium was the first country to introduce a list PR system in 1899. After that, a wave of countries introducing the proportional representation system started. The Scandinavian countries were first, with Finland¹⁰ (then the Grand Duchy of Finland as part of Russia) in 1906, followed by Sweden in 1907 and Norway in 1921. Today, 72 countries use proportional representation systems, 70 employ list PR systems, and only two, Ireland and Malta, have a system of single transferable votes. In terms of the number of countries, this is the most widespread system in the world, because it is used in 36.2% of countries, but not in terms of the size of the population that uses it, because the relative majority system is still in first place. Proportional systems are used by countries where 24% of the world's population live. According to IDEA, list PR systems are the most popular in countries with newer democracies because they are used in 19 countries, or 61.3%. Given the interest in this system, the range of countries in which proportional representation systems are applied is expected to expand.

Demands for further introduction of proportional systems, which would replace the remaining majority electoral systems, continue, especially in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. True, in addition to the list PR system, the demands are dominated by ideas that favour a mixed proportional member system. In the primary elections in the United States, in some states, the proportional electoral system is used to elect a representative whose role is to elect a Democratic presidential candidate. In the United Kingdom, similarly to Canada, calling for more proportional systems has manifested itself in proposing a mixed proportional member system.

4.1.2.1. List proportional representation (list PR)

In the list PR system, each party, i.e., electoral list, participates in the race for voter support in a multi-seat constituency. Voters vote for one of the offered electoral lists, and the electoral lists receive the number of seats corresponding to the percentage of voter support won. Candidates are selected from the electoral list in the order presented to voters. An exception to this rule exists in systems where there is a possibility of preferential voting for candidates within the proposed lists. In that case, the candidates who achieved more

¹⁰ "After the revolutionary turmoil in Russia, the Tsar was obliged to introduce major constitutional reforms in Russia, and also in Finland in 1906. The Diet of the Four Estates unanimously adopted the new Parliamentary Act, which the Tsar accepted. Finland has suddenly ceased to be a country with an old-fashioned representative system and has become modern"...."The Parliamentary Act from 1906 is the basis of the Finnish electoral system. Its principles remain in force: (1) universal and equal suffrage for men and women; (2) a proportional electoral system with large constituencies; (3) D'Hondt's method of allocating seats." Internet presentation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States: <http://www.cbss.st/documents/cbsspresidencies/7lithuanian/outlook/dbaFile481.html>

votes, or a certain number prescribed by law, have an advantage over other candidates from the list. In addition to this exception, there is another example of deviation from the order of candidates on the electoral list: a “modified closed list”. On the modified closed list, the submitter of the list has the right to change the order of candidates on it after the elections, and thus decide, bypassing the will of the citizens, which candidates from the list will gain parliamentary status and which will not. In Montenegro, the submitter of the list was limited by the position of the candidate only in the distribution of the first half of the parliamentary seats. “This bizarre novelty has been applied even more consistently in Serbia, where the submitter of the list assigns all parliamentary seats regardless of their order on the electoral list.” In both cases, the determination of the holders of the half (Montenegro), i.e., all seats (Serbia), happens after the announcement of the overall election results! This is a solution that abolishes the link (in whole or in part) between the will of citizens and MPs, because a citizen voting for a particular list does not know the order in which seats will be distributed, nor the principles on which it will be done (2008: 121). According to Goati, this system is considered an indirect proportional system (2004: 252), based on the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, made in the middle of the twentieth century: “The mentioned court answered the question of whether proportional elections for representative bodies are the type of direct elections required by the Basic Law (1949), i.e., the Constitution of Germany. The court took the position that the elections were organized according to the proportional system, direct, provided that the ‘third person’ did not intervene between the voting and the acquisition of the seat (Birke, 1961: 19). In the case of Montenegro and Serbia, the ‘third person’ is the party leadership, who, after the vote, makes the final election of deputies instead of voters, which is a gross violation of fundamental democratic principles and values” (Goati, 2008: 122).

The principle of proportional representation tends to bring the percentage of votes won closer to the percentage of seats won through this system. The expression of that relationship is the index of proportionality. The proportionality index¹¹ represents the ratio of the distribution of seats and the share of votes of each individual electoral list in the

11 The proportionality index can refer to the electoral and parliamentary party system: if it refers to the electoral party system, the basis for determining the index is vote values, and if it refers to the parliamentary party system, the starting point is the seat values. In modern electoral studies, several methods are used to calculate the proportionality or disproportion of elections, but the most standard are Loosemore-Hanby’s, Rae’s, Rose’s and Lijphart’s index.

Loosemore-Hanby’s proportionality index, which is basically equal to Rose’s, is calculated by dividing the percentage difference of all parties in votes (Gx) and seats (Mx) by two, and subtracting the resulting quotient from 100:

$$I = 100 - [(Gx - Mx):2].$$

Rae’s disproportionate index, named after US election researcher D.W. Rae, is derived from the difference in the percentages of all parties in votes (Gx) and seats (Mx) except those parties that received less than 0.5% of the vote and those from the group of “others”, which is why Rae is accused of being inclined to underestimate the disproportionate nature of the elections – divided by the number of parties (S) involved in the procedure, and this quotient is subtracted from 100:

$$I = 100 - [(Gx - Mx):S].$$

The Lijphart proportionality index is the simplest and equals the largest deviation between the voting and seat share of the largest party or, alternatively, the mean of these deviations for the two largest parties:

$$I = Ga - Ma \text{ ili } I = [(Ga - Ma) + (Gc - Mc):2] \text{ (Kasapović, 2003:125).}$$

total mass of fallen votes. The closer the proportionality index is to the number 100, the closer we are to the ideal that the percentage of votes won corresponds to the percentage of seats distributed.

Despite numerous variations, list PR systems are still the most popular among designers of electoral systems and representatives of political parties. Such a positive preference among political parties is explained by giving the parties strong control, and on the other hand by depriving voters of the opportunity to influence who among the large number of candidates, personally, will be their representative in parliament. This effect is exacerbated by closed, blocked and, as we have seen, modified closed electoral lists where party leaders decide which politicians will be elected.

4.1.2.2. Single transferable vote (STV)

In addition to the list PR system, another system that belongs to the proportional group is the single transferable vote system. This system is currently used in the Republic of Ireland and Malta. In fact, these are the only two countries in the world that use the single transferable vote system to elect representatives to the national parliament. As can be seen, this is one of the least used electoral systems. According to IDEA's research, only two types of electoral systems in the world are used less frequently, namely a modified Borda count and limited vote system. "The core principles of the system were independently invented in the nineteenth century by Thomas Hare in Britain and Carl Andrea in Denmark" (Reynolds, Riley, Ellis, 2005: 71). It was first applied in Ireland in 1921, where it is still in use. Following Ireland, it began to be used in Malta in 1947, and experienced a short period of use in Estonia in 1990.

Constituencies in which representatives are elected are small, and in them, most often, a maximum of five candidates are elected. Parties may nominate at most as many candidates as there are deputies elected in that constituency. To be elected, a candidate needs to reach a certain quota of votes. Voters vote preferentially, i.e., they rank candidates by preference. Votes are counted based on the first preference. If all the offered places are not filled in that way, the candidate with the least number of votes is rejected. The votes of that candidate are distributed to the other candidates based on second choice.

The main attraction of this electoral system is the power that it gives to voters to express their preferences among individual candidates in elections (Gallagher, 2000: 293). The advantage of this system is that it allows high proportionality. The system was introduced in countries where, under British domination, a relative majority system was used, and the transition from a relative majority system to this system had the function of increasing proportionality. By applying this system, since it uses small multi-seat units, the link between voters and candidates is maintained. Due to preferential voting, there is a possibility of voters influencing post-election coalitions. Also, the single transferable vote system encourages strong competitiveness within parties, which can lead to their fragmentation. The theory treats it as a kind of proportional system. In addition to elections to national

parliaments, the Republic of Ireland, Malta and Northern Ireland use this system to elect representatives to the European Parliament.

4.1.3. Mixed systems

Combined, i.e., mixed, electoral systems, are a group of electoral systems that represents an attempt to combine the positive characteristics of majority and proportional systems. Some of the deputies are usually elected in single-seat constituencies in the first round on the principle of a relative majority, while the others are elected using the proportional method. Depending on whether there is an interdependence between the application of these two methods in terms of allocation of seats won, we distinguish between a mixed proportional member system (MPMS) and a parallel system (PS). In the case of the mixed proportional member system, there is a corrective mechanism to ensure the predominance of proportionality, while in the case of parallel systems, the distribution of seats is carried out through two methods, independently of each other.

Since we have opted for the IDEA typology, we will explain in more detail the mixed-member proportional system and the parallel system, two types of mixed systems.

4.1.3.1. Mixed-member proportional (MMP)

Mixed proportional member systems began to be applied in Germany, which is the most studied example of the use of this system. In addition to Germany, this system is used in seven other countries, two of which are in Europe. One of them is a member (Hungary), while the other (Albania) is fighting for the status of a candidate for membership in the European Union. In addition to these countries, according to IDEA (2005), it is also used in Bolivia, Lesotho, Mexico, New Zealand and Venezuela. According to IDEA data, Italy is also mentioned as a country where this system is used, but after the last electoral reforms (2005), the list PR system was introduced instead of MMP. However, this source does not include territories that do not have the status of independent states and in which this system is used. These include Scotland and Wales, provinces of the United Kingdom, which use this system to elect representatives to provincial parliaments.

In seven of the eight countries, the mixed proportional member system combines a list PR system with an FPTP, while in one, Hungary, a TRS is used. When we talk about the proportion of representatives elected by the proportional method, it is possible that the country is one constituency, or that the distribution of seats is done at the regional level.

The role of seats distributed by the proportional method is to correct the disproportion caused by seats distributed by the majority method. "For example, if a party wins 10% of the vote nationally but no district seats, then it will be awarded enough seats from the PR lists to bring its representation up to 10% of the seats in the legislature" (Reynolds, Reilly, Ellis, 2005: 91). In some systems, voters may have two votes at their disposal, as in Germany

and New Zealand, or one vote, where the number of votes the party list wins is obtained through the number of votes of individual candidates belonging to the party list. One of the goals of this system is to strike a balance between the representation of the interests of voters in the constituency and the interests expressed at the national level. This can be both an advantage and a disadvantage. In a situation of two votes, it is possible for a party to get more votes in constituencies than it could get based on proportions at the national level. In this case, additional, compensatory (overhang) seats are used, which may lead to an increase in the total number of members of the representative body.

The use of this system seeks to improve the relationship between voters and representatives, and to strengthen the role of voters in the election of their representatives. List PR systems, with closed electoral lists, do not pay enough attention to the influence of voters on determining the composition of parliament. One of the attempts to eliminate this shortcoming of the list PR system is the MMP. Personalization of the electoral system provides the basis to some authors to believe that it is a proportional system with an enhanced element of personalization, and not a type of a special group of mixed systems. A significant number of authors do not agree with the typology we have opted for in this paper and believe that the mixed proportional member system “is a special form or subtype of proportional electoral systems because they differ significantly from other mixed electoral systems according to the exclusive proportional principle distribution of seats among the parties (Vogel et al., 1971; Kaase, 1984; Nohlen, 2000)” (Kasapović, 2003: 269), therefore they call it a personalized proportional system.

4.1.3.2. Parallel system (PS)

In the case of a mixed proportional member system, the seat is compensated in order to equalize the results achieved by applying the proportional method if the majority system deviates from the results achieved by applying the proportional method. In the parallel system there is no such connection, so in contrast to the mixed proportional member system, there is a very significant degree of disproportion. Since the disappearance of the one-party system in the former communist countries, there has been a rapid expansion of this system, as well as mixed systems. However, parallel systems have proven to be significantly more popular than mixed proportional member systems. According to IDEA data (2005), 21 countries use this system, with eight being members of the former USSR (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine).

In theory, these systems, in addition to the term “parallel”, are also called “mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems”, as they are dominated by the majority method, whose application results in a high degree of disproportion between the percentage of votes won and distributed seats. Similarly to mixed proportional member systems, with mixed-member majoritarian systems, for example in Lithuania, the voter has two votes at his disposal. The first vote is given to the candidate in a single-seat constituency, and the second to the list PR in a multi-seat constituency. In addition to parallel systems that use the system of relative majority and TRS, some countries also use party block votes, as a

system of single non-transferable votes. Monaco and Andorra are two of the countries that use a parallel system, and they have multi-seat constituencies in which the majority method is used. In Monaco, the block vote method is used, and in Andorra, the party block vote method.

4.1.4. Other electoral systems

4.1.4.1. Single non-transferable vote (SNTV)

A single non-transferable vote system is a system in which a voter has only one vote available in a multi-seat constituency, even though more than one representative is elected. A voter votes for one candidate within the given electoral lists. The candidates who win the most votes are elected. A party can have an equal number of candidates and seats, but there is a risk that if its voters do not distribute the votes evenly to all their party's candidates, there may be a waste of votes. For example, if five candidates are elected in a constituency, the candidate will certainly be elected if he wins more than 20%. If the total percentage of votes that the party won is 40%, distributed between two candidates so that one won 35% and the other 5%, the first will certainly be elected, while the second risks losing his seat. This system is used in Afghanistan, Jordan and some other smaller countries (Pitcairn Islands and Vanuatu).

4.1.4.2. Limited vote (LV)

The limited vote system, unlike the system of single non-transferable votes, envisages that in a multi-seat constituency, voters have more than one vote, but the number of votes is still lower than the number of seats distributed in the respective constituency. This system is very rarely used today. It is used in the elections for the parliament of Gibraltar, as well as for the upper house of the Spanish parliament. The main advantage is that it gives a greater chance of success to independent candidates and minority candidates.

If the party decides to run as many candidates as the number of seats distributed, it may happen that due to the scattering of votes, the party does not achieve a good result. "For example, when it comes to vote with one vote, and let's assume that there are 100 voters in a constituency, three representatives are elected, and three parties compete for seats: party A with 54 voters, party B with 24 and party C with 22. Parties B and C nominate only one candidate each. The party has the choice to nominate two or three candidates. If A nominates two candidates, and her voters are evenly divided and vote for her candidates, both will win. If party A nominates three candidates and its voters are divided equally, the order is as follows: the first seat is held by party B with 24 votes, the second party C has 22 votes, while three candidates each with 17 votes compete for a third seat. Only one of the three candidates of party A will win the seat due to too many prominent candidacies" (Cox, 2000: 157).

4.1.4.3. Borda count (BC)

The Borda count system was named after the person who created it, Jean-Charles de Borda, a French mathematician, to be used to elect members of the French Academy of Sciences. This system is considered to be the beginning of proportional elections, because Borda disputed the notion that elections by a relative majority best express the true will of the voters (Kasapović, 2003: 49). It was used in the period from 1784 to 1800. Today, it is used nationally only in the Pacific state of Nauru. This system can be used in single-seat and multi-seat constituencies. Voters vote in the same way as in the case of an alternative vote. There is only one count. When counting, where n represents the number of seats to be elected in the designated constituency, the first voter preferences are $n = 1$, the second $n = 2 \dots$, and the candidate who is last receives 0 points. The number of points is multiplied by the number of votes won that correspond to the expressed preference. These values are added together, and the candidate with the highest calculated value is the winner.

4.1.4.4. Supplementary vote (SV)

Although this system is not covered by the IDEA typology, due to its attractiveness, we have included it in this publication.

The system used to elect the mayor of London stipulates that an absolute majority is needed for his election. If the same does not happen in the first round, all candidates except the two who won the most votes are excluded, while their votes are distributed based on the second choice. As can be seen, voters can vote for two candidates: the first, which is the primary, and the second, which is used exclusively in this case. This approach allows the elections to take place in the first round, although it could be argued that the two rounds are held on the same day. Although some authors describe it as a “British invention” (Norris, 1995a), this system was used by other authors (Ben Reilly, 1997b) in Alabama in the first half of the twentieth century, but also in 1982 in the Australian state of Cleveland. In this system, like the alternative vote system, we have one round of voting, but therefore, in addition to the first, we have a second round of counting, which replaces the second round of voting used in some electoral systems to get a candidate with an absolute majority.

The Jenkins Report, which was commissioned by the British parliament in order to reform the electoral system in this country, deals in more detail with the issue of this electoral system. The perceived advantage of this system, which is a subtype of the alternative vote system, is that, unlike the alternative vote, it prevents a third-ranked or in some cases fourth-ranked candidate being elected based on first preferences. The supplementary vote system enables the selection of one of the two first-place winners based on the first preferences by an absolute majority, which is achieved by adding other preferences of voters who voted for candidates who are not in the first two places.

Further reading:

Andrew Reynolds et al., *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2005.

4.2. Electoral management bodies (EMBs)

Electoral management bodies or electoral administration represent an institution or body, or a group of them, that is responsible for administration of electoral processes. In some countries, one electoral administration is responsible for all electoral processes, but in others, different electoral administrations can manage parliamentary and presidential elections, as is the case in Lithuania.

There are different classifications of electoral administration. In this handbook, we will use the classification developed by IDEA in their handbook *Electoral Management Design*¹². In this subsection, we will present this classification and its key categories as a guide for our core team experts, as well as LTOs, in their assessment of electoral administration. In this document, we will present key features of this classification together with an overview of electoral administration in countries of the ENEMO region as well as that of countries where ENEMO is planning to conduct election observation.

IDEA's classification distinguishes three different models of electoral administration: (1) independent, (2) governmental, and (3) mixed.

4.2.1. Independent model

The independent model following IDEA's definition (7) represents electoral management in those countries where elections are organized and managed by an EMB that is institutionally independent and autonomous from the executive branch of government and has its own budget. As can be seen from the definition, there are two key features that are used to classify the electoral administration of one country in this category: institutional independency from the executive branch and its own budget.

EMBs from this category are independent of the parliament, or in some cases from the Judiciary or the President of the Republic. This model also includes EMBs that are composed of party representatives as a prevailing model in transitional countries that previously had a communist regime. This model prevents influence from the executive branch of the government, but based on ENEMO findings, the influence of party representatives in most cases is extremely high and endangers the integrity of the decision-making process.

¹² Helena Catt et al., *Electoral Management Design*, Revised edition, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2014.

The Venice Commission recommends the establishment of an independent electoral administration. The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters states: “Where there is no long-standing tradition of administrative authorities’ independence from those holding political power, independent, impartial electoral commissions must be set up at all levels, from the national level to the polling station level”¹³.

4.2.2. Governmental model

Mostly in old, consolidated democracies, elections are conducted by institutions or bodies under the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the government. That is possible due to the high level of trust of the public in the integrity of the public administration. Public officers on different levels manage electoral processes instead of members of an electoral administration. Those officials are already employed by the public administration.

IDEA distinguishes two groups of countries within this category. In one group belong those countries where the electoral administration represents a centralized model managed from a central level (very often that is the Ministry of the Interior), such as in Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and Germany. The other group comprises countries where elections are managed by local authorities, as in the USA and the UK.

4.2.3. Mixed model

The mixed model combines elements of both previously presented models. In this model, the election administration consists of two components, i.e., two election administration bodies that differ in structure, functioning and organization. The first body (independent component) has a similar structure and competencies to the central body of the election administration of the independent model. The independent component is autonomous in its work and supervises the conduct of election-related activities. The second body (governmental component) is very similar in structure, as well as in competencies, to the election administration of the governmental model.

Usually the independent body has limited formal legal powers, limited to overseeing the conduct of elections. In some countries it has broad powers and the ability to oversee and evaluate the work of the institutional component of the election administration.

We can find this model in Japan and some countries of West Africa (mostly former French colonies such as Mali and Senegal), as well as in some EU member countries, namely France, the Netherlands, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain.

¹³ Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, European Commission for Democracy through Law, Venice, 2002: 10; available at: <https://rm.coe.int/090000168>

4.2.4. Guiding principles for EMBs

The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters defines three key principles that are of high importance for securing the legitimacy and credibility of electoral processes: (1) independence, (2) impartiality, and (3) transparency. Aside from these three, IDEA adds four more principles: (4) integrity, (5) efficiency, (6) professionalism, and (7) service-mindedness. In this section, we will present all those seven principles as they are important for the assessment of the work of EMBs.

- ***Independence***

It is believed that EMBs' decisions are not affected by governmental, political or other partisan influence. In some countries, senior members of the Judiciary are chairs of higher EMBs in order to prevent influence from the executive or political parties. Alternatively, a respected public figure is appointed, or representatives of election monitoring CSOs (Montenegro).

- ***Impartiality***

EMBs should treat election participants equally and fairly, as none of the election candidates should be favoured.

- ***Transparency***

For gaining the trust of the public it is important that EMBs act in a transparent way. Transparency should be present both in operational and financial management. Electoral transparency can be prescribed by the law. A lack of transparency causes a lack of public trust and concern that fraudulent actions are taking place.

- ***Integrity***

Although EMBs are not in charge of the whole electoral process, they are the primary guarantors of its integrity. As such, it is extremely important to give EMBs the authority to oversee the performance of other state bodies that are involved in the electoral process. Breaches of the electoral legislation should be followed by appropriate sanctions that are enforced.

- ***Efficiency***

Successful EMBs are those that display integrity, competence and efficiency. Some EMBs are very slow in providing the public with unofficial results, leading to a lack of trust. A legal framework should be set to ensure EMBs perform efficiently.

• **Professionalism**

Skilled and trained staff are of key importance for having credible elections. That is why it is important to provide adequate training to electoral administration staff. Proper selection and constant evaluation of performance, as well as of staff's personal commitment, is of crucial importance.

• **Service-mindedness**

The service delivery of EMB staff could influence the perception of stakeholders of EMBs' performance regarding the integrity of the electoral process. It is important to have the post-election administered. It is important that EMBs develop service delivery standards and based on that evaluate the performance of every staff member.

Further reading:

Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook

The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters developed by the Venice Commission

Table 4: Electoral systems and central election administration bodies in selected European countries

| Country | Electoral System (Parliamentary election) | Electoral Administration Model ¹⁴ | Election Administration Body | No. of Members | Term of Office (#) | Type of Membership |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|
| Albania ¹⁵ | List PR | Independent | Central Election Commission | 11 | Commissioner 7 Commissions 5 | Combined |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina ¹⁶ | List PR | Independent | Central Election Commission | 7 | 7 | Expert |
| Croatia ¹⁷ | List PR | Independent | State Election Commission | 9 | 8 | Combined |
| Kosovo ¹⁸ | List PR | Independent | Central Election Commission | 11 | 7 | Combined |
| Montenegro ¹⁹ | List PR | Independent | State Election Commission | 11 | 4 | Combined |

14 When it comes to the mixed election administration model, the number of members, term of office, type of membership and election of members refer only to the independent component of election administration bodies.

15 Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania (approved by Law No. 10 019 of 29 December 2008, amended by Law No. 74/2012 of 19 July 2012 and Law No. 31/2015 of 2 April 2015 and Law No. 101/2020 of 23 July 2020).

16 Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ("Official Gazette of BiH", No. 23/2001, 7/2002, 9/2002, 20/2002, 25/2002 – corr., 4/2004, 20/2004, 25/2005, 77/2005, 11/2006, 24/2006, 33/2008, 37/2008, 32/2010, 48/2011 – decision CC, 63/2011 – decision CC, 18/2013, 7/2014, 31/2016, 54/2017 – CC decision and 41/2020).

17 The Law on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament (NN 116/99, 109/00, 53/03, 69/03, 167/03, 44/06, 19/07, 20/09, 145/10, 24/11, 93 / 11, 120/11, 19/15, 104/15, 98/19) and the Law on the State Election Commission of the Republic of Croatia (NN 44/06, 19/07).

18 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (as amended I-XXIV); available at: <https://tinyurl.com/ewbyppf2>.

19 Law on Election of Councillors and MPs ("Official Gazette of Montenegro", no. 16/2000, 9/2001, 41/2002, 46/2002, 45/2004 – CC decision, 48/2006, 56/2006 – CC decision and "Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro", no. 46/2011, 14/2014, 47/2014 – CC decision, 12/2016 – CC decision, 60/2017 – CC decision, 10/2018 – CC decision and 109/2020 – CC decision); available at: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF\(2020\)031-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2020)031-e).

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|--|----|-----------|----------|
| North Macedonia ²⁰ | | Independent | State Election Commission | 7 | 2 | Party |
| Serbia ²¹ | List PR | Independent | Republic Election Commission | 17 | 14 | Combined |
| Czech Republic ²² | List PR | Governmental | State Electoral Commission (for elections to the Parliament of the Czech Republic) | 10 | Permanent | N/A |
| | | | Ministry of Interior (for area of elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) | | | |
| Slovakia ²³ | List PR | Mixed | Ministry of Interior (governmental component) | 14 | 4 | Combined |
| | | | State Commission for Elections and Control of Funding of Political Parties (independent component) | | | |
| Hungary ²⁴ | MMP (List PR & FPTP) | Mixed | National Election Office (governmental component) | 10 | 9 | Expert |
| | | | National Electoral Committee (independent component) | | | |
| Armenia ²⁵ | List PR | Independent | Central Electoral Commission | 7 | 6 | Expert |
| Azerbaijan ²⁶ | Parallel (TRS& List PR) | Independent | Central Election Commission | 18 | 3 | Combined |
| Belarus ²⁷ | TRS | Independent | Central Election Commission | 18 | 5 | Expert |
| Georgia ²⁸ | Parallel (TRS& List PR) | Independent | Central Election Commission | 17 | 5 | Combined |
| Kyrgyzstan ²⁹ | TRS | Independent | Central Commission for Elections and Referenda | 12 | 5 | Expert |

20 Electoral Code ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Northern Macedonia" (No. 40/06, 136/08, 148/08, 155/08, 163/08, 44 / 11,51 / 11, 54 / 11,142 / 12, 31 / 13.34 / 13.14 / 14.30 / 14.196 / 15.35 / 16, 97 / 16.99 / 16.136 / 16, 142 / 16.67 / 17.125 / 17.35 / 18.99 / 18.140 / 18.208 / 18, 27 / 19,98 / 19 and 42/20).

21 Law on the Election of Members of Parliament ("Official Gazette of the RS", No. 35/2000, 57/2003 – decision of the CPVO, 72/2003 – other law, 75/2003 – amended other law, 18/2004, 101 / 2005 – other law, 85/2005 – other law, 28/2011 – CC decision, 36/2011, 104/2009 – other law, 12/2020 and 68/2020).

22 Act of Law No. 247/1995 Coll. of September 27th, 1995, on elections to the Parliament of the Czech Republic and on change and amendment of other selected acts of law, amended by 212/1996 Coll., 243/1999 Coll., 204/2000 Coll., 64/2001 Coll., 491/2001 Coll., 204/2000 Coll. (part), 37/2002 Coll., 171/2002 Coll., 230/2002 Coll. (part), 230/2002 Coll., 62/2003 Coll., 418/2004 Coll., 323/2006 Coll., 480/2006 Coll.

23 The Law on the Conditions for the Exercise of the Right to Vote and on the Amendment of Certain Laws; available at: <https://tinyurl.com/1ktg8woy>.

24 <https://www.refworld.org/d/MMPocid/4c3465ed2.html>

25 Armenia Electoral Code; available at: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF\(2017\)023-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)023-e).

26 Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan (including amendments and changes made in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan 11.11.2003 (No.526-IIQD), 08.06.2004 (No.685-IIQD), 12.10.2004 (No.771-IIQD), 08.06 (No.819-IIQD), 04.03.2005 (No.856-IIQD), 14.06.2005 (No.938-IIQD), 28.06.2005 (No.957-IIQD), 23.12.2005 (No.35-IIIQD), 16.06.2007 (No.385-IIIQD), 02.06.2008 (No.611-IIIQD), 16.12.2008 (No.739-IIIQD), 05.03.2010 (No.972-IIIQD), 18.06.2010 (No.1035-IIIQD), 01.02.2011 (No.55-IVQD), 20.04.2012 (No.327-IVQD), 30.04.2013 (No.632-IVQD), 03.04.2015 (No.1243-IVQD), 07.04.2017 (No.578-VQD), 15.12.2017 (No.917-VQD), 06.03.2018 (No. 1022-VQD), 18.12.2018 (No.1397-VQD) and 01.02.2019 (No.1460-VQD).

27 Electoral Code of the Republic of Belarus; available at: <http://law.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=Hk0000370ee>.

28 Election Code of Georgia; available at: <https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/1557168?publication=69>.

29 The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic "On Election Commissions to Conduct Elections and Referenda in the Kyrgyz Republic"; available at: https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/7571/file/Kyrgyzstan_Law%20on%20Election%20Commissions_am2017_ENG.pdf.

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----|--------------------------|----------|
| Moldova ³⁰ | List PR | Independent | Central Election Commission | 9 | 5 | Expert |
| Russian Federation ³¹ | Parallel (List PR & FPTP) | Independent | Central Election Commission | 15 | 5 | Expert |
| Ukraine ³² | Parallel (List PR & FPTP) | Independent | Central Election Commission | 17 | 7 | Expert |
| Bulgaria ³³ | List PR | Independent | Central Election Commission | 18 | 5 | Party |
| Poland | List PR | Independent | National Electoral Commission | 9 | 9 | Expert |
| Romania ³⁴ | List PR | Independent | Permanent Electoral Authority | 3 | 8 | Expert |
| | | | Central Electoral Bureau | 21 | For election period only | Combined |

Source: Helena Catt et al., Electoral Management Design, Revised edition, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2014, updated by authors.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter IV – Understanding and assessing the electoral process

- What is the definition of an electoral system?
- What is the difference between a plurality and majority electoral system?
- What are the main types of plurality/majority electoral systems?
- What are EMBs and which purpose do they serve?
- Which are the main different models of EMBs?
- What are the guiding principles for EMBs?

30 Electoral Code of Moldova; available at: <https://cec.md/storage/ckfinder/files/cec-electoral-code-2019.pdf>.

31 Federal Law of the Russian Federation of June 12, 2002 No. 67-FZ About basic guarantees of the voting rights and the participation rights in referendum of citizens of the Russian Federation (as amended on 04-06-2021); available at: <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&prevDoc=102171479&backlink=1&&nd=102076507>.

32 Law of Ukraine on the Central Election Commission; available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-15/print1443087113377542?lang=en#Text>.

33 Bulgaria Electoral Code (2014, amended by SG. 107/18 Dec 2020); available at: <https://www.cik.bg/upload/146300/Election+code+25012021.pdf>.

34 Act of January 5, 2011, Electoral Code (legal status as of August 10, 2019); available at: https://sejmsenat2019.pkw.gov.pl/sejmsenat2019/statics/kodeks/pliki/1566220388_kodeks_wyborczy_-_2019_10_08.pdf



CHAPTER V

OBSERVER REPORTING

5.1. Observer Reporting

5.1.1. LTO reporting

Observers will deliver collected information to the CT through different types of reports. LTO reports are the key output of LTOs and provide the CT with information on LTOs' activities and findings. The report 5.1. Observer reporting s from each LTO team, covering the respective AoR, is essential for the CT to make an accurate assessment after receiving quality and relevant information.

The LTO coordinator provides LTOs with all details on reporting, including clear deadlines, templates and guidelines. While the CT meets the central authorities (the chairperson of the CEC, political leaders, others) and the leaders of civil society groups, the long-term observers meet with their regional counterparts.

The usual types of reports in ENEMO IEOMs include:

- Daily reports
- Weekly reports
- Campaign and spot reports
- Post-election day reports
- Final LTO report
- Other mission-specific reports

Daily reports

At the end of each working day, LTO teams are expected to provide a concise report on their activities throughout the day and a brief plan for the next day. Daily reports also help

LTOs to closely follow the implementation of the team's plan and performance.

Weekly reports

Weekly reports summarize the activities and findings in the AoR for the respective week. They represent the key document LTOs present to the CT and are usually the main source of the team's findings. Technical instructions for preparing the weekly report are defined and provided to LTOs by the LTO coordinator, and include information on the format (font, size, spacing) and deadlines.

Campaign and spot reports

Campaign and spot reports are used for events that require special attention, such as campaign or rally events, or any kinds of incident. They are submitted to the LTO coordinator for each event separately on the day of the event.

Whenever a campaign event is observed, LTOs should send a brief and concise description of its size, tone, main messages and attendance. Campaign reports are useful to the CT as they help the respective analysts to understand the tone, activity and visibility of the campaign. Spot reports serve the purpose of bringing a certain issue to the attention of the core team or an additional and more detailed explanation of an occurrence, chain of events or single event in addition to the weekly report. If deemed necessary, the CT may ask the LTO team to submit a spot report if they believe there is a need for additional explanation.

Post-election day reports

Post-election day reports are sent immediately after the election day and reflect all major findings observed by the LTO team and their STOs in their AoR the previous day. The report is brief but summarizes the election day findings in order to ensure that the preliminary mission statement accurately reflects the observation of all observed regions.

Final LTO report

One general report is prepared by every LTO team at the end of their work and delivered to the LTO coordinator before the final debriefing. The final LTO report sums up the whole observation period, including their main findings and conclusions, as well as recommendations the team identified through their observation.

Other reports

Some missions might require different types of reports due to specific circumstances and depending on the mission's needs. For example, weekly plan reports are used in some remote missions to present the LTO team's plan for the upcoming week and to help the LTO coordinator identify possible challenges in the upcoming period. Additionally, the CT may require one or more interim reports before each mid-briefing for missions that last for a longer period of time.

5.1.2. STO reporting

The key output of STOs is election day reporting forms, which are filled in for each type of observation and for each polling station. Observers perform in accordance with ENEMO monitoring methodology and principles, so it is important for STOs to have an approach that will result in a full and substantive analysis of the election process, which ensures a comprehensive and credible assessment of the elections by the ENEMO IEOM.

Types of forms

STOs must be fully familiarized with the election day reporting forms to perform the observation in a quality manner. Several reporting forms are usually used in ENEMO IEOMs, depending on the type of election day process that is monitored:

- Opening of the polling station (Opening form)
- Observation of voting (Voting form)
- Observation of closing and counting (Counting form)
- Observation of collation (Collation form)
- Incident forms

Each STO team should complete one report form for each observation during the election day. It is important to note that the forms should reflect the findings of both team members.

Preparation of STO forms

STO forms are prepared by all CT members in accordance with the national legislation and election day procedures for the country where elections are being held and observed, as well as international standards for elections. STO forms are updated specifically for each election due to changes in legislation, election day procedures, the type of election and other conditions that might influence the content of the forms.

A data analyst is responsible for preparing and updating STO forms, in close cooperation with other CT members. STO forms must be prepared in a user-friendly format that is clear and consistent, and the forms must be available to observers electronically and in printed format to ensure that no information is lost.

Transmission of STO reporting forms on election day

STOs must be briefed on the electronic submission of reporting forms during the STO briefing by the mission's data analyst. Generally, the reports should be submitted electronically no later than one hour after visiting the polling station. Exceptions may be acceptable but only if there is no Internet coverage in some rural areas.

Each STO must have a smartphone or tablet provided by ENEMO at their disposal. The devices will be equipped with a local SIM card and enough credit for local phone calls and Internet use. STOs may fill in the online application forms directly on their ENEMO phone

or by using their ENEMO phone as a mobile hotspot. All STOs must familiarize themselves with the reporting app and forms during the STO briefing and test the app after arriving at the AoO.

5.2. Guidelines for report writing

The information LTOs collect, analyse and distribute to the CT represents one of the key elements of the IEOM. It is crucial to prepare and deliver comprehensive, detailed and high quality reports to the CT. This is why special attention is given to report writing in each mission at LTO briefings, and reporting details are communicated frequently to LTOs by the LTO coordinator.

Which information to collect

Based on the information obtained at meetings and through general observation, LTOs will analyse the electoral process in their respective area of responsibility and report back with their observations and analysis on issues including, but not limited to:

- **Regional political context:** the role of the key political and electoral participants in the process and political developments
- **Election management bodies (EMBs):** the performance of the election administration in
 - preparing and implementing the election process
- **Voter registration:** the level of public confidence in the quality and accuracy of the electoral roll and tracking any related complaints
- **Campaigning:** the range of campaign activities taking place and whether there are any restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly or movement, and the effectiveness of any campaign regulation mechanisms that are in place
- **Media:** the role of local media and its coverage of the election campaign
- **Gender issues:** the participation of women as voters, candidates, electoral officials and domestic observers
- **Persons with disabilities:** all aspects of participation of people with disabilities in the electoral process (as candidates, voters or electoral officials)
- **Non-majority representatives:** their ability to access all stages of the electoral process
- **Civil society:** the range of local civil society activities related to the elections, especially domestic observers
- **Complaints:** the credibility of election-related complaints and the effectiveness of processes for redressing them
- **Election day:** following the developments and the general environment in the AoR during election day, either remotely or directly
- **Results and post-election issues:** the aggregation, tabulation and publication of election results and the environment after the election; handling official complaints

Observers should also refer to Chapters 10, 11 and 12 on the key aspects to observe when it comes to the pre-election period, election day and the post-election period, respectively.

Searching for information online

Along with meeting different groups of interlocutors, one of the main tasks of LTOs is following local media and searching for information online. It is extremely important for LTOs to visit relevant local news portals regularly and familiarize themselves with the content they publish. LTO assistants should help with differentiating independent and relevant Internet sources from sources that are potentially affiliated with a certain political option. This way it is possible to identify potential cases of black PR, defamatory language, fake news, and other violations and irregularities. Even though most LTOs do not speak the local language, there are several ways to automatically translate a web page or text, such as through Google Translate and different add-ons. Additionally, assistants may help with the translation, especially when it comes to sensitive information that needs to be confirmed.

As social media plays an important role in terms of elections, it is important to include certain social media accounts as a source of information. Most candidates and political entities run designated social media accounts that may be a useful source of information. LTOs and their assistants should visit them regularly and cross-check and verify information presented on these platforms.

5.3. Principles for reporting

ENEMO has established a set of principles and comprehensive guidelines for reporting within the mission. These principles contribute to the overall quality of all LTO reports, especially weekly reports, and ensure a standardized approach to reporting.

The main principles for preparing the reports are:

- All reports should be delivered in a timely manner and in the prescribed format.
- LTO teams should organize their work to ensure they meet all reporting deadlines.
- Reports must summarize the team's activities and findings in their respective AoR for the given time frame. The main points should be presented in an analytical way, trends should be mentioned to indicate how widespread the problem is, and suitable examples should be provided.
- Reports should be concise, clear, precise and easy to understand when referring to factual information, accurate on facts and provide the team's analysis of the situation in their AoR.
- A detailed track of all contact details of relevant interlocutors should be kept and presented on a weekly basis.
- Reporting should be specific and tend to answer the following questions in the reports: what, where, who, why, when and how often. If possible, quantitative information should be included, and each chapter should include the team's assessment.
- Reports should not contain minutes from meetings or extensive explanations about well-

established procedures. Factual information should be clearly separated from the analysis.

- Issues that remain unresolved should be noted in the report, as well as what further investigations or actions the team is planning to take.
- Not all questions must be answered in each report. If the team does not have anything to report on a subject, they might indicate “NTR” (“nothing to report”). However, “nothing to report” should not mean “no problems to report”.
- LTOs should always bear in mind that the reports they prepare are sensitive documents that should not be shown to non-mission members, including their assistant.
- Reports should reflect the views of both members of the LTO team (and both LTO members should have read the report before it is submitted). If both LTOs do not agree on a particular issue or do not share their view on a specific matter, it should be stated in the report.

Principles for analysing the information and presenting it in the reports:

Reports must be analytical: This means that information must be presented in a narrative form that is an assessment of the electoral process. Data should not just be gathered, but it should be explained how different data and information interact together and what the team’s assessment is in such case.

Reports should include LTOs’ opinion: For example, if allegations of fraud are mentioned, additional information should be included, such as who makes the allegations, on what basis, and what the team’s opinion and conclusions are.

Allegations and direct observation must be differentiated: It must always be specified what the LTO team witnessed and what was reported to them by other interlocutors. The information should be verified whenever possible, and observers should always make a judgment/opinion on the information received from other sources and be clear about it in the report.

Trends should be identified rather than isolated instances: Isolated incidents are sometimes important, but observers should try to notice trends (e.g., confirming whether a trend occurred during previous elections in a given area).

Reporting should be balanced: Reports should include both positive and negative findings. Observers should not fish for negative aspects. It is also important not to downplay what appear to be small or insignificant irregularities since they might point to bigger trends or unexpected problems.

Types of violations should be well defined: LTOs should always differentiate between instances of fraud or malfeasance and irregularities and mistakes. It should be clearly stated what the team’s assessment is and why.

The confidentiality of sources must be respected: If any information has been given to the team confidentially, they need to clearly indicate it in the reports and highlight whether it was possible to verify the information from other sources.

Typical mistakes observers make when preparing the reports:

- The structure, format and deadline for the report were not respected.
- Information is not synthesized and analysed, but the notes are simply transferred into the report.
- The essential facts and most important findings are not highlighted in the report. It is not

clear how the information was collected and whether the source is reliable.

- LTOs did not offer their assessment on findings and other information presented in the report.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter V – Observer reporting

- What is an LTO and which are their key tasks?
- What are the different types of LTO reports?
- Why are LTO reports important?
- What are the fundamental aspects on which LTOs should report?
- What are the main principles for preparing LTO reports?
- What is an STO and which are their key tasks?
- What are the different types of STO reporting forms?
- How are STO forms transmitted on Election Day?



CHAPTER VI

ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION REPORTING

The 2005 Declaration of Principles on International Election Observation defines election observation as:

- *The systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to organizing genuine democratic elections*
- *The impartial and professional analysis of such information*
- *The drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis and the reporting of those findings*

This highlights the critical importance of reporting by an election observation mission as the final output following the work of the mission in gathering information, providing analysis and reaching its conclusions.

The IEOM core team is responsible for writing the mission's reports and statements. All reports produced by the mission should meet the highest possible standards in terms of quality and thoroughness. Particular attention should be paid to verifying information and ensuring that assessments are accurate and objective. Additionally, the assessment should be evidenced by concrete examples and refer to the mission's findings and observations, using sources such as core team meetings with stakeholders, LTO reports and STO reports on election day.

All mission reports should clearly distinguish what has been directly **observed by** ENEMO observers from what has been reported to them by various **interlocutors**. ENEMO's mission may report on information mentioned by interlocutors, however this should be clearly differentiated from facts directly observed. While the mission may refer to information from interlocutors received from credible sources, information that is not properly evidenced or comes from unverifiable sources should be clearly indicated as such.

Generally, mission reports should be clear, concise and to the point. They should also be written in clear language, using the proper election-related terminology. Their structure should be consistent with ENEMO reporting templates and written following the guidance provided by ENEMO.

All IEOM reports, including interim reports, preliminary statements and final reports, should be adequately branded with donor visibility requirements, such as logos, disclaimers, etc.

In the case of exceptions to standard donor branding requirements, the ENEMO head office should inform the mission, while the IEOM leadership should address their questions to the ENEMO head office if clarifications are required.

Additional information on how to use international standards in the framework of report writing is provided in Section 2 of this handbook, while all report templates can be found in the Compendium which includes all mission templates.

6.1. Interim reports

The interim report should provide information and an assessment of **relevant electoral developments, and analyse the legal provisions** in force for the respective aspects of the electoral process. Interim reports are usually published one to two weeks before election day and should be seen as external documents to be shared with stakeholders and the public. Depending on the mission's length and duration of deployment, as well as the number of election rounds, the mission may have more than one interim report.

6.1.1. Purpose and principles of interim reports

Interim reports provide an in-depth overview of aspects of the electoral process assessed by the ENEMO IEOM during the reporting period. These include political developments, preparations for the elections, voter registration, candidate registration, the campaign, the media, election-related complaints, human rights issues, participation of women and minorities, etc.

Interim reports also provide **key information** on the elections and information on mission activities including core team composition and updates on the deployment of LTOs and STOs to the field.

The information and analysis contained in interim reports should provide a basis for the findings and conclusions outlined by the mission in its statement of preliminary findings and conclusions, which will later be published after election day, as well as for the final report. It should be noted that interim reports should contain only a preliminary analysis based on information available at the time of writing, and the tone and nature of the language used should reflect this preliminary nature of the interim report.

Therefore, the purpose of interim reports published by the mission is **to provide information** to the reader on all aspects of the electoral process deemed of importance. The main targets of these reports are citizens of the observed country, domestic election stakeholders, media, government and state institutions, international stakeholders, international community and diplomatic corps in the observed country, but also ENEMO's donors funding the mission and the donor community in general.

6.1.2. Preparation and writing of interim reports

While the precise content of interim reports will vary, they should in general be concise and written in clear language. The **structure followed should be the one indicated in the appropriate sections**, using the **template** provided by ENEMO, which can be found in the Compendium which includes all mission templates.

Analysts from the core team should be instructed to use the template provided, with each section being filled in by the respective CT member. The sections for interim reports are the following:

- **Executive summary**
- **Background**
- **Legal framework and electoral system**
- **Registration of voters**
- **Candidate registration**
- **Electoral campaign and campaign finance**
- **Media**
- **Gender representation**
- **National minorities**
- **Inclusion of people with disabilities**
- **Complaints and appeals**
- **Observers**

Which CT member should work on which section in particular depends both on the scale of the IEOM and the CT positions comprising the mission. In accordance with the decision of the HoM and DHoM, which expert/CT member is responsible for which section of the report should be clearly defined in **advance**.

In the Compendium, CT members will find the template for interim reports, containing **specific questions** with a view to better understanding expectations in terms of content. They should refer to these questions as a **"checklist"** to verify that no essential aspects have been omitted. This should also help them better frame the issues of importance during the electoral process and their observation, and better target which data they will need for their written analysis. The mission should additionally use the format of this template for publication, bearing in mind it is obligatory to fill in, complete or modify the sections **highlighted in yellow** before publication (mission-specific data such as dates, names, donors, donor logos, disclaimer, key message of the report, etc.), as reflected in

the Compendium template.

It should be noted that the questions and points mentioned in the template are **indicative**, and that additional aspects may need to be mentioned, particularly information or issues specific to the country or to the election observed.

In general, interim reports should deliver a proper **balance** between analysing the electoral **framework** and the **findings** of the mission. Findings without the framework cannot adequately measure compliance with the domestic legislation and international standards, while the framework without findings will result in an abstract and theoretical report without any empirical evidence.

If several interim reports are planned during the mission, the CT should be mindful of properly measuring and calibrating the **amount of information** delivered in each report. This should be done in order to avoid potential repetitions, running out of content for subsequent reports or ending up with a considerable imbalance in the number of pages.

Interim reports should contain a **legal framework analysis** and the **findings of the mission**, although some findings may be cut from one report in order to include them in the next. However, attention should be given to properly prioritizing this information, ensuring at least that information on the framework (laws, by-laws, rules, procedures, rights, conditions, etc.) is analysed in the first interim report, with subsequent reports focusing more on the findings of the mission if necessary.

Reports should be written in **Times New Roman font**, size **12**, interline **1.15**, unless specific reasons justify a change in the size or font.

Any questions or potential concerns regarding writing or publication of the report, whether in general or on specific points, should be explicitly mentioned to the HoM and DHoM.

6.2. Statements of preliminary findings and conclusions

The statement of preliminary findings and conclusions (i.e., preliminary statement) is the first post-election assessment delivered by an ENEMO mission. It is **generally presented at a press conference** within 48 hours after election day.

One of the important characteristics of the preliminary statement is that it is often the highest-profile output of the mission, since it can be expected to attract high levels of interest from electoral stakeholders, political actors and the international community, as well as from media and the general public.

Like interim reports, preliminary statements are an external document and should be written to be read by election stakeholders in the observed country.

The quality of the preliminary statement should be one of the primary goals for all CT members and observers during their engagement in the mission. It could be said that, to a large extent, the quality of a mission is judged by the quality of its preliminary statement.

It is also important to remember – and this should always be emphasized by the CT during any press conference presenting a preliminary statement – **that the statement is preliminary in nature**, and that the mission will continue to observe post-election developments and will issue its overall assessment and recommendations in the final report.

6.2.1. Purpose and principles of the preliminary statement

The purpose of the preliminary statement is to provide information to the reader on all aspects of the electoral framework and pre-electoral process deemed of significance, with a particular additional focus on the conduct of the **election day**. It is released following the election day, in order to present the mission's assessment of the electoral process up to and including the day of voting.

The preliminary statement can represent an important indicator for electoral stakeholders regarding the credibility of the election process. It is important for the mission to emphasize that it will continue to observe the completion of the counting and tabulation of votes (if ongoing), the official announcement and publication of results, the adjudication of election complaints and appeals, and the general post-electoral environment.

It is essential that the preliminary statement contains an **objective, impartial and fair assessment of the whole pre-election period** (based on data gathered from observers/experts deployed), while also analysing and reporting on potential **shortcomings observed** during the **main phases of the process at polling stations** throughout the election day: opening, voting, closing and counting, and transferring of materials to higher-level commissions.

Additionally, the week building up to the day of the election is usually not covered in the interim report(s) and is highly likely to contain essential developments that need to be reported. All key points analysed in the interim report(s) published by the mission before election day should be included to provide context for the preliminary statement. The preliminary statement should be seen as a stand-alone report, and therefore should not omit the important aspects already mentioned in the interim report.

The preliminary statement – as with all mission reports – should clearly distinguish what has been **directly observed** by ENEMO observers from what has been reported to them by various **interlocutors**. ENEMO's mission may report on information mentioned by interlocutors, however this should be clearly differentiated from facts directly observed. This also applies to **election day findings**, where a distinction should be made between facts witnessed by ENEMO observers directly at or around polling stations, and allegations reported by other individuals or groups (other domestic or international observers, voters,

candidates, election commission members, etc.). Other precautions include the fact that, as the name suggests, the statement is preliminary in nature, which implies that conclusions are not final and may depend on the post-election situation or other information coming to light only after publication.

Authors should be aware that the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions is often **more politically sensitive** than the interim report, and more subject to being used (or misinterpreted, intentionally or unintentionally) by political actors, and therefore should be **worded very carefully**. The goal is to provide a balanced and accurate assessment, voicing criticism and concerns where they are due, while bearing in mind the general political situation in the country.

The **structure followed should be the one indicated in the appropriate sections**, using the **template** provided by ENEMO in the Compendium.

6.2.2. Preparation and writing of the preliminary statement

Analysts from the core team should refer to the template provided, with each section being filled in by the respective CT member. The sections for the preliminary statement are the following:

- > **Preliminary conclusions**
- > **Background**
- > **Legal framework and electoral system**
- > **Registration of voters**
- > **Candidate registration**
- > **Electoral campaign and campaign finance**
- > **Media**
- > **Gender representation**
- > **National minorities**
- > **Inclusion of people with disabilities**
- > **Complaints and appeals**
- > **Election day**
- > **Observers**

As with interim reports, which CT member should work on which section in particular depends both on the scale of the IEOM and the CT positions comprising the mission. In accordance with the decision of the HoM and DHoM, which expert/CT member is responsible for which section of the report should be clearly defined **in advance**.

In the Compendium which includes all mission templates, CT members will find the template for preliminary statements, containing **specific questions** with a view to better understanding expectations in terms of content. They should refer to these questions as a “**checklist**” to verify that no essential aspects have been omitted. This should also help them better frame the issues of importance during the electoral process, election day and

their observation, and better target which data they will need to write their analysis.

As for interim reports, the mission should additionally use the format of this template for publication, bearing in mind it is obligatory to fill in, complete or modify the sections **highlighted in yellow** before publication (mission-specific data such as dates, names, donors, donor logos, disclaimer, key message of the report, etc.).

It should be noted that the questions and points mentioned in the template are **indicative**, and that additional aspects may need to be mentioned, particularly information or issues specific to the country or to the election being observed.

In general, the preliminary statement should place more emphasis on **findings** from the **pre-election period** and the **election day**. However, whenever necessary, for instance if specific aspects of the legal framework were problematic in the election and are connected to key findings, focus can and should be put once more on targeted elements of the framework.

The statement of preliminary findings and conclusions should also be written in **Times New Roman** font, size **12**, interline **1.15**, unless specific reasons justify a change in the size or font.

Any questions or potential concerns regarding writing or publication of the statement, whether in general or on specific points, should be mentioned to the HoM and DHoM.

Important: *Readers may note that there are minor distinctions between the section titles between the interim report template and the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions template. For instance, the first section in the document refers to “preliminary conclusions” rather than “executive summary”, and the election day section appears between complaints and appeals and the observer sections. These may look like subtle differences, but the template should be respected, as it has consequences for the content, which is why two different unique templates are provided in the Annex (one for interim reports, one for preliminary statements).*

6.3. Final reports

The final report of the mission contains the ENEMO IEOM’s full assessment of the observed electoral process and is usually published two to three months after the announcement of final official election results. The final report is essential for providing a comprehensive, independent and objective assessment of the electoral process, along with recommendations for future improvements. As with interim reports and preliminary statements, the final report is a public document. This means that it should be produced with the aim of reaching all election stakeholders of the observed country, as well as international stakeholders.

6.3.1. Purpose and principles of the final report

The final report is an opportunity for the mission to go into more detail on the findings and conclusions pertaining to the observed elections. It is also a document dedicated to delivering ENEMO's final assessment of the degree to which the election was conducted in accordance with the domestic electoral legislation and international standards.

As mentioned above, one of the key characteristics of the final report is the series of recommendations offered to improve the legal framework and conduct of future elections, along with strengthening democratic institutions and enhancing the effectiveness, integrity and transparency of the electoral process.

Whenever it is not the first time ENEMO deploys an IEOM to an observed country, reviewing past assessments and recommendations from previous ENEMO final reports for that country should be considered a standard requirement. This provides the opportunity for the mission to reiterate past recommendations that have not yet been addressed, and to emphasize aspects that remain problematic.

6.3.2. Preparation of the final report

As with previous reports, analysts from the core team should refer to the template provided, with each section being filled in by the respective CT member. The sections for the final report are the following:

- > **Introduction and acknowledgements**
- > **Executive summary**
- > **Background**
- > **Legal framework and electoral system**
- > **Registration of voters**
- > **Candidate registration**
- > **Electoral campaign and campaign finance**
- > **Media**
- > **Gender representation**
- > **National minorities**
- > **Inclusion of people with disabilities**
- > **Complaints and appeals**
- > **Election day**
- > **Observers**
- > **Recommendations**
- > **Annexes**

As with interim reports and preliminary statements, which CT member should work on which section in particular depends both on the scale of the IEOM and the CT positions comprising the mission. In accordance with the decision of the HoM and DHoM, which expert/CT member is responsible for which section of the report should be clearly defined

in advance.

CT members should pay attention to at least two important differences compared to the interim report/preliminary statement:

Recommendations

As illustrated in the corresponding template, all recommendations should be compiled at the end of the final report, with the recommendations deemed by the mission as “priority recommendations” first, followed by recommendations addressed to specific types of electoral stakeholders (as illustrated in the template, this includes recommendations to the parliament, to the government and ministries, to the election management body, to political parties and electoral contestants, to oversight bodies, etc.).

Report annexes

As a standard practice, ENEMO final reports include the final results of the observed elections, as reflected by the official results announced by the country’s responsible body. Additionally, annexes should also contain the questions from STO election day observation forms, as well as percentages for corresponding answers. They should also detail the mission’s composition (CT, LTOs, STOs), with their names, positions and areas of deployment, and mention which ENEMO member organizations nominated them.

In the Compendium, CT members will find the template for final reports, containing **specific questions** aimed at enabling a better understanding of expectations in terms of content. As for all other reports and statements, the mission should additionally use the format of this template for publication, bearing in mind it is obligatory to fill in, complete or modify the sections **highlighted in yellow** before publication (mission-specific data such as dates, names, donors, donor logos, disclaimer, key message of the report, etc.).

It should be noted that the questions and points mentioned in the template are **indicative**, and the content of the report should mostly follow what was written in the interim report(s) and preliminary statement(s). However, the final report can be an opportunity to slightly adjust, revise or recalibrate the assessment formulated in previous reports/statements. The final report should also be more extensive and offer more leeway to analysts for writing extensive sections and going into more detail when relevant.

The final report should also be written in **Times New Roman** font, size **12**, interline **1.15**, unless specific reasons justify a change in the size or font.

6.3.3. Recommendations

Recommendations for future improvements to the electoral process are an essential part of ENEMO IEOM final reports. They can be used in the assessment of future elections and the general democratization process of the observed country. The combination of

ENEMO's recommendations with those from other international observation groups, and especially domestic non-partisan observers, has a multiplier effect that should not be underestimated.

It is important to remember that ENEMO often observes in the context of transitional countries and “developing democracies”. Strong democratic institutions are essential for improving a country's stability, and a genuine democratic system requires regular, inclusive, credible and transparent elections. The goal of ENEMO recommendations is to contribute to assisting observed countries in achieving this goal and better fulfilling their international obligations and democratic commitments.

Therefore, the recommendations should be formulated to help bring the electoral legislation and the implementation of the electoral process more in line with international standards and best democratic practices.

Recommendations should be constructive and, whenever possible, based on concrete examples of problems identified in the assessment sections of the final report. Recommendations should be linked to a concrete assessment, and they should work in tandem with the analysis; a recommendation should not be offered without corroborating analysis of the issue in the report itself.

In that sense, recommendations highlight where further efforts are needed to address specific problems during the election process, which can include, for example, shortcomings that led, or could have led, to abuse or confusion, a lack of transparency, a lack of resources or a lack of public confidence in a specific aspect, etc.

Recommendations can also be formulated where the mission has determined that action should be taken to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and institutional capacity of electoral stakeholders. This can include, for instance, the work of election management bodies, electoral contestants, civil society, media, rights of minorities, etc.

Each recommendation should be realistically achievable, assuming there is the political will to improve the electoral process ahead of future elections. Recommendations should use clear language and identify the relevant standards they are addressing. The CT should determine which recommendations in the final report are priorities for implementation and should categorize them as such.

On average, the number of recommendations included in ENEMO usually ranges from 20 to 40 (although there is no specifically predetermined upper or lower limit).

In general, recommendations should be:

- **Consistent** – recommendations should be in line with previous ENEMO reports and avoid contradicting previous recommendations formulated, unless the situation has substantially changed since previous elections.

- **Achievable** – recommendations should be realistic, relate to an assessment and offer concrete policy propositions.
- **Clear** – recommendations should be straightforward, rather than too abstract or theoretical.
- **Brief** – recommendations should avoid being too extensive, which could have the effect of losing the reader along the way, and each recommendation should deal with one issue and not contain too many elements.
- **Use international standards (whenever possible)** – recommendations should refer to international standards enshrined in documents (as illustrated in Chapter 2).

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter VI – Election Observation Mission reporting

- Which are the three types of reports which a mission produces?
- What are the purpose and principles of each type of report?
- Which are the sections (areas of assessment) in the reports?
- How are the mission's reports prepared?
- What is the timeframe for publication of each type of the mission's reports?
- What are the key principles for developing recommendations?



CHAPTER VII

CONDUCTING MEETINGS AND INTERVIEWS

7.1. Meetings and interviews

Meetings with interlocutors are a unique opportunity to obtain quality and useful information, and to discuss election-related issues with stakeholders who are directly involved in the electoral process. It is important that all ENEMO observers are courteous, considerate and sensitive to local habits and political sensitivities at all times.

Observers should try to maintain good relations with all the interlocutors. No personal opinions on election-related issues are to be expressed at any time. Any comment an observer gives to anyone can be taken out of context and quoted as the views of the mission. Therefore, observers should talk about the mission in general, but not about the actual election process.

Generally, ENEMO observers should avoid asking leading questions and listing questions from a checklist, but have more open, free-flowing discussion. It is important to initially build a quality and trustful relationship with interlocutors, in order to ensure an open discussion even at the later stage. LTOs have to find a balance between the need to obtain clear and precise information and keeping their questions open-ended. They should check the accuracy of information by cross-checking with other interlocutors, through direct observation and by obtaining copies of relevant documents.

7.1.1. Organizing and holding meetings with local stakeholders

One of the first tasks LTOs need to perform after forming the team (that includes local staff) is to plan, organize and hold meetings with interlocutors. This includes a series of preparatory steps that will prioritize interlocutors for the upcoming period, obtain contacts and start setting up meetings. One of the main challenges in this regard is uncertainty,

meaning that there is always a risk that some interlocutors will be hesitant to meet observers, may not appear at the right time or place, or will not be as open as is expected of them. This is why a detailed and proactive approach is crucial at the beginning of the mission.

1. Obtaining contacts

The CT will do everything in their power to obtain as many contacts as possible in advance to make the work of LTOs easier. Whenever possible, LTOs will receive contact lists from their region from previous missions along with some updated contacts (for example, contacts of EMB members, political parties, local observers and media). Nevertheless, this information might change and LTOs cannot always rely on it due to replacements in EMBs, political parties, and other institutions and organizations.

LTOs should always rely on the local assistant, who should do their best to proactively gather all the important and updated contacts needed for the team's work. LTOs should provide the assistant with clear guidelines on which contacts are to be prioritized, depending on the type of interlocutors.

2. Making a list of preferred contacts

For the whole duration of the mission as well as for each upcoming week, LTOs should prepare and regularly update the list of preferred or priority contacts, which will include all the contacts the team aims to meet in the given period. Before the meetings are scheduled and held, it is useful to identify priority stakeholders, while at the same time being aware that it might not be possible to establish contact with all desired stakeholders as soon as wanted or within a given period.

For the first weeks of the LTOs' work, preferred contacts should include all regional and local EMBs, prominent party representatives, relevant local and regional media outlets, local observer groups and relevant CSOs.

3. Preparing a "request for meeting" letter

Before attempting to establish initial contact with any interlocutor, the team should prepare a detailed request for meeting letter to be distributed to all interlocutors, both in English and in the local language. The content of the letter should be adjusted for each interlocutor before sending it and prepared on the ENEMO memorandum (letterhead).

Each request letter should contain the following information:

- Introduction/purpose of the letter – explanation of the mission's mandate and purpose in regard to respective elections; introduction of the LTO team and the team's main activities

- Explanation about ENEMO – brief explanation of ENEMO’s history and previous missions in the country if possible
- Explanation about the mission – brief overview of the structure of the mission, including CT, LTOs and STOs, the format of the mission and the fact that the mission is accredited to observe elections
- Information about the LTO team – a short introduction of the LTOs and their AoR should be included
- Previous experience in the AoR (optional) – if the mission previously had great cooperation with a given interlocutor, institution or organization, it can be mentioned

Additional details that could contribute to increasing the probability of meeting the interlocutor include the following:

- Suggesting the time and place – proposing a specific time and place for the meeting may increase the chances of holding the meeting
- Flexibility – LTOs should show flexibility when setting up the meetings, leave room for interlocutors to suggest the most suitable option for them and demonstrate willingness to adjust the team’s schedule accordingly
- Appreciation – the letter should show appreciation of the interlocutors’ time they are potentially willing to invest to meet their team, especially if their schedule is tight
- Reactiveness – the letter, as well as the following communication, should demonstrate the reactivity of the team when setting up the meetings

4. Reaching out to interlocutors

After distributing the meeting request letters to interlocutors by e-mail, the LTO assistant should make a follow-up phone call to each interlocutor a few hours after sending the letter to confirm whether the letter has been received. It might be necessary to resend the e-mail to some interlocutors, while others might propose a meeting over the phone.

If the team is not able to successfully schedule a meeting by e-mail or phone, they should reach out to interlocutors directly, in person. The LTO team should not act in a pushy way, be rude or insist on meetings at all costs. The team should remain respectful, considerate, polite and professional at all times, in order to enable a good relationship to be developed with all stakeholders.

5. Preparations for the first meetings

Before the team conducts their first meeting, LTOs need to make sure that the assistant is familiar with the election-related terminology and is able to translate properly, without leaving out any important information interlocutors provide the team with. LTOs can practise holding interviews with the assistant to demonstrate possible scenarios.

Before conducting the first meeting with an interlocutor, LTOs should do the following:

- If the interlocutor is politically affiliated to a certain party or has a political history, brief research should be conducted to get to know the interlocutor in advance.
- If the interlocutor holds a position within a local government, LTOs should be informed about their mandate.
- If the interlocutor is a media representative, LTOs should try to find out the ownership structure of that media outlet.
- LTO partners should agree on the key topics they will cover during the first meeting.
- LTO partners should agree on the division of topics during the interview.
- LTOs should make sure that all team members are prepared for the meeting and are appropriately dressed for it.

6. Conducting the first meeting with an interlocutor

Once the team sets up the first meeting with a certain interlocutor, the following guidelines will contribute to a smooth and friendly interview:

- The interview should start by showing appreciation for interlocutors' time and their willingness to meet LTOs.
- A short introduction of the LTOs and the mission should be presented.
- The interview should start with general questions (for example, which election-related activities is the interlocutor conducting at the moment). This will give the interlocutor an opportunity to explain all key points they consider important.
- Specific questions the LTO team agreed on and prepared in advance should follow.
- The team should make sure that no members interrupt the interlocutor in the middle of a sentence.
- Attention should be paid to the translation. If the interlocutor is talking for a longer period, the team should kindly ask them to pause to enable the assistant to translate properly.
- LTOs should make sure that the interlocutors understand that they are interested in what they have to say and should ask for additional clarifications if needed.
- LTOs must not make any assessment of the process during the meetings and should remember that the meetings are conducted to gather information that will later be assessed in the reports when a broader picture is made.

7.1.2. Key groups of interlocutors

Election officials

The primary sources for following and assessing the work of election management bodies are their representatives, most usually chairpersons, their deputies and secretaries. Meetings with election officials should be arranged as soon as possible, and each team is expected to hold meetings with representatives of each regional EMB once a week.

LTOs should also discuss the work of EMBs with other interlocutors to understand their cooperation and possibly detect challenges in their work (local observers, local administration officials, international observers, media representatives, candidates, political parties, etc.). When meeting election officials, LTOs should consult with the election calendar to understand which phase of election preparations they are currently in and gather relevant and timely information on both their current and upcoming work.

Possible issues to raise in meetings with the regional and local election administration include, but are not limited to:

- Relations between the various administrative levels, working and coordination procedures
- Responsibilities, deadlines, potential operational problems, resources and logistics
- Procedures for voter registration, results of voter registration (e.g., detailed figures), reasons for possible discrepancies, publicity of the electoral roll, provisions for displaced people
- Measures in place for updating the voter lists and means for citizens, candidates/ political parties and CSOs to inspect them
- Preparation for “E-day” such as selection and set-up of polling stations and centres, planning the delivery and reception of materials, the transmission of results and materials, security arrangements for both materials and election day operations
- Recruitment and training of the election officials
- Voter education programmes, such as organizations involved, content, areas covered, etc.
- Relations with political parties and candidates
- Complaints received, how the complaints were evaluated, actions undertaken

Local administration and public officials

Before meeting local administration officials, it is important for LTOs to get familiar with the background of the interlocutor. For example, when meeting a mayor, LTOs should know which party they come from, what kind of activities they conducted, whether they are known to cooperate well with other local bodies, whether there are any significant past events related to the interlocutor, etc.

During the meeting, it is important to inquire about their cooperation with local EMBs, as well as candidates and parties, in terms of campaigning. It should be borne in mind that these kinds of officials are often politically affiliated to some party, making it important to cross-check the obtained information and confirm it. It is useful to meet local administration officials at the beginning of the observation period, and again closer to election day.

Possible issues to raise in meetings with public officials include, but are not limited to:

- Their role and responsibilities in the electoral process
- Their impressions of the election campaign
- Problems or concerns they may have about the electoral process or election day

- Differences between these and previous elections

It may be necessary at meetings with public officials to raise allegations received, or irregularities observed by the ENEMO EOM, concerning areas over which they have responsibility. This may include the misuse of public resources, interference in campaign activities or particular human rights election-related concerns. The ENEMO EOM should inquire about how the issue will be addressed by the public official and ask to be kept updated by the public official on its progress.

But it should be made clear in the conversation that this inquiry is based on an allegation raised with the mission and is not the mission's position per se.

Local offices of main political parties and candidates

In some countries, political parties and candidates often have fully functioning regional and local offices. Their representatives can be a useful source when it comes to updates on their activities, their plans and expectations for the elections, problems and challenges they meet, and cooperation with local administration, EMBs and local media.

LTOs should meet representatives and/or candidates of main political parties in their region and maintain contact with them throughout the election process, including after election day. To plan and prepare for the meetings with parties and candidates, LTOs should prepare a comprehensive list of key political parties and prominent candidates in their AoR that includes the updated contact list, in cooperation with the team's assistant.

Possible issues to raise in meetings with representatives of election contestants include, but are not limited to:

- Levels of support in the electoral constituency, including specific areas or groups, and which candidates they consider to be the main contenders
- Campaign environment, such as campaign regulations, freedom of speech, relations with the authorities, security of the campaign; campaign methods and strategies; misuse of administrative positions and resources; election-related violence
- Preparations for the election day such as contestants' observers (proxies) in the polling stations and how they intend to follow or observe the tabulation of the results
- Overall view about the current election including its atmosphere, local context, comparisons with previous elections, election law and electoral system
- Relations with the local election administration staff; evaluation of the regional election administration performance
- Implementation of the voter registration process; specific concerns about the election day
- What kind of audience a candidate/political party in the region attracts
- Access to media and relations with journalists
- Issues with campaign finance regulations
- Whether any candidates, supporters or activists have been arrested or detained

- The relevance of issues pertaining to the participation of women and people with disabilities

Local media

In cooperation with the assistant, LTOs should identify local media outlets (TV, radio, newspapers and online media) as well as independent journalists and try to meet as many as they can. It is particularly useful to try to check whether some of the media outlets are directly or indirectly affiliated to any parties and/or candidates.

Media representatives can be a good source of information on local developments and campaigns, but also in regard to campaign activities in the media (for example, political advertisements, reporting on campaign events, debates, etc.) and potential pressure on journalists, censorship and other challenges journalists might meet. After the team establishes quality cooperation with relevant media representatives, it is advised to meet them periodically to stay updated on media-related issues.

Possible issues to raise in meetings with media representatives include, but are not limited to:

- Freedom of press (opinions about the legal framework, the role of the authorities and owners, the attitude of parties, etc.)
- Structure of the outlet (funding, means, material, organization, etc.)
- Geographical coverage and estimated audience/readership
- Approach toward coverage of the election campaign (news, advertisements and related rates, other election-related programmes)
- Relations with specific political parties
- Opinions about the election process (main issues, comparison with previous elections, etc.)

In meetings with the media, observers should be particularly cautious: it is important to be careful about what you say and how you raise questions to avoid unwanted media reporting that could affect the reputation of observers or jeopardize the image of the mission.

Local civil society organizations (CSOs) and domestic observers

This group of interlocutors can often provide observers with reliable and useful information on different aspects of the electoral process. LTOs should identify the most prominent CSOs that observe elections in the country, and especially those that will deploy observers in their AoR. When the mission is deployed in one of the ENEMO member countries, local observers are usually among the most useful sources of information.

LTOs should make sure they establish friendly and cooperative relations with CSO representatives, as well as representatives of other domestic observer groups, and stay in

close contact with them throughout the observation period. LTOs should also remember to meet with local CSOs that deal with specific issues, such as female rights, people with disabilities and different local initiatives.

Possible issues to raise in meetings with CSOs include, but are not limited to:

- Opinions on the electoral process, including the legal framework, electoral administration role and performance, and voter registration
- Opinions on the political context, the election campaign and political dynamics in the AoR
- Opinions regarding the elections and the CSO's specific field of activity (e.g., women, corruption, etc.)
- The organization's background, objectives, membership, relations with other organizations and with international stakeholders, relations with the authorities for registration, funding, freedom to operate and its relation with different parties
- Issues pertaining to the participation of women and people with disabilities in political life

Specific issues to raise in meetings with domestic observers:

- Views on the election process so far, specific concerns, relations with the local electoral bodies (e.g., any accreditations they have applied for)
- Preparations for election day such as the recruitment of observers, training of observers, funding and deployment plans
- Relations with other CSOs, political parties and candidates
- Specific issues to raise in meetings on civic/voter education programmes
- Nature of the activities and approach (duration, targeted groups, methodology, content)
- Relations with local electoral bodies, political parties, donors and other organizations

Political analysts and experts

Meeting political analysts and experts – for instance, at local universities or related NGOs – might be useful at the beginning of the mission, as such meetings could provide observers with a general overview of the political landscape in the region and political power games at a regional and national level. In communicating with political analysts, these are some issues that can be discussed:

- Analysis of the legislative framework regulating the political landscape
- How autonomous media are from the political system and how diverse the media landscape is
- How the role of the public broadcaster in the electoral process is perceived
- The role of social networks in political discussions and elections
- What the political engagement of candidates/political party representatives was like in the past
- The ideological and main policy stances of different candidates/political party

representatives

International organizations and election observation missions

If some international organizations hold regional or local offices in their respective AoR, they might be able to provide LTOs with some region-specific findings. Also, LTOs can meet other international observers – for instance, from OSCE/ODIHR – within their AoR and mutually exchange information and impressions on a regular basis, if deemed adequate. If observers have any doubts about meeting other international observers, they should contact the LTO coordinator and ask for detailed instructions.

Other interlocutors

If LTOs identify any other interlocutors that might be able to provide the team with reliable and useful information, they should not hesitate to meet them. For example, university professors are often open to cooperation and happy to share relevant and recent information. It is useful to meet with the police authorities upon arrival and exchange security and contact details. Additionally, groups of voters, students, public employees and any other participants of the electoral process might be considered worth meeting.

7.2. Presenting ENEMO's mission, goals and work to stakeholders

At meetings with all interlocutors, ENEMO observers should introduce the ENEMO IEOM to a certain extent. The information that should be used to present the mission to different stakeholders should include the following:

- Introduction of present ENEMO IEOM members, including local staff.
- Brief description of the background and the methodological basis of the ENEMO IEOM.
- The ENEMO IEOM has been invited to observe by the host authorities and ENEMO observers are impartial, will not interfere in the electoral process and will assess the extent of the elections' compliance with international commitments for elections as well as domestic legislation.
- The mission will release interim reports, a preliminary statement shortly after election day(s) and a detailed final report, which includes recommendations, after the completion of the election process.
- LTOs can also explain the structure of the mission (CT, LTOs and STOs), as well as the fact that LTOs report their findings to the CT in the capital, who will gather information from all the teams across the country.

The CT will also provide LTOs with a one-page information leaflet about ENEMO that will also be available in the local language. LTOs are encouraged to share the one-pager with all interested interlocutors, as well as any press release that was issued by the mission on the occasion of a press conference. In particular, the first press release announcing the mission can be useful for explaining the mandate and structure of the IEOM.

7.3. Interview techniques

Strong interest in the presence of the ENEMO IEOM may lead journalists to approach observers in the field, asking to make a statement or give an interview regarding the mission and its findings. We believe in the value of transparency and the importance of outreach work in the ENEMO IEOM. However, it is rather important that the election mission speaks with a single voice and transmits to the public a consistent message about the election observation process and its findings. In order to ensure these principles and standards, all observers must follow certain guidelines when it comes to dealing with the media.

Observers may speak with the media about ENEMO and their work, but not about their opinions and findings. Bear in mind that observers' comments about electoral processes might be taken out of context and misinterpreted as the ENEMO IEOM's official view of the election process. Also, these kinds of comments will not necessarily reflect the wider trend around the country and the overall findings of the IEOM.

Observers may not:

- Share their personal comments or personal opinions with media representatives or on any of their social media accounts
- Speculate on any aspect of the electoral process, including the election day or the results
- Show bias towards national authorities, political parties, candidates or in relation to any contentious issues in the election process
- Compare the electoral processes of the host country with any other country observed

Observers may:

- Share information about ENEMO (refer to the LTO handbook), as well as who they are and where they are from
- Share press releases about the mission, particularly the press release announcing the mission if the aim is to present the IEOM to stakeholders
- Talk or write about the nature of the observation mission: that ENEMO is a signatory of the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and thus adheres to the principle of impartiality and non-interference
- Explain the scope of the mission: that a mission comprised of a core team, a certain number of teams of LTOs and a certain number of STOs will be observing elections from the very beginning until the end of the process. The press release announcing the mission can be of particular use in that regard
- Explain that the methodology requires meetings with a broad range of interlocutors (political parties, candidates, officials, electoral management bodies, etc.)
- Tell the media representative to check the ENEMO website for detailed information about ENEMO, missions and IEOM findings in the interim and preliminary reports and press releases
- Mention that a final report will be released within two months after completion of an

- electoral process
- Share a contact of the IEOM PR officer

7.4. Frequently asked questions about ENEMO

Each mission will prepare a list of frequently asked questions that observers in the field may refer to when asked a certain question. Here is an overview of some of the most common inquiries made by journalists:

Q: WHAT DOES ENEMO THINK ABOUT ELECTIONS? DO YOU THINK THE PROCESS IS (UN)FAIR?

A: The ENEMO core team based in the capital is the only body authorized to express opinions on behalf of the mission. The core team will issue official statements based on reports from long-term observers (LTOs) and short-term observers (STOs) deployed throughout the country. Since LTO/STO teams are located in one region, they cannot assess the overall electoral processes in the country.

However, observers will gladly share press statements and reports published by the mission with a detailed overview of the findings of ENEMO's observers. Also, our members will be happy to share contact details of the core team, mainly the mission's PR officer, who can facilitate any communication between local media and core team members.

Q: WHAT IS ENEMO? WHO DO YOU REPRESENT?

A: The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) is a network of 22 civic organizations from 18 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including two European Union countries that are leading domestic election monitoring organizations in their countries.

ENEMO has been a signatory of the UN Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation since 2005 and the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers since 2012. A full-scale ENEMO mission is composed of a core team (CT), long-term observers (LTO) and short-term observers (STO), thus ensuring a comprehensive observation of the whole electoral cycle across the country.

ENEMO member organizations have monitored more than 200 national elections and trained more than 200,000 observers. To date, ENEMO has monitored over 30 election processes in numerous countries. ENEMO seeks to support democracy building in the post-communist countries of the OSCE region, through assessing electoral conditions and the political environment, and offering accurate and impartial observation reports. ENEMO international observation missions evaluate the electoral process using international standards for democratic and fair elections, and benchmarks in the host country's legislation and constitution.

Q: WHO FINANCES THE ENEMO MONITORING MISSION?

A: The mission is run by ENEMO member organizations who represent long-established, non-partisan civic organizations in their home countries. The funding of each ENEMO international observation mission is fully transparent. You can find this information on ENEMO's website, or reach out directly to the mission's PR officer, who will gladly provide you with these details.

Q: WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES DOES ENEMO SUPPORT?

A: ENEMO does not endorse or support any candidate or political party. We are a non-partisan international observer mission interested in promoting free and fair elections as prescribed in the national constitution and election laws as well as in the international commitments this country is obliged to undertake. To us, it is important that the voters are able to cast their ballots in an atmosphere unbiased by harassment, intimidation or law violations. We are interested in the process itself, not the election results.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter VII – Conducting meetings and interviews

- What is the purpose of conducting meetings and interviews in the framework of IEOMs?
- Which are the steps for organizing and holding meetings with stakeholders?
- Which are the necessary preparations before conducting a meeting?
- Which are the key groups/types of interlocutors?
- How should ENEMO's mission, goals and work be presented to interlocutors?
- What are the main interview techniques for leading an interview?



ASSESSING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

PART III



CHAPTER VIII

STRUCTURE OF AN ENEMO IEOM

8.1. Types and scale of IEOMs carried out by ENEMO

Depending on the format, scope and scale, ENEMO conducts four different types of election observation mission (EOMs):

1. Needs assessment mission (NAM)
2. Election observation mission (EOM)
3. Limited election observation mission (LEOM)
4. Expert election observation mission (EEOM)

8.1.1. Needs assessment mission (NAM)

8.1.1.1. General description

A needs assessment mission (NAM) is usually deployed several months before the elections to evaluate the political, legal, institutional, technical, human rights and security environment in the country, the legal and institutional framework governing the electoral process, and the capacity and needs of the various election stakeholders, in order to recommend whether or not ENEMO should conduct an EOM, as well as the format, scope and scale of the EOM, if the conducting of an EOM is recommended.

8.1.1.2. Methodology of a NAM

A NAM may be conducted over a period of one to two weeks by the CEO and can include operations, security and other experts, as required.

In general, a NAM will meet with election administration officials and officials from government authorities, representatives from political parties, the media, civil society organizations and any other relevant international organizations.

When recommending a possible EOM, the NAM considers several criteria:

- The existence of minimum conditions for effective, credible and professional election observation
- Political pluralism in the electoral process
- Respect for fundamental freedoms
- Public confidence in the electoral process
- Transparency of the electoral process
- A pluralistic media environment
- Extent of follow-up to previous recommendations
- The added value of a possible ENEMO EOM

The recommendation of the specific format, scope and scale of an EOM shall be included in the NAM report. The NAM report should include a preliminary assessment of election preparations, including:

- The pre-election environment, including the extent to which human rights and fundamental freedoms, as they relate to the upcoming election, are respected by the state
- The legal framework for elections, including any amendments made since the last election
- The composition and structure of the election administration, the status of its preparations for the election, and the extent of public and political confidence in its impartiality, independence, efficiency and professionalism
- The level of political pluralism and whether the field of candidates and parties expected to contest the elections represents a genuine choice for voters
- The status of the media and their expected role in the elections
- The existence of effective check-and-balance mechanisms, such as pluralistic and independent media, access to effective legal remedies, a vibrant civil society and domestic observation
- Any election-related concerns expressed by election stakeholders and other issues of particular relevance, such as voter registration, the candidate/party registration process, the participation of women, the participation of minorities and domestic observation
- The degree to which interlocutors believe that ENEMO EOM can serve a useful purpose and add value
- The overall security situation

The NAM report should additionally assess logistical and other conditions in the country and shall serve to educate the design of the mission, including visa requirements for the ENEMO members, travel options, the availability of translators and costs for all the above actions. The CEO designs the EOM, based on the provided information from the NAM

report, while considering the costs versus the efficiency and the equal representation of ENEMO members. The NAM report also has to consider how the resources can be used most efficiently to maximize the EOM's outputs.

Based on the aforementioned, a NAM may recommend not conducting an EOM, or conducting one of the three types: election observation mission (EOM), limited election observation mission (LEOM) or expert election observation mission (EEOM).

The report recommends the number of analysts required for a specific mission, as well as the number of long-term observers (LTOs) and short-term observers (STOs) (depending on the type of mission), in order to ensure comprehensive election observation. When establishing the optimal number of LTOs and STOs (if any), the NAM may consider several factors. These include the type of election, the number of electoral districts involved, the size of the electorate, the country's geography, the structure of its election administration at the subnational level, the number of polling stations and the number of observer reports needed for a statistically relevant sample of polling stations.

If there aren't funds for a NAM, but there are funds for an EOM, then the CEO shall prepare a desk assessment of the situation in the respective country.

ENEMO members shall have the opportunity to provide additional information for the assessment report. This additional information shall be thoroughly and comprehensively evaluated and included in the assessment report.

8.1.2. Election observation mission (EOM)

8.1.2.1. General description

This type of mission shall consist of a full composition of the core team, a sufficient number of LTOs to cover all regions of the territory (depending on the security situation on the ground) and all the electoral units in the country (also depending on security), as well as a sufficient number of STOs to cover at least 3% of the polling stations in the country with a proportional geographical and demographical distribution. The core team shall be composed of a head of mission, deputy head of mission, elections analyst, legal analyst, political analyst, media analyst, data analyst, LTO coordinator, STO coordinator (if the number of STOs is higher than 150), press officer, logistics officer, security officer, financial officer and junior financial officer (if the budget of the EOM exceeds one million euros).

Certain positions within the CT can be merged or excluded, depending on the particular situation in each EOM and the provided funds.

Subjects for observation by the EOM (CT + LTOs + STOs) are:

- Election legislation

- Election administration (state/central election commission, DEC, PECs, etc.)
- Conduct of the national and local media
- Political environment
- Election campaign
- E-day
- Local administration
- Post-E-day period (announcing of preliminary results, complaints and appeals).

8.1.2.2. EOM methodology

Within the network, there is a standard procedure for organizing and conducting an EOM. At the very beginning of the implementation of the EOM, the CEO informs the network about it and asks the member organizations to nominate candidates for positions within the core team of the EOM. The Governing Board makes decision about the members of the CT, except for financial and logistic officers, who are appointed by the CEO. The candidates shall be interviewed by the Governing Board representative and the CEO.

The first step in an EOM is the deployment of the CT in the targeted country and the start of preparation activities for conducting the EOM.

The LTOs are nominated by the member organizations and are selected by the CT in close coordination with the CEO and Governing Board members. With the aim of having the best candidates on the ground, interviews with the candidates shall take place and shall be conducted by a Governing Board representative, CT members and the CEO.

The STOs are nominated by the member organizations too.

A member organization cannot nominate a person that is under suspension, neither that person can be selected for any position within EOM.

The CT provides briefings and debriefings to the LTOs at the beginning of the EOM, and at the end of it, regarding the elections and the political situation in the country. The LTOs are deployed in the regions of the targeted country.

STOs are obliged to attend the briefings and debriefings organized and conducted by the LTOs, where information on the elections and the political situation in a certain region are explained. The STOs are provided with an observation kit comprising observation forms, maps of the regions, badge holders and bags.

The LTOs determine the number and location of the polling stations that are to be monitored by each STO team (composed of two observers), and the reporting procedures.

As a standard procedure, the launching of the EOM shall be announced to the public at a press conference. The key findings of the observation efforts shall be announced publicly as well.

All the reports produced during the mission shall be in full compliance with the international standards for election monitoring and shall be based on facts and evidence as observed by the EOM, without taking into consideration rumours and unverified information. Specially designed observation forms shall be used for reporting the findings from the observation efforts.

At the end of the mission, LTOs and STOs evaluate each other's work, as well as the work of the CT. Once the mission is over, the members of the CT develop a final report on the elections, which is to be approved by the CEO and the Governing Board. The final report shall be published on the web page of the network and shall be distributed to all stakeholders and donors within two months after E-day.

Deliverables:

- At least one interim report
- At least one preliminary statement
- Final report containing the following elements: legal framework, assessment of pre-election developments (voters' registration, submission of list of candidates, campaign, media monitoring), E-day assessment, post-election period (complaints and appeals), recommendations, as well as all other elements from the scope of election observation
- At least three press conferences and press releases
- Public events
- Follow-up report about post-election developments
- Medium election observation missions (LEOMs)

8.1.3. Limited election observation missions (LEOM)

8.1.3.1. General description

The ENEMO network has established rules and procedures regarding the medium type of election observation mission. This type of mission is to be composed of a core team (CT) and long-term observers (LTOs). However, should there be additional funds provided, the mission may also include a certain number of short-term observers (STOs). The number of members of the core team as well as the number of LTOs (acting as STOs on E-day) shall depend on the number of polling stations, their location and the geographical characteristics of the targeted country.

Nevertheless, the more observers there are, the more in depth the observation of the election process will be. The core team is to be composed of a head of mission, deputy head of mission, election analyst, legal analyst, political analyst, media analyst, data analyst, press officer, LTO coordinator, logistics officer and financial officer.

Certain positions within the CT can be merged or excluded, depending on the particular situation in each EOM and the provided funds.

As regards the above-mentioned criteria, the LEOM will aim to cover the entire territory of the country for long-term observation, depending on resources and the security situation on the ground.

Subjects for observation by the LEOM (CT+ LTOs) are:

- Election legislation
- Election administration (state/central election commission, DECs, PECs, etc.)
- Conduct of the national and local media
- Political environment
- Election campaign
- E-day
- Local administration
- Post-E-day period (announcing of preliminary results, complaints and appeals)

8.1.3.2. Methodology for conducting an LEOM

Within the network, there is a standard procedure for organizing and conducting an EOM. At the very beginning of the implementation of the EOM, the CEO informs the network about it and asks the member organizations to nominate candidates for positions within the core team of the LEOM. The members of the Governing Board make decisions about the members of the CT, except for financial and logistic officers, who are appointed by the CEO. The candidates shall be interviewed by the Governing Board representative and the CEO.

The first step in an LEOM is the deployment of the CT in the targeted country and the start of preparation activities for conducting the LEOM.

The LTOs are nominated by the member organizations and are selected by the CT in close coordination with the CEO and Governing Board members. With the aim of having the best candidates on the ground, interviews with the candidates shall take place and shall be conducted by the Governing Board representative, CT members and the CEO.

The CT provides briefings and debriefings to the LTOs at the beginning of the EOM, and at the end of it, regarding the elections and the political situation in the country. The LTOs are deployed in the regions of the targeted country.

The LTOs determine the number and location of the polling stations that they shall monitor as an STO team for E-day, as well as the reporting procedures. The same procedure applies when STOs are deployed to a particular EOM.

As a standard procedure, the launching of the EOM shall be announced to the public at a press conference. The key findings of the observation efforts shall be announced publicly as well.

All the reports produced during the mission shall be in full compliance with the international standards for election monitoring and shall be based on facts and evidence as observed by the EOM, without taking into account rumours and unverified information. Specially designed observation forms shall be used for reporting the findings from the observation efforts.

At the end of the mission, the LTOs and the CT evaluate each other's work.

Once the mission is over, the members of the CT develop a final report on the elections, which is to be approved by the CEO and the members of the Governing Board. The final report shall be published on the web page of the network and shall be distributed to all stakeholders and donors within two months after election day.

Deliverables:

- At least one interim report
- At least one preliminary statement
- Final report containing the following elements: legal framework, assessment of pre-election developments (voters' registration, submission of list of candidates, campaign, media monitoring), post-election period (complaints and appeals), recommendations, as well as all other elements from the scope of election observation
- At least three press conferences and press releases
- Public events
- Follow-up report about post-election developments

8.1.4. Expert election observation mission (EEOM)

8.1.4.1. General description

The ENEMO network has established rules and procedures regarding the expert election observation mission. This type of mission shall be comprised only of a core team (CT). However, should there be additional funds provided, the mission may also include a certain number of STOs.

The CT shall be composed of the following positions: a head of mission, deputy head of mission, election analyst, legal analyst, political analyst and media analyst. The actual number and composition of members of the CT depends on the particular situation in each EOM and the provided funds. If an EEOM also includes a limited number of STOs, the CT will also include a data analyst.

In regard to the above-mentioned criteria, the CT members of the EEOM shall aim to cover at least two major cities besides the capital, depending on resources and the security situation on the ground.

Subjects for observation by the EEOM (CT) are:

- Election legislation
- Election administration
- E-day
- Conduct of the national and local media
- Political environment
- Election campaign

8.1.4.2. Methodology for conducting an EEOM

Within the network, there is a standard procedure for organizing and conducting an EOM. At the very beginning of the implementation of the EOM, the CEO informs the network about it and asks the member organizations to nominate candidates for positions within the core team of the EOM. The members of the Governing Board shall make decisions about the members of the CT. The candidates shall be interviewed by the Governing Board representative and the CEO.

The first step in an EEOM is the deployment of the CT in the targeted country and the start of preparation activities for conducting the EEOM.

The core team shall be deployed at least three weeks prior to E-day and shall stay in the country of observation for at least one week after E-day.

Language: English shall be the working language of small-scale EOMs.

Deliverables:

- A report covering legislative and electoral framework, political background and media landscape
- At least one press conference and/or press release
- Overview of the pre-election period compiled from credible domestic sources

8.2. Core team (CT): positions, key tasks and responsibilities

8.2.1. Head of mission

Responsible to: Executive Director

Job summary: The HoM leads the ENEMO mission in its ongoing election observation. They are responsible for the day-to-day work of the observation mission. Also, the HoM represents the EOM in relations with authorities, partners, mass media, donors and other organizations. They are ultimately responsible for all the reports prepared by the EOM staff.

Main tasks:

- Manages and oversees all EOM activities;
- Develops plans for EOM activities;
- Gives tasks and delegates responsibilities to EOM personnel;
- Evaluates the work of the EOM core team members;
- Conducts the EOM staff meetings;
- Coordinates preparation of election observation reports, participates in reports drafting and approves official observation reports and public statements.
- Reports to the Executive Director on EOM activities
- Hires/fires local staff for the EOM core team
- Approves LTO and STO deployment plans.
- Resolves conflicts between EOM personnel
- Establishes and maintains relations with authorities, partners, mass-media, donors, political parties.
- Speaks on public events and makes official statements on behalf of ENEMO EOM, and approves and helps implement the comprehensive PR and outreach plan.
- Ensures that the EOM activities correspond to its overall strategy.
- Ensures that EOMs expenses correspond with the budget of the mission
- Monitors and evaluates EOM participants
- Makes sure that the mission and its personnel follow Observers' Code of Conduct and standards of ENEMO election observation
- Provides timely programmatic and financial information needed by the ENEMO Governing Board to report to donors.

Requirements:**Basic requirements:**

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- MSc/MA, LL.M or PhD. Preference shall be given to graduates in Social Sciences, Law or Data analysis.
- Experience with organising domestic election observation missions (at least 5 missions), or coordinating teams or projects/organisations larger than 20 persons (at least 3 years).
- Experience with working at international election observation missions (ENEMO, OSCE or other) as a core team member.

Other requirements:

- Good interpersonal, organisational and communication skills, as well as conflict resolution skills and risk management skills
- Analytic abilities, good report writing skills

- Good computer skills
- Fluent knowledge of English language
- Ability to make decisions independently and work under pressure;
- Ability to work irregular working hours.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country
- Experience of work in the host country

8.2.2. Deputy head of mission

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job summary: The deputy head of the ENEMO EOM shall assist the head of mission in managing and coordinating ENEMO EOM activities.

Main duties:

- To coordinate the EOM's operation, communication, reporting and its day-to-day management as far as they have been delegated to the Head of Mission;
- To represent the Head of Mission in their functions during their absence and within the framework of the EOM's mandate;
- To represent and promote ENEMO at different levels;
- To support the Head of Mission in the planning and development of the Mission;
- To ensure timely and appropriate reporting, including regular operational reporting on the Mission's work to the Governing Board as well as project reporting (progress and financial reports);
- To represent the Mission on behalf of the Head of Mission at senior level meetings with the international community;
- To work closely with other election related institutions on delivering recommendations for specific capacity building tasks;
- To undertake any other tasks required by the Head of Mission;
- To participate in EOM staff meetings;
- To participate in conducting briefings for LTOs and STOs (if the STO briefings are not to be conducted in the field);
- To participate in developing reporting forms for LTOs (together with LTO coordinator);
- To examine LTO reports;
- To take part in preparation of election observation reports and statements.

Requirements:**Basic requirements:**

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- MSc/MA, LL.M or PhD. Preference shall be given to graduates in Social Science, Political Science, Law, Media, Communication Computer Science.
- Experience with organising domestic election observation missions (at least 3 missions), or coordinating teams or projects/organisations larger than 20 persons (at least 2 years).
- Experience with working at international election observation missions (ENEMO, OSCE or other) as a core team member.

Other requirements:

- Good interpersonal, organisational and communication skills, as well as conflict resolution skills and risk management skills
- Analytic abilities, good report writing skills
- Good computer skills
- Fluent knowledge of English language
- Ability to make decisions independently and work under pressure;
- Ability to work with irregular working hours

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country
- Experience of work in the host country

8.2.3. Election analyst

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job summary: Responsible for monitoring the work of the election administration.

Main duties:

- Assesses the performance of the country's election administration in the context of national legislation and other international standards;
- Is the EOM's principal point of contact with the election administration and attends all meetings of the national electoral authorities;
- Assesses the work of the election administration;
- Monitors various stages of the election process for conformity with legal regulations

and administrative procedures, including the final aggregation of results;

- Is responsible for the initial development of the forms to be filled out by observers, based on a standard template;
- Works closely with the legal analyst on election-related complaints and appeals.

Requirements:

Basic requirements:

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- BA or MSc/MA, LL.M. Preference shall be given to graduates in Law and Political Science.
- Experience with at least 3 domestic/international election observation missions (ENEMO, OSCE or other).
- Good knowledge of elections legislation of the countries in Europe and the members of ENEMO, as well as full understanding of the international observation standards .

Other requirements:

- Good interpersonal and communication skills
- Fluent knowledge of English language
- Ability to work having irregular working hours and to work under pressure, as well as to work as member of the team and independently if needed

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country
- Experience of work in the host country

8.2.4. Legal analyst

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job description: Responsible for assessment of the election legislation and its application.

Main duties:

- Reviews the election legislation and regulations, and other legislation pertaining to elections;
- Assesses the extent to which the legislation and its implementation comply with international standards, and whether national laws are applied fairly and impartially;
- Follows all election-related disputes, complaints, court cases and appeals.

Requirements:**Basic requirements:**

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- LLM, BA or MSc/MA in Law.
- Experience with at least 3 domestic/international election observation missions (ENEMO, OSCE or other).
- Good knowledge of election legislation of the countries in Europe and the members of ENEMO, as well as full understanding of the international observation standards.

Other requirements:

- Good interpersonal and communication skills
- Good computer skills
- Fluent knowledge of English language
- Ability to work having irregular working hours and to work under pressure, as well as to work as member of the team and independently if needed

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country
- Experience of work in the host country

8.2.5. Political analyst

Responsible to: Head of Mission

Job summary: Responsible for contact with candidates and political parties and other election stakeholders.

Main duties:

- To serve as the EOM's principal contact with candidates and political parties
- To monitor and assess the election campaign in line with international standards, as well as with national legislation
- To establish contacts with political parties and civil society organizations relevant to the political process
- May also be tasked with being the main point of contact with domestic election observers and international observer groups
- Depending on circumstances, may be tasked with specific issues of concern, such as women's participation, minority issues, and civil and political rights issues

Requirements:**Basic requirements:**

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- BA or MSc/MA, LL.M. Preference shall be given to graduates in Law and Political Science.
- Experience with at least 3 domestic/international election observation missions (ENEMO, OSCE or other).
- Good knowledge of election legislation of the countries in Europe and the members of ENEMO, as well as full understanding of the international observation standards

Other requirements:

- Good interpersonal and communication skills
- Good computer skills
- Fluent knowledge of English language
- Ability to work having irregular working hours and to work under pressure, as well as to work as member of the team and independently if needed

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country
- Experience of work in the host country

8.2.6. Media analyst

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job summary: Monitors and assesses the performance of private and public electronic and print media as well as social media during the election process in line with international standards for democratic elections and national legislation.

Main duties:

- Creates and maintains database of local mass-media;
- Observes work of local mass-media: visits editorial staff of newspapers and electronic mass media; examine newspapers and TV/radio broadcasts;
- responsible for preparing a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the activities and content of the electronic and print media during the election process;
- assesses the extent to which parties and candidates have unimpeded access to the media and are not discriminated against in gaining this access, in accordance with

international standards;

- monitors whether the media, and state or public media in particular, meet their responsibilities to provide balanced and neutral coverage of the electoral process;
- considers the media environment and the extent to which media are able to work freely;
- assesses whether the media provide sufficient, balanced and diverse information to enable voters to make a well-informed choice;
- analyzes relevant media legislation, the regulatory framework for the media during elections, the work of regulatory bodies and any media-related election complaints.

Requirements:

Basic requirements:

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- BA or MSc/MA, LL.M. Preference shall be given to graduates in Social Science, Political Science, Law, Media, Communication Computer Science.
- 4 years of relevant professional work experience with some experience in monitoring the conduct of media during election processes
- Experience with at least 3 domestic/international election observation missions (ENEMO, OSCE or other).

Other requirements:

- Good knowledge of election legislation of the countries in the region and the members of ENEMO, as well as full understanding of the international observation standards
- Good interpersonal and communication skills
- Good computer skills
- Fluent knowledge of English language
- Ability to work having irregular working hours and to work under pressure, as well as to work as member of the team and independently if needed

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country
- Experience of work in the host country

8.2.7. Data analyst

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job summary: Prepares statistical analysis of key election day findings based on observation forms completed by short-term observers (STOs).

Main duties:

- Provide advice/input in the development of the election day observation forms.
- Ensure use of appropriate database and software for the statistical analysis of the election observation report forms .
- Recruit, train and oversee a team of data entry clerks.
- Ensure the processing of election day observation forms.
- Produce a statistical analysis of the observation forms.

Requirements:**Basic requirements:**

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- BA MSc/MA. Preference shall be given to graduates in Data Analysis or Computer Science.
- Two to three years of relevant professional work experience at the national or international level with some experience in conducting sociological and statistical surveys, and in observing election processes.
- Advanced computer skills, including knowledge of statistical software.

Other requirements:

- Ability to manage and coordinate the work of others.
- Ability to work having irregular working hours and to work under pressure, as well as to work as member of the team and independently if needed .
- Demonstrated ability to work as a member of a team composed of individuals of different cultural and political backgrounds, while maintaining impartiality and objectivity.
- Excellent written and oral communication skills in English.

8.2.8. Long-term observer coordinator

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job summary: The LTO coordinator directs LTOs' activities and maintains communications between the EOM and LTOs.

Main duties:

- Develops LTO and STO deployment plans.
- Organises briefings and debriefings for LTOs during mission.
- Prepares and provides LTOs with LTO observation pack, that must include all necessary

information, documents, materials (observer's manual, reporting form, reporting schedule and communication plan), and security and protocols and policies.

- Organises a briefing for STOs, provides STOs with necessary information, documents and materials (if the briefings are not to be conducted in the field).
- Establishes and maintains regular contact with LTOs.
- Develops reporting forms for LTOs (together with election analyst, legal analyst and media analyst).
- Develops reporting forms for STOs (together with election analyst).
- Gives tasks to LTOs, writes instructions to them.
- Receives information from LTOs (including observation reports).
- Schedules reporting by LTOs and STOs during observation.
- Ensures that full and timely reports from LTOs are available.
- Analyses LTO reports and compiles summary reports.
- Organises debriefings for LTOs during observation.
- Travels to the field in order to assist LTOs in their work and/or evaluate their work.
- Evaluates work of LTOs.

Requirements:

Basic requirements:

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- BA or MSc/MA, LL.M. Preference shall be given to graduates in Social Science, Political Science, Law, Media, Communication, Computer Science.
- Experience with organising at least 5 domestic election observations (including LTO and STO) in their own country.
- Experience with working at international election observation mission (ENEMO, OSCE or other) as a core team member or LTO, full understanding of the international observation standards.

Other requirements:

- Good interpersonal, organisational and communication skills
- Good computer skills
- Fluent knowledge of English language
- Ability to work having irregular working hours, under pressure and to provide risk and time management

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of language of host country
- Knowledge of the language of the host country
- Experience of work in the host country

8.2.9. Short-term observer coordinator

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job summary: The STO coordinator directs STOs' activities and maintains communication between the EOM and STOs.

Main duties:

- Develops STO deployment plans.
- Organizes briefings and debriefings for STOs during mission.
- Prepares and provides STOs with STO observation pack, that must include all necessary information, documents, materials (observer's manual, reporting form, reporting schedule and communication plan), and security and protocols and policies.
- Organizes a briefing for STOs, provides STOs with necessary information, documents and materials (if the briefings are not to be conducted in the field).
- Establishes and maintains regular contact with STOs.
- Develops reporting forms for STOs (together with election analyst).
- Gives tasks to STOs, writes instructions to them.
- Receives information from STOs (including observation reports)
- Schedules reporting by STOs during observation.
- Ensures that full and timely reports from STOs are available.
- Analyses STO reports and compiles summary reports
- Organizes debriefings for STOs during observation.
- Travels to the field in order to assist STOs in their work and or evaluate their work.
- Evaluates work of STOs.

Requirements:

Basic requirements:

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- BA or MSc/MA, LL.M. Preference shall be given to graduates in Social Science, Political Science, Law, Media, Communication Computer Science.
- Experience with organizing at least 5 domestic election observations (incl. LTO and STO) in their own country.
- Experience with working at international election observation mission (ENEMO, OSCE or other) as a core team member or LTO, full understanding of the international observation standards.

Other requirements:

- Good interpersonal, organizational and communication skills
- Good computer skills
- Fluent knowledge of English language
- Ability to work having irregular working hours, under pressure and to provide risk and time management

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of language of host country
- Knowledge of the language of the host country
- Experience of work in the host country

8.2.10. Press officer

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job summary: PR officer is responsible for EOM relations with mass media, and particularly for the development of the PR and outreach strategy and message development.

Main duties:

- To develop plan of EOM PR activities
- To establish and maintain contacts with local mass-media
- To create and maintain database of local mass-media
- To work closely with the PR agency on the development and implementation of the comprehensive PR strategy
- To work closely with the Head of the Mission on the development and implementation of the outreach strategy
- To participate in EOM staff meetings;
- To participate in conducting briefings for LTOs and STOs (if the STO briefings are not to be conducted in the field) and the EOM's media policy (e.g. who can talk to the press and on what topics)
- To participate in developing reporting forms for LTOs (together with LTO coordinator)
- To examine LTO reports.
- To take part in preparation of election observation reports and statements

Requirements:**Basic requirements:**

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- BA or MSc/MA, LL.M. Preference shall be given to graduates in Social Science, Political Science, Media, Communication.
- At least 3 years of experience with work in/with mass media.
- Experience with at least 3 domestic/international election observation missions (ENEMO, OSCE or other).

Other requirements:

- Good knowledge of elections legislation in minimum 3 countries and full understanding of the international observation standards
- Good interpersonal and communication skills
- Good computer skills
- Fluent knowledge of English language
- Ability to work with irregular working hours and to work under pressure, as well as to work as a member of the team and independently if needed

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country
- Experience of work in the host country

8.2.11. Security officer

Responsible to: Head of the mission

Job summary: The security expert directs security activities within the EOM.

Main duties:

- Provides EOM staff members with comprehensive briefings including: main safety, security and health risks, areas of deployment, advice on behaviour, attitude to be adopted in accordance with cultural and social environment, advice on contact to be made with local authorities at the state level in order to ensure security for teams at all times, detailed training in terms of security equipment.
- Prepares the Mission security plan, and carries out security assessments.
- Develops the EOM security policy and protocol with the Head of Mission.
- Advises the EOM on security arrangements, including private security around premises, provision of escorts, Mission visibility, observer Code of Conduct.
- Plans and carries out, where appropriate, security and safety checks of HQ premises and accommodation, observer accommodation in deployment areas, car parks, etc.
- Maintains daily contact with observer teams deployed on the ground.
- Ensures that safety and security procedures are enforced by all EOM members at all times and recommends appropriate courses of action to be taken by the CT in the case of infringement of these procedures.

- Establishes an EOM Security Operations Centre capable of tracking observers' vehicular movements and providing constant communication facilities between EOM HQ and observers.
- Maintains a communications logbook for the EOM Security Operations Centre.
- Provides the CT and the LTOs with Safety and Security Situation Report on a weekly or a daily basis.
- Advises the EOM on the safety and security conditions relevant to the deployment of observers and possible evacuation in case of emergencies.
- Assures that all EOM members follow the security procedures.
- Organizes medical trainings for observers and local staff and provides security training for drivers.
- Establishes and maintains working relations with relevant security officers operating in the respective country such as security officers at the EU Delegation, NDI, OSCE, United Nations Security Officers and other diplomatic missions.
- Establishes an emergency/contingency response and MEDEVAC capability for the LTOs, STOs and Core Team.
- Participates in planning and implementation of election observation Missions.

Requirements:

Basic requirements:

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- MSc/MA, LLM or PhD. Preference shall be given to graduates in Social Science, Political Science, Law or Security Studies.
- 5 years of experience in the field of security working for local or international missions/ organisations.
- Experience with at least 3 domestic/international election observation missions (ENEMO, OSCE or other).

Other requirements:

- Adequate training in a related field.
- Technical and tactical training in military, police or other security procedures and practices.
- Substantial experience in security training of civilian international and local staff, notably defensive driving and use of IT security equipment.
- Ability to collect, collate and assess information from different sources prior to disseminating relevant reports and conclusions.
- Ability to remain calm in an emergency situation; with a high sense of responsibility and confidentiality, and; initiative and good judgement.
- Courteous and tactful with ability to work effectively in a multinational and multicultural environment, with excellent communication and training skills.
- Demonstrated management skills as well as good interpersonal skills, with a

- demonstrated ability to support and liaise with civilian staff.
- Physically fit for duty.
- Proven working experience in the region, under difficult logistical and security conditions and environment.
- Experience in security training of civilian international and local staff.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country;
- Experience of work in the host country.

8.2.12. Logistics officer

Responsible to: Head of the mission and CEO

Job summary: Logistic officer is tasked with all issues related to the logistical operations of an EOM.

Main duties:

- Provides the EOM with suitable office premises, equipment, communications facilities.
- Identifies options for accommodation of the EOM core team members.
- Finds candidatures for local staff (including local staff at the core team, drivers and interpreters for LTOs and STOs) .
- Provides logistical support for the core team, LTOs and STOs arrival and departure.
- Makes arrangements for various EOM events (LTO briefing, press-conferences, etc.).
- Arranges accommodation.
- Hires local staff (drivers and interpreters)..
- Creates and maintains the database of the local staff.
- Arrives to the country of observation a few days before the rest of the core team in order to make office, equipment, communications and other arrangements (if necessary).
- Stays in the country of observation a few days after the rest of the core team in order to finish the closure of the mission (if necessary).
- Communicates with domestic ENEMO member NGOs and coordinates travel arrangements of LTOs and STOs groups.

Requirements:

Basic requirements:

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- BA. Preference shall be given to graduates in Social Science, Political Science, Law

- Media and Communication, Computer Science or Data analysis.
- Minimum 4 years of experience with logistics and event management.
- International election observation experience.

Other requirements:

- Excellent organisational and communication skills;
- Excellent computer skills;
- Fluent knowledge of English language;
- Ability to work having irregular working hours and work under pressure.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country;
- Experience of work in the host country.

8.2.13. Financial officer

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job summary: Responsible for financial aspects of project implementation.

Main duties:

- Facilitates the EOM's finances;
- Preparing contracts;
- Preparing procurement;
- Preparing financial reports;
- Developing financial plan;
- Archiving and taking care of all financial documents related to the mission.

Requirements:

Basic requirements:

The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.

- BA. Preference shall be given to graduates in Economy, Finances, Business administration, Social Science, Political Science, Law or Data analysis;
- Good computer skills;
- Knowledge of financial and procurement procedures of the country of registration.

Other requirements:

- Fluent knowledge of English language;
- Ability to make decisions independently and work under pressure;
- Ability to work with irregular working hours.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country;
- Experience of work in the host country.

8.2.14. Junior financial officer

Responsible to: Finance Officer

Job summary: Responsible for financial aspects of project implementation. Junior Financial Officer is a part of the EOM only if the budget of the EOM exceeds 1 million EUR.

Main duties:

- Facilitates the EOM's finances together with the Finance Officer;
- Assisting in contract preparations;
- Preparing procurement documentation;
- Assisting the Finance Officer with financial reporting;
- Collecting and archiving supporting documentation related to the EOM.

Requirements:**Basic requirements:**

- The applicant must meet two out of three mentioned requirements in order to be considered for an interview.
- BA. Preference shall be given to graduates in Economy, Finances, Business administration or Data analysis.
- Good computer skills.
- Knowledge of financial and procurement procedures of the country of registration.

Other requirements:

- Fluent knowledge of English language;
- Ability to make decisions independently and work under pressure;
- Ability to work with irregular working hours.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country;
- Experience of work in the host country.

8.3. Long-term observer (LTO)

Responsible to: LTO coordinator

Job summary: LTOs conduct observation and organize work of STOs in their area of responsibility (AoR).

Main duties:

- Organises own work in the AoR;
- Establish communication with the Core Team;
- Represents the ENEMO EOM in respective AoR;
- Distributes EOM public statements in the AoR;
- Establishes and maintains contacts with election administration, authorities, NGOs, mass-media, parties and candidates in corresponding AoR;
- Observes various election related activities:
 - Work of election administration (election commissions);
 - Work of local authorities, related to the elections;
 - Activities of parties and candidates (HQ work, public events, campaigning) ;
 - Work of mass-media;
 - Any other activities or events, related to the elections;
- Establishes and maintains regular contact with the CT through the LTO coordinator, informs LTO coordinator about trips inside of the AoR;
- Fulfils tasks and instructions, received from LTO coordinator;
- Participates in LTO briefings and debriefings;
- Provides the LTO coordinator with observation reports according to the forms and the schedule;
- Reports immediately to the LTO coordinator about any extraordinary occurrence in the AoR related to the election (including any danger for LTOs or STOs);
- Organises regional briefing and debriefing for STOs;
- Develops detailed STO deployment plan for E-day;
- Provides STOs with accommodation and local staff (interpreters, drivers);
- Prepares and provides STOs with STO observation pack, that must include necessary information, documents and materials;
- Establishes and maintains regular contact with STOs;
- Gives tasks to STOs;
- Receives information from STOs (including observation reports);
- Schedules reporting by STOs during observation;
- Ensures that full and timely reports from STOs are available;
- Examines STO reports;

- Travels to the field in order to assist STOs in their work and/or evaluate their work;
- Evaluates the work of STOs;
- Acts in accordance with the ENEMO Observer’s Code of Conduct.

Requirements:

- BA. Preference shall be given to graduates in Social Science, Political Science, Law or Data analysis;
- Experience in domestic election observation (at least as an STO);
- International election observation experience, preferred;
- Good knowledge of English;
- Good interpersonal and organisational skills;
- Good report writing skills;
- Good computer skills;
- Ability to take actions without supervision;
- Ability to work having irregular working hours;
- Ability to live and work under hard circumstances;
- Willingness to travel.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Knowledge of the language of the host country;
- Work experience in the host country.

8.4. Short-term observer (STO)

Responsible to: LTO

Job summary: STOs conduct observation in their area of responsibility (AoR).

Main duties:

- Observes voting and vote counting processes in their AoR according to instructions received from LTOs;
- Establishes and maintains regular contact with LTOs;
- Fulfills tasks and instructions, received from LTOs;
- Provides LTO (or the Core Team) with observation reports according to the defined procedure;
- Reports immediately to LTOs about any extraordinary occurrence related to the elections (including any danger for STOs);
- Participates in briefing and debriefing for STOs;
- Acts in accordance with the ENEMO Observer’s Code of Conduct;
- Is disciplined.

Requirements:

- Experience/knowledge of electoral processes in their own country;
- Good knowledge of English;
- Ability to live and work under hard circumstances;
- Readiness to spend the most of the work time travelling on the field.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Experience with international election observation;
- Knowledge of the language of the host country;
- Work experience in the host country.

8.5. Local support staff

8.5.1. Local legal expert

Responsible to: Head of mission

Job summary: A local legal expert provides expertise on election legislation and regulations and monitors election-related disputes, complaints and court cases.

Main duties:

- Provides legal advice to EOM staff;
- Prepares official documents for correspondence with the authorities and the election administration;
- Examines election legislation and regulations;
- Monitors election-related disputes, complaints, court cases;
- Participates in EOM staff meetings;
- Participate in conducting briefings for LTOs and STOs (if the STO briefings are not to be conducted in the AoRs);
- Participate in developing reporting forms for LTOs.

Requirements:

- BA degree in law;
- work experience in at least 2 elections in their own country;
- Good interpersonal skills;
- Good computer skills;
- Excellent knowledge of the language of the host country;
- Good knowledge of English language;
- Ability to work with irregular working hours.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Experience with working at international election observation missions (ENEMO, OSCE or other).

8.5.2. Assistant/interpreter to the core team

Responsible to: Respective core team member

Job summary: The assistant provides translation and assistant services for core team members.

Main duties:

- Provides oral and/or written translation to the Core Team members;
- Provides assistance in organising meetings and events, plans working hours, keeps contacts, prepares documents, etc.;
- Participates in staff meetings and external meetings if needed;
- Travels outside the place of deployment with the Core Team members.

Requirements:

- Excellent knowledge of the language of the host country;
- Excellent knowledge of English language;
- Good organisational and computer skills;
- Ability to work having irregular working hours.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- domestic or international election observation experience.

8.5.3. Assistant/interpreter to observers

Responsible to: ENEMO EOM observers

Job summary: Assistant provides translation and assistant services to observers.

Main duties:

- Provides oral and /or writing translation to the observers;
- Provides assistance in organising meetings and events, plans working time, keeps contacts, prepares documents, etc.;
- Participates in external meetings;
- Travels outside the place of deployment with the observers.

Requirements:

- Excellent knowledge of the language of the host country;
- Good knowledge of English language;
- Good organisational and computer skills;
- Ability to work having irregular working hours;
- Readiness to travel.

Preferred but not obligatory:

- Domestic or international election observation experience.

8.5.4. Driver

Responsible to: Respective core team member or EOM observers.

Job summary: Driver provides transportation service for EOM staff using their own car.

Main duties:

- Provides transportation for EOM staff including travelling outside of the place of deployment;
- Maintains the car in a good technical condition in order to ensure safe and comfortable driving;
- Observes the road/traffic laws;
- Washes the car on a weekly basis;
- Places the EOM stickers on the car if needed.

Requirements:

- Driving licence;
- At least five years of driving experience;
- Ability to work with irregular working hours.

Essential but not obligatory:

- Domestic or international election observation experience;
- Knowledge of English.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter VIII – Structure of an ENEMO IEOM

- Which are the different types of IEOMs which ENEMO conducts?
- What are the deliverables of an IEOM?
- Which are the Core Team positions, and what are their respective tasks?
- What are the requirements for Core Team positions?
- What are the requirements for Core Team assistants/interpreters, and what is their role?
- What are the requirements for LTO positions?
- What are the main duties of LTOs and the main duties of STOs?
- What are the requirements for local staff such as assistants/interpreters and drivers, and what is their role?



CHAPTER IX

ORGANIZATION OF AN ENEMO IEOM

9.1. Recruitment of observers and national staff

IEOMs organized by ENEMO follow specific recruitment procedures that are prescribed within ENEMO Policies and Procedures, as well as standard established practices. Procedures apply to all positions, including expert positions, LTOs and STOs, and national staff.

Within the process of selection of the staff members, ENEMO provides equal opportunities regardless of the candidates' race, colour, gender, age, health (i.e., disability), religious or other background, union membership, national or social background, family status, welfare, sexual orientation or other personal characteristics.

ENEMO respects the generally recognized principles in regard to preventing nepotism in the process of selection of its staff and during its functioning. In a case where a candidate for a position in ENEMO is a close relative to somebody already working for ENEMO, this should be disclosed, and the decision on their employment shall be made by a higher body.

Source: ENEMO Policies and Procedures

ENEMO has endorsed the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and all ENEMO missions are conducted according to the principles set out in this declaration (see Chapter 2).

Table 5: Overview of the selection procedures

| | CT | LTOs | STOs |
|----------------------------|---|---|---|
| Selection body | Governing board | CT Selection board | Member organization + CT (STO/LTO Coordinator) |
| Steps of selection process | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Call for candidates 2. Pre-selection of candidates 3. Interviews with candidates 4. Written assignment (optional) 5. Selection of candidates | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Call for candidates 2. Pre-selection of candidates 3. Interviews with candidates 4. Selection of candidates | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Call for candidates 2. Pre-selection and ranking of candidates by member organizations 3. Testing the language skills (optional) 4. Selection of candidates |

9.1.1. Selection and deployment of core team (CT) members

Prior to any IEOM, ENEMO will announce the call for CT members and distribute it to member organizations as well as other official communication channels. The announcement is published at least seven days prior to the closing date. In extraordinary cases, the time of duration of the announcement can be less than seven days. Candidates may apply for one or more CT positions, according to the maximum number of positions indicated in the call. All applicants are required to submit the application form and their CV to prove their qualifications for the position or positions they are applying for.

After the completion of the call, all applications will be distributed to the Governing Board members who will preselect valid applications and candidates who meet the terms of reference (ToR) requirements. These candidates will be invited for an online interview with the members of the Governing Board, who will give all suitable candidates an opportunity to introduce themselves and elaborate their qualifications for the position or positions they have applied for. All members of the Governing Board will have the opportunity to ask questions about the candidates' background, education, motivation for applying for the position and language skills, as well as questions specific to the country of deployment and the position they have applied for. In some cases, a short assignment may be given to candidates with similar qualifications to determine the most suitable candidate. This kind of assignment looks further into the candidates' writing and language skills, as well as general and country-specific knowledge of election-related matters.

External experts may apply to open calls for all CT positions, except for HoM and DHoM, but ENEMO members' nominees shall have priority. During the selection process it might occur that candidates nominated by ENEMO member organizations and candidates outside of the ENEMO network have equal qualifications. In this case, preference shall be given to ENEMO member candidates. The same candidate cannot be hired for the same position on more than two consecutive EOMs, unless there are no candidates for the

respective position, or the candidates who have applied do not meet the ToRs.

Members of the Governing Board will discuss to determine the most suitable candidates for each CT position. After the selection process is completed, ENEMO will notify all candidates about the outcome of the selection process and proceed with other steps needed to form the CT. After the CT is formed, its members will start working as a group, hold regular meetings and assist each other whenever necessary. Initial tasks of the CT will include the LTO selection process, drafting the LTO and STO guide, preparing the briefing agenda, drafts of different reports, daily briefs and all other mission-related tasks.

9.1.2. Selection and deployment of long-term observers (LTOs)

One of the initial steps in forming an ENEMO IEOM is the selection of LTOs. The CT publishes the call through official channels in cooperation with ENEMO staff and notifies member organizations in a timely manner. Announcements for LTO positions should be published at least seven days before the closing day, if possible. All full-member organizations have the opportunity to nominate candidates for LTOs. In extraordinary cases, and upon the decision of the Governing Board, candidates for LTOs outside the ENEMO network may submit their application. Such cases include an insufficient number of candidates nominated by member organizations who meet the ToRs and other specific circumstances that require the engagement of external LTOs. All applicants are required to submit the application form and their CV to prove their qualifications for the position.

The selection board will be defined within the CT to proceed with the selection process. The selection board will consist of three CT members and will include an HoM or DHOM, an LTO coordinator and another member. All applications will be delivered to the selection board, whose members will preselect all LTO candidates who meet the prescribed requirements. An online interview will be scheduled with the selected applicants, where they will be given an opportunity to present their motivation, their qualifications for the position and their language skills. The selection board will keep track of each candidate's performance during the interview and agree on the most suitable candidates.

During the selection process, the selection board will prioritize candidates with sufficient election observation experience as well as other relevant factors in order to ensure a successful election observation in the field. A limited number of less experienced LTOs who meet other requirements will be included in each mission, while gender representation will be respected to the maximum extent possible, and in accordance with received applications.

In cases when an insufficient number of LTOs apply for the mission, a repeated call may be announced to provide member organizations with an additional opportunity to nominate candidates. Repeated calls may sometimes be open to candidates who do not represent any non-member organization, but ENEMO members' nominees shall have priority over external candidates if they have equal qualifications.

Members of the selection board will select the required number of LTOs and will notify all candidates about the outcome of the selection process and proceed with other steps needed to start their engagement in the ENEMO IEOM. A certain number of LTO candidates who were not selected for the mission will be selected as reserve candidates and will be ready to participate in the mission due to circumstances that might result in the dismissal of selected LTOs.

Prior to their deployment, all LTOs will be contacted by e-mail by the IEOM's logistics officer and LTO coordinator to receive logistical information and election-related information such as an LTO guide to prepare themselves for the start of the mission. LTOs will be trained upon their arrival in the country of observation and deployed in international teams of two.

9.1.3. Selection and deployment of short-term observers (STOs)

Closer to election day, the CT will prepare and issue the call for STOs to all member organizations. Member organizations will distribute the call to possible candidates and select the required number of applicants and reserves for the mission. It is the responsibility of each member organization to select STOs who meet the ToRs, especially when it comes to language skills. If a member organization does not submit the required number of applicants, other member organizations' reserve applicants will fill in the positions.

If deemed necessary, the STO/LTO coordinator may schedule interviews with STO applicants to test their language skills. Those candidates who fail to prove that their language skills are sufficient to participate in the IEOM will not be engaged in the mission. A certain number of STO candidates will be selected as reserve candidates and will be ready to participate in the mission to replace STOs who might not be able to participate.

STOs will sign their contracts and receive logistical information and election-related information from the IEOM members prior to their deployment. An STO guide will be sent in advance to prepare the observers for their observation activities before being trained upon their arrival in the country of observation and deployed in international teams of two.

9.1.4. Selection of national staff positions

National staff are selected to assist international observers in the IEOM in their work, including CT members, LTOs and STOs. A call will be prepared for each position by ENEMO staff and announced via different channels in the country of observation, as well as ENEMO's official channels. If ENEMO disposes of a database of local staff from previous IEOMs in a given country, contacts of previously positively evaluated members of local staff will be shared with observers, who will be able to include them in the selection process.

All applications will be distributed to respective members of the mission (CT, LTOs and STOs), who will interview and select the best candidate. The selection of national staff is performed at the discretion of observers, but observers must ensure that all selected candidates fulfill the ToRs and obey the code of conduct. National staff are briefed by CT members or LTOs and should remain impartial and objective at all times.

9.2. Briefing of observers

All observers must undergo a briefing before the start of their engagement. As soon as the CT is formed, their members will start preparing the elaborate documents with all crucial materials and compile them into an LTO and STO guide. As soon as the guide is finalized, it will be shared with observers to prepare for the mission. Ideally, the guide will be delivered at least seven days before the start of their engagement, but sometimes it might be closer to the date of their briefing due to the short time frame of the mission.

9.2.1. Briefing of LTOs

It is obligatory for all selected LTOs to participate in a briefing prior to their deployment. Sometimes, reserve LTOs may be briefed as well to ensure an equal level of preparations in case of a later engagement. An LTO briefing is an elaborate session prepared by the CT where experts and analysts present crucial information on different aspects of the mission. In some cases, LTOs might be briefed online.

All members of the CT will introduce LTOs to the information needed for their work. LTOs will learn the key segments of the political background, legal framework, rules of campaigning and campaign finance, electoral system in power, media landscape and other important aspects that will be a part of their observation. Furthermore, the LTO briefing will introduce observers to the general principles of international election observation, a code of conduct, their rights and obligations, tasks and reporting systems, teamwork, how to conduct meetings and other practical information, such as logistics and finance.

LTOs should actively take part in the briefing, not only as passive listeners, but through engagement in discussions, and by inquiring about any missing or additional information from the CT members. Sometimes, the IEOM will engage local experts for some segments of the briefing to ensure that quality information is provided to LTOs.

9.2.1. Briefing of STOs

STOs are required to participate in the briefing held by the CT before their deployment to the area of observation (AoO). The STO briefing will introduce observers to their rights and responsibilities, the code of conduct and the international methodology for observing the election day, as well as the political background, legal framework, rules of campaigning and campaign finance, electoral system, media landscape and other segments relevant for their work.

After attending the STO briefing, all STOs should be able to conduct the election day observation without major obstacles. Additionally, STOs will participate in a regional briefing held by respective LTOs, where they will learn more about the region they are deployed to, communication on election day and the reporting system.

9.3. Debriefing of observers

At the end of their engagement, all observers will attend a debriefing to sum up and conclude their observation. The debriefing is the opportunity to share experiences and draw conclusions about their work. Additionally, the debriefing helps CT members to confirm identified trends and agree on recommendations that will be published in the mission's final report.

9.3.1. Debriefing of STOs

After the election day, STOs will participate in the regional debriefing that will be organized and conducted by the respective LTOs in their AoO. STOs will be able to share their findings related to the election day and contribute to forming conclusions on the conduct of the election day in the respective region.

9.3.2. Debriefing of LTOs

All LTOs will attend the debriefing before their departure and prior to the end of their engagement. At the debriefing, LTOs will share their findings with the CT members, which will help to form conclusions on different aspects of the electoral process and to suggest and agree on recommendations of the mission. Additionally, LTOs will have the opportunity to discuss other segments of their work, including suggestions for improvement of different aspects of their engagement and work in general.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter IX – Organization of an ENEMO IEOM

- How are CT members selected and deployed for a mission?
- How are LTOs selected and deployed for a mission?
- How are STOs selected and deployed for a mission?
- How are national staff members selected?
- What are the different types of briefings/debriefings which observers need to undertake?



CHAPTER X

OBSERVING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD

10.1. Political background

All citizens should have the right to participate in government and to take part in the conduct of public affairs through elections reflecting the free expression of the will of voters. Democratic legitimacy is a consequence of the authority granted to a government by citizens, and the government should be accountable to them when it comes to exercising that authority. In this sense, the holding of genuine and periodic elections is a necessary condition for a country to be a democracy.

However, assessing the conduct of an election also requires a broader understanding of the democratic environment and political framework of the observed country. When assessing the political context in which the electoral process is taking place, the mission should consider the background of the elections.

In particular, the mission should analyse whether the political environment in the observed country allows for the conduct of democratic elections. Respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms is a prerequisite in this regard, and the background section of the reports and statements issued by the mission should clearly state whether conditions were met for conducting genuine elections.

This includes governance and the general democratic situation of the observed country, and an analysis of:

- Opportunities for citizens to partake in the election and public affairs, in terms of political freedoms and democratic environment.
- Issues pertaining to respect for human rights and the extent to which this may impact on the climate for the elections and electoral rights, rule of law and the periodicity of elections in the observed country (i.e., when previous elections took place and whether elections take place with sufficient regularity).
- The nature of political engagement, pluralism and conditions for political parties and candidates to participate in elections. Are elections genuinely competitive, reflecting a broad range of political choices for voters?
- The way in which elections were called, and whether the electoral process was scheduled in line with the legislation and related procedures (including if elections were called early).
- The political landscape and recent political developments leading up to the elections.
- Possible shortcomings from previous electoral cycles, and whether or not they remain to be addressed (for instance, through electoral reform or legislative amendments to the legal framework for elections).

10.2. Legal framework and electoral system

10.2.1. Legal framework

Electoral processes are implemented within a legislative and regulatory framework. In this regard, national legislation is key to understanding the basis upon which the electoral process is conducted in the observed country.

The role of the observation mission is to identify possible shortcomings in the legislation and its implementation by referring to the relevant international standards for democratic elections (universal and regional instruments presented in Chapter III) when assessing the electoral process. Therefore, the conduct of the electoral process should be assessed with international standards in mind, with respect for fundamental freedoms and the exercise of political rights.

The legal framework should consist first and foremost of specific electoral legislation. It is essential to assess this legislation (whether it exists in the form of laws or a code, for instance) and its implementation.

However, other relevant national legislation may include provisions of the Constitution of the observed country, but also other laws related to regulating the function of political parties, voter registration, media, campaign finance, and administrative and criminal proceedings, along with other aspects relevant to the electoral process.

The assessment of the legal framework should also be mindful of secondary legislation, including sources for administrative regulation such as decrees and decisions. For instance, election management bodies in the observed country may have the power to regulate crucial aspects of the electoral process. In particular, the assessment should consider whether these decisions, decrees or other sources are in line or in contradiction with other laws. Secondary legislation should be consistent and provide adequate and clear provisions on regulating aspects of the electoral process. This is essential in order to limit the creation of inconsistencies, loopholes and space for possible subjective interpretation or abuse. Ideally, all of the above legal sources should be publicly available, as stakeholders should in principle have access to copies of all laws and regulations.

Particularly important aspects to mention when formulating the assessment of the legal framework include:

- Assessing if the legal framework provides the conditions for the conduct of competitive, transparent, inclusive and credible elections.
- Assessing whether the process of adopting electoral legislation and election-related regulations was legitimate, transparent and supportive of democratic elections.
- Assessing whether legislation was adopted in an inclusive and timely manner, with consensus on important issues. As regards timeliness, late changes in the laws or delays in adopting regulations on key issues can put the electoral process at risk.
- Assessing whether the legislation provides for legal certainty (i.e., the provisions of the legislation are clear, unambiguous, not lacking and without space for possible misinterpretation or abuse) and if there is coherence between laws relating to the elections.
- The range of fundamental rights and political freedoms necessary for an election is adequately enshrined in the law, including conditions that apply to the exercise of electoral rights, based on objective and reasonable criteria.

- Any discriminatory provisions should be assessed, for instance towards specific categories of citizens and/or electoral contestants. No distinctions should be permitted between citizens in the enjoyment of their electoral rights on the grounds of race, sex, birth, colour, religion, language, national or social origin, political or other opinion, property, or other status.

Additionally, the mission's assessment of the legal framework should also include an analysis of the extent to which relevant legislation is properly implemented. Remember, the ICCPR points out that states must provide both the "right and the opportunity" for citizens to participate. This means analysing whether all rights are protected, respected and fulfilled de jure (in the legislation itself) as well as de facto (through the implementation of the legal provisions, in practice).

All bodies with specific responsibilities to enforce the law (for example, judiciary instances such as courts and public prosecution, election management bodies, oversight bodies such as media regulators or anti-corruption agencies, ministries, government officials, etc.) should do so in a consistent and impartial manner. In this regard, an assessment should be made of the degree to which these bodies uphold the legal framework and international standards related to elections.

10.2.2. Electoral system

Importance of the electoral system

The choice of electoral system plays a defining role in determining the relationship between voters and the institutions they elect. This also has consequences for the modalities of the institutional functioning, political environment and political culture in specific countries.

Every electoral system has its own specifics and characteristics that influence the level of complexity of the system, the costs related to conducting elections under that system, how votes cast translate into actual election results, etc.

Electoral systems in some countries are rarely if ever amended, having been well established over many years, while others may have been subject to more frequent amendments. This depends on the political context, as the stability of the electoral system can be affected in particular when countries go through a democratic transition phase. This also means that the choice of electoral system can be a source of contention or political struggle. For instance, some stakeholders from the political opposition can claim that they are disadvantaged by the system in force, while ruling parties may try to maintain the advantages they benefit from under the current system – for instance, the often recurring debate between having a requirement for an absolute or relative majority in presidential systems.

Electoral systems can vary greatly, and these variations can have extremely considerable effects on crucial aspects such as the delimitation of electoral boundaries and constituencies, voting methods and procedures, calculation of results and distribution of seats, etc.

Chapter IV offers more in-depth insight when it comes to the various types of electoral systems, with detailed categories explaining their key characteristics and differences.

It is important to note that the mission should rarely comment on an electoral system itself, unless the system in place is deemed to violate a core principle or has critical issues affecting the integrity of the election. In this sense, the mission should avoid criticizing the use of majority or proportional systems, for example, insofar as both systems are legitimate and commonly accepted.

Assessing the electoral system

It is very important to note that there is no “ideal” electoral system per se, in the same way that there is no particular model for an electoral system that can qualify as an “international standard”. Therefore, for the purpose of the analysis and assessment, different electoral system models should not be compared. Rather, they should be assessed contextually for the specific country being observed.

Another important aspect to take into account is whether the electoral system in force benefits from public trust, and if it guarantees that fundamental freedoms and political rights are upheld.

The mission should assess whether the electoral system provides for equal suffrage through a “one person, one vote” principle. Each vote should be equal in weight. If there is an imbalance in the allocation of mandates or the delimitation of electoral boundaries among electoral districts, this should be analysed. In particular, the mission should assess whether the votes have proportionally the same “weight”, meaning that seats are allocated to a district based on the size of the district and not an arbitrary logic.

Particularly in proportional systems, a given constituency with more voters can hold more “weight”, whereas a constituency with fewer voters may have less “weight”. This means that an imbalance can manifest itself depending on how the system translates votes cast into seats. For this reason, the mission should pay attention to the electoral formula used to allocate seats, along with the electoral threshold used as a minimum to reach for parties or candidates to win a seat. The goal is to assess whether it is possible for the system to create a disproportion in the results of the election.

When assessing the electoral system, the mission may also pay attention to the procedures for the delimitation of electoral boundaries. Drawing up electoral boundaries should be conducted through a transparent process, with consistent and clear procedures established in the legislation. Procedures may include the use of criteria such as demographics and geographical/administrative boundaries. However, electoral boundaries should be

regularly reviewed to reflect changes in population.

It is important to bear in mind that drawing electoral boundaries can be abused when undertaken in bad faith or with the aim of manipulating the outcome of an election. This negative practice is often referred to as “gerrymandering”.

Generally, important aspects to observe when it comes to the electoral system include:

- Assessing if the electoral system enjoys trust from the public and guarantees respect for fundamental freedoms and political rights.
- Is the system inclusive, or are some communities under-represented because of the electoral system or the drawing of constituency boundaries?
- Assessing whether the electoral system provides for equal suffrage by respecting the principle of “one person, one vote”, i.e., are electoral constituencies more or less the same size, giving equal weight to each vote?
- When possible, assessing district “magnitude”, which means identifying risks of possible disproportionality in the attribution of seats for smaller electoral districts (which can lead to “wasted votes”), but also unreasonably high thresholds, which can render it impossible for some parties to be elected.
- Assessing whether the established thresholds and quotas (for instance, for women candidates or national minorities) are reasonable within the context, or on the contrary if they are at odds with international standards.

10.3. Election management bodies

Election management bodies are responsible for organizing and administering the electoral process. The effectiveness and professionalism of these bodies are essential to achieving a genuine electoral process.

The manner in which election administrations, often referred to as “election management bodies” (EMBs), conduct the electoral process should ensure that citizens are able to exercise their fundamental freedoms and political rights. EMBs should work transparently, professionally and efficiently and are accountable for administering the electoral process so that it is conducted under principles of fairness and impartiality, and in accordance with national laws and international standards. EMBs should be in a position to work free from political interference or intimidation.

EMBs are usually multitiered and operate under different models. These models are detailed further in Chapter IV, but there are essentially two different models of independent election commissions most commonly found in ENEMO’s area of observation:

- **Multiparty**, with a balance of political interests represented or
- **Non-political members**, appointed in their professional capacities

However, there are two additional models that are also used in some countries:

- **Governmental**, where the state authorities run an election; this is the case, for instance, in the United Kingdom and in France
- **Mixed**, where a commission exists to provide inclusive membership for party representatives, but state agencies may be involved to deliver operational aspects

Whichever model is adopted, or whichever variation of these models, the mission should assess whether the election administration is operating in a professional, impartial, transparent and accountable manner, focused on the integrity of the process rather than narrow party, political or personal interests.

In any case, EMBs should operate under the principles of independence and impartiality. To ensure that decisions are perceived as free from partisan interests, EMBs should act transparently, in a collegial manner, and be accountable for their actions/inactions.

The independence of EMBs is usually guaranteed in law and, according to good practice, should be facilitated by the provision of a realistic budget in advance, rather than ad hoc government funding. It is also important to note that the independence of EMBs can be undermined if its members can be arbitrarily removed or replaced.

Independent election administrations may either be organized ad hoc (i.e., assembled for each election) or permanently (i.e., as a permanent body or at least with permanent key staff members).

EMBs are usually headed by a commission, which is responsible for the decision-making process and supervising the body’s activities. EMBs are frequently composed of lower-level bodies that often reflect different territorial levels or local government (for example, districts, regions, municipalities, etc.).

These bodies may or may not operate on a permanent basis, as they can also be bodies established specifically and temporarily for the electoral period. Temporary bodies constitute a risk that can be important for the mission to assess, as they may be underprepared for administering the election if they are not appointed in a timely manner and their members properly trained.

EMBs are expected to plan the process effectively and ensure that all electoral materials, as well as voting requirements, are provided for in a timely manner and within the legal deadlines (for instance, determining voting and counting procedures, forming electoral commissions, identifying polling station locations, printing materials such as ballot

papers, etc.). Decisions taken by EMBs should be clear, transparent and made sufficiently in advance so as to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.

EMB members should additionally be provided with instructions, and preferably training, on their roles and responsibilities, including their duties to conduct the process in a fair, transparent and impartial manner. In this sense, the role of the mission is also to assess the level of preparedness, professionalism and overall competence of EMBs.

Usually, the secretariat of EMBs plans and implements administrative and technical tasks. EMBs should use appropriate rules and procedures in line with the legislation to regulate the conduct of their work and the decision-making process. The mission should analyse the level of preparedness, professionalism and proper coordination among various levels of EMBs, and assess whether there is a clear distinction of responsibilities among the different branches and levels of the election administration.

The mission should observe the work of all levels of the election administration, ranging from the work of polling station commissions/boards and regional/territorial bodies to the highest level of decision-making and coordination at the central level.

The responsibility for impartial voter education frequently rests with the EMBs, often in conjunction with civil society and the media. Voter information and education activities are essential for ensuring that all eligible citizens are aware of their political and voting rights, including procedures for voter registration and information pertaining to voting on election day (date, times and locations, polling stations, etc.).

The election administration analyst/CEC observer is responsible for closely observing the work of EMBs, in particular the work of the CEC (or equivalent institution, depending on the observed country). Particular attention should be paid to the collegiality, impartiality, transparency and efficiency of the work of the election administration.

Generally, when observing and assessing the work of EMBs, the mission should take into account the following aspects:

- Neutrality in the running of electoral operations; this includes how the appointment mechanism for the EMB, and its composition, impacts on political and public perceptions and levels of confidence in it.
- The degree of independence from the government and/or a dominant political party.
- Access to the work and decisions of the election administrators by political parties and civil society organizations.
- Transparency of the election administration, including publication of decisions online.
- The efficiency of the work of EMBs when it comes to organizing and holding the electoral process; this will vary depending on the specific role of the EMB in each country but can include some or all aspects of the process, such as voter registration, candidate and party registration, management of administrative complaints, oversight of campaign financing, voting and counting and results, etc. These aspects should be comprehensively observed.
- The internal rules of procedure of EMBs, and the decision-making process, with transparency and accountability as key criteria.
- The degree of decentralization to lower levels of the election administration
- The level of training for election administration members, and their level of professionalism/preparedness to conduct the process.
- Human and financial resources allocated for the work of EMBs, including sufficient budgetary means.
- The quality and proper conduct of voter education campaigns by EMBs, including the provision of all the necessary information to the voters to exercise their rights.

Given the extensive nature but also the importance of observing and assessing the work of EMBs, the following table offers an indication of which key aspects should be observed by CT analysts and LTOs, respectively:

Table 6: Overview of aspects and roles of observers in observation of EMBs

| Aspects to observe | CT (national/central level) | LTOs (regional/local level) |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Appointment mechanism for EMBs, legal framework regulating the work of the election administration | ✓ | |
| Observing sessions, assessing the work, efficiency, impartiality, and transparency of the CEC (or other equivalent body/bodies heading the election administration) | ✓ | |
| Assessing EMBs decisions and organizing of the general process at the national level (including Election Day) | ✓ | |
| Assessing the efficiency of the work of EMBs when it comes to organizing and holding the electoral process | ✓ | ✓ |
| Assessing (based on meetings with interlocutors, including electoral contestants) the level of confidence and trust in EMBs and their work | ✓ | ✓ |
| Voter education campaigns and other forms of outreach regarding informing voters about voting procedures, important decisions, deadlines, etc. (for instance, via social media) | ✓ | ✓ |
| Assessing EMBs work during the post-election period | ✓ | ✓ |
| Meeting with lower-level commission members, observing lower-level EMB sessions, and following the decision-making process of lower-level election commissions | | ✓ |
| Assessing trainings provided to lower-level EMB members | | ✓ |
| Observing opening, voting, closing and counting at polling stations and transfer of materials to high-level commissions on Election Day | | ✓ |

✓ CT

✓ Both CT and LTOs

✓ LTOs

10.4. Voter registration

Voter registration is a crucial aspect of the electoral process, as it is determinant in providing the opportunity for citizens to exercise their right to vote.

Article 25 of the ICCPR recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and the right to be elected. Additionally, states must provide not only the right to vote, but also the opportunity, which means voter registration must be inclusive. This principle of inclusiveness is correlated to universal suffrage, by which all citizens with the right to vote should be able to do so freely.

The right to vote

There are a number of principles pertaining to the right to vote that the mission should take into account.

The right to vote should be:

- **established by law**
- **provided without discrimination.** Along with other rights enshrined in the ICCPR, the principle of non-discrimination applies to voting rights, as follows: *“Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”* (Article 2)
- and **with only reasonable restrictions.** Most common restrictions relate to citizenship, age and residence.

Conditions for voting generally include:

Citizenship, as “citizens” have the right to participate in the government of “their country” (Article 25 of the ICCPR). This principle applies to all citizens. General Comment N°25 states that distinctions between those entitled to citizenship by birth and those who acquire it by naturalization are at odds with Article 25 of the ICCPR. This applies also to individuals holding dual citizenship in countries that allow it.

Age, where attaining the age of majority (usually 18 years old, but not always) should mean that “rights, but also obligations of a civil nature, must at least confer the right to vote” (Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, paragraph 6). It is relevant for the mission to pay attention to individuals who come of age between the close of registration and the day of voting, and whether or not they are able to exercise their right to vote.

Residency, and in particular the duration of residency. Usually, the exercise of the right to vote is subject to the requirement for voters to have their residence where the election

takes place. There are some specific cases, however, when a requirement of minimum residency duration can be introduced. This may be the case for elections and/or referendums that affect national minorities or a specific territory. The mission should be mindful of residency requirements, especially if their duration is excessive and at odds with international standards. Legislation can also at times be vague or unclear, and confusion may arise between the notions of residency (being registered as having a residence at a given address) and domiciliation (actually living there). This can be the case for citizens who have multiple residences (main and secondary, for instance).

Additionally, the mission should be mindful of the right to vote of certain categories of voters, for instance prisoners or military personnel.

In many countries, individuals who are serving a prison sentence at the moment of an election are not allowed to vote. This exclusion can be *de jure* (enshrined within the law) or *de facto* (in the case of the absence of specific provisions or a procedure permitting detained individuals to vote in prison facilities). As a good practice, however, individuals serving a prison sentence should not be deprived of their right to vote by default. If this restriction exists, it should at least take into account the nature or gravity of the offence for which they have been sentenced.

With respect to military personnel, a number of countries entirely exclude the military from exercising their right to vote. In the ENEMO observation region, however, although there are different views on this issue, most commonly military personnel are enfranchised under specific conditions (for instance, within military facilities or some form of mobile voting) and are able to exercise their right to vote.

Some of the key issues for the mission to consider when it comes to voting rights include:

- Whether universal suffrage is provided for in the legislation, free from discrimination.
- Whether the legal provisions pertaining to voter eligibility are adequate and in line with international standards.
- Whether there are unreasonable legal restrictions on the right to vote.
- Whether there are any obstacles for voters to exercise their right to vote.

Registration of voters

In general, voter registers are compiled either by EMBs or by another state body. Voter registers may be centralized through the use of regional authorities, which provide information to the central level. Information is then compiled in order to produce a single national register.

There are two main **voter registration methods**, which can differ depending on the country:

Active registration (also referred to as “voter-initiated registration”): this requires individual eligible citizens to apply in order to be included in the voter register. Procedures and time frames for this may vary but usually include some form of proactive steps to be undertaken by the individual.

Passive registration (also referred to as “state-initiated/automatic registration”): this requires state bodies to compile the voter register and is done in such a way that eligible citizens do not need to proactively apply or initiate a request to be included. Usually, this is achieved through the use of civil status records (for instance, the civil register) or citizenship (for instance, databases of national identification cards).

In principle, the registration of voters should enable eligible citizens to exercise their suffrage rights on the day of voting. For this purpose, it is crucial that there be a reliable, accurate and properly maintained voter register. This is essential for establishing proper voter lists for each polling station, which can be a complex issue to address depending on the country. The thoroughness and reliability of the voter register is critical in that regard, as non-registration prevents citizens from enjoying their right to vote, which therefore affects the universality of suffrage. Issues pertaining to the voter register may also result in a lack of transparency, leaving space for misuse or possible manipulation, and potentially affecting public trust in the electoral process.

Some of the ways this can be misused include irregularities such as voter identity theft or multiple voting, which breaches the principle of equality of suffrage and can partially affect the integrity of the process. Likewise, a voter register that is lacking may disenfranchise (i.e., deprive of the right to vote) a considerable number of voters who would otherwise be eligible.

It is important to note that legal provisions may apply to allow non-registered eligible voters to be included on special supplementary voter lists on the day of voting. “Same day voter registration”, also sometimes referred to as “conditional voting”, can allow voters to be registered on election day. Conditions to apply for this procedure vary from country to country, and in many countries this is not allowed. The mission should pay attention to the procedures in place in that regard, and whether they ensure that all eligible citizens (and only eligible citizens) are able to vote. Measures in place to prevent possible abuse, such as multiple registration or multiple voting, should also be analysed.

In general, voter registration procedures should be clearly enshrined in the legislation. All definitions pertaining to place of residence should avoid ambiguities and room for mistakes (or possible abuse). Voter registers do not necessarily require the inclusion of personal data other than mandatory data used to identify voters and establish their eligibility. In that regard, any requirement for additional information such as ethnicity or religion or other excessive requirements constitute discrimination.

An effective administrative or judiciary process should be enshrined in the legislation to provide individuals and/or other stakeholders with the possibility to legally challenge irregularities in the

voter register. This includes decisions leading to the exclusion of eligible voters, the opportunity to correct errors in the register or seeking the removal of ineligible individuals.

In regard to out-of-country voting, international standards do not provide an explicit obligation for states to organize out-of-country voting for citizens living abroad. The procedures used in countries that have decided to adopt out-of-country voting vary considerably both in terms of eligibility principles and in terms of technologies. When applicable, it is important for the mission to analyse whether the out-of-country voting process guarantees the same level of transparency, integrity and secrecy as the in-country voting process.

Out-of-country voting can lead to considerable additional budgets and logistical challenges for the observed country, and these challenges should be assessed by the mission. Also, the decision to conduct out-of-country voting by definition affects the size and proportions of the electorate, which may significantly impact electoral results. For this reason, it can be a politically sensitive issue for countries seeking to implement out-of-country voting.

Overall, it is important that the public enjoys confidence in the accuracy and reliability of voter registers. Public authorities should guarantee that preliminary and final voter registers are officially published, and that copies are available for public scrutiny to enable checking for inaccuracies, omissions and other discrepancies. In particular, best practices indicate that political parties should have an opportunity to access the full voter register. It can also be permitted for civil society organizations to audit voter registers, which is particularly important in the case of substantive allegations or evidence of inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the voter registers. In such instances, public authorities should take adequate and transparent measures to improve their quality.

Key aspects for the mission to observe and assess when it comes to voter registration include:

- Whether voter registration procedures are explicitly enshrined in the legislation.
- Whether restrictions on registration (such as residence) are reasonable.
- Whether the established procedures allow the opportunity for all eligible citizens to be registered.
- Whether there are suitable measures for the inclusion of newly eligible voters, measures in place to prevent multiple entries and consistent/regular removal of ineligible or deceased individuals.
- Whether the extracts of the voter lists correctly attribute voters to their respective polling stations.

- Whether there is evidence that eligible voters are not registered, or that on the contrary ineligible voters are registered (and if so, whether these are isolated cases or constitute a trend).
- Whether the preliminary voter register is available for public inspection.
- Whether there are effective opportunities and legal remedies available for identified inaccuracies and omissions to be corrected.
- Whether the data on the total number of registered voters are published.
- Whether there are relevant extracts of voter lists posted at polling stations or another accessible location before the day of voting.
- Whether the voter register enjoys the confidence of the public and electoral stakeholders, especially when it comes to accuracy and reliability.
- Whether there were problems with the voter register observed on election day.
- When applicable, whether there are effective out-of-country procedures in place to ensure registration of expatriate voters, and proper conditions for them to exercise their right to vote.
- In the case of active voter registration, whether there was adequate voter education on the registration procedures.
- In the case of passive registration, whether the sources of information used to draw up the register were accurate and updated, and whether there are any measures in place for the inclusion of individuals such as national minorities, refugees (for out-of-country voting) and internally displaced people (IDPs).

Given the extensive nature but also the importance of observing and assessing voter registration, the following table offers an indication of which key aspects should be observed by CT analysts and LTOs, respectively:

Table 7: Overview of aspects and roles of observers in observation of registration of voters

| Aspects to observe | CT (national/central level) | LTOs (regional/local level) |
|--|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Legal framework provisions (including eligibility criteria, restrictions, conditions, procedures enshrined in the legislation) | ✓ | |
| Data on the total number of registered voters | ✓ | |
| Preliminary voter register is available for public inspection | ✓ | |
| Assessing whether the voter registry is overall comprehensive, enfranchising most voters and allowing them the possibility to vote (including newly eligible voters) | ✓ | |
| Consistent/regular removing of ineligible or deceased individuals, allowing for a reliable voter registry | ✓ | ✓ |
| Assessing (based on meetings with interlocutors) whether the voter registry/voter lists enjoys the confidence and trust of stakeholders | ✓ | ✓ |
| Voter education campaigns on social media and on the ground | ✓ | ✓ |
| When voter registration is active, citizens are able to register in time before Election Day. | ✓ | ✓ |
| Where registration is passive, citizens are able to request changes within a reasonable timeframe before Election Day | ✓ | ✓ |
| Possibility for effective opportunities and legal remedies for corrections to the voter registry | | ✓ |
| Extracts of voter lists are posted at polling stations or other accessible location before Election Day | | ✓ |
| Extracts of the voter lists correctly attribute voters to their respective polling stations | | ✓ |
| Problems with the voter register observed on Election Day | | ✓ |

✓ CT

✓ Both CT and LTOs

✓ LTOs

10.5. Registration of candidates and political parties

Fundamental political rights enshrined in international standards include freedom of association and the right to stand for election. Freedom of association and the right to stand are fundamental to the right to take part in government, including by forming or joining political parties. In general, a pluralistic environment is a precondition for genuine and democratic elections to take place, which means a competitive environment composed of different political views and interests.

The legal framework of the observed country should regulate procedures and rules applying to political parties and political movements. Restrictions on the right to form or join a political party should have legal grounds that are objective and reasonable, and the legislation should contain adequate provisions allowing a decision on the matter to be challenged.

When it comes to the process of registration of candidates and political parties in elections, it should be open and inclusive in order for the election to be considered genuine. This should be the case for all parties and candidates across the political spectrum, which is crucial for voters to exercise a real choice. The exclusion of candidates or parties for political or arbitrary reasons can put the genuineness of an election at risk. In that sense, party and candidate registration is a very important variable to measure when assessing an election's integrity.

Election management bodies are usually responsible for registering candidates. This can either be achieved at the central level or it can be devolved to regional or district level. It is relevant for the mission to assess whether procedures for registering candidates are clear, established in advance and applied consistently without undue discrimination or restrictions. In particular, the decision-making process on the matter should be transparent. This is of great importance in cases where such restrictions could aim at deliberately restricting the political options of voters and influencing their choice.

The requirements for candidate registration should be enshrined in legislation. Although some types of restrictions or conditions to be registered as a candidate may be permissible, they should be reasonable and should not include excessive or discriminatory grounds such as those based on gender, ethnicity, language, education, etc.

Other examples of unreasonable restrictions may include a requirement to have an excessive number of supporting signatures, or extremely high financial deposits, for instance. Additionally, a reasonable time frame should be provided for candidates to submit registration documentation before the closing of registration.

Rejections of candidacies should be done only on substantial and evidenced grounds, based on the legal provisions in force. It is important that prospective candidates have the right and opportunity to correct technical errors in their documentation, and the opportunity to challenge a decision rejecting their candidacy. Complaints pertaining to candidate registration should be addressed within a reasonable time frame before election day in

order for candidates that obtained legal redress to have sufficient time to campaign.

Mission members should be mindful of the fact that the candidate registration process may have unfolded before the mission was deployed. The mission should nevertheless assess the legal and procedural framework and evaluate how effectively candidate registration was conducted. This includes following possible complaints submitted in this regard.

In countries using more complex electoral systems or during local elections, LTOs may be required to play an important role in tracking the registration of candidates and complaints in respective localities.

Key issues to be assessed by the mission include:

- Whether the right to form or join a political party is guaranteed by the legislation.
- Whether there are undue restrictions or conditions for the registration of political parties and candidates that are excessive and/or contrary to international standards.
- Whether there were any political movements refused registration as a political party, and whether the refusal can be deemed reasonable and in line with the law and/or international standards.
- Whether a party or candidate was denied registration on technical grounds (for instance, mistakes in submitted documentation), and whether they were given the opportunity to correct these shortcomings before the decision became final.
- Whether the legal and procedural framework for candidate registration provides for the right to stand for election on equal grounds for all candidates, political parties and political groups.
- Whether criteria and/or restrictions provided for in the legislation were applied without discrimination and objectively.
- Whether prospective candidates were allowed to correct mistakes in their documentation or other technical errors before the legal deadline and, when necessary, were given the opportunity to challenge decisions refusing their registration.

- Whether any aspects of candidate registration were unduly restrictive or discriminatory towards women candidates, national minorities or other minority groups, affecting their right to stand for election.

Table 8: Overview of aspects and roles of observers in observation of registration of candidates and political parties

| Aspects to observe | CT (national/central level) | LTOs (regional/local level) |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Assessment of the legal and procedural framework for candidate registration (eligibility criteria, restrictions, conditions, procedures enshrined in the legislation) | ✓ | |
| Assessing that criteria and/or restrictions provided for in the legislation were applied without discrimination and objectively | ✓ | |
| Assessing complaints (at the national level) and assessing grounds for rejection/acceptance of candidacy registration | ✓ | |
| Tracking data on the total number of registered parties/lists/candidates | ✓ | ✓ |
| Assessing are able to register free from violence, pressure, harassment, and without arbitrary dismissal of their candidacies | ✓ | ✓ |
| Assessing whether parties and candidates representing minority groups (women, PWDs, national minorities, etc.) are able to register free from violence, pressure, harassment before and during registration, and without arbitrary dismissal of their candidacies | ✓ | ✓ |
| Collecting information on complaints regarding registration in respective local areas | | ✓ |
| Assessing the opinion of parties at the local level on how registration was managed, notably if it was a devolved process. | | ✓ |
| Tracking possible withdrawals of candidacies at the local level | | ✓ |

✓ CT

✓ Both CT and LTOs

✓ LTOs

10.6. Electoral campaign and campaign finance

10.6.1. Electoral campaign

Campaign: definitions and activities

Freedoms of assembly and association, along with freedoms of expression and of movement, without discrimination, are preconditions to the conduct of genuine and democratic elections. The key objective of an electoral campaign is to provide for an open and fair contest.

For a fair and competitive campaign, opportunity should be given to all electoral contestants (candidates, political parties) and their supporters to promote programmes, party platforms and policies, while being able to hold meetings with citizens. Voters should have the right to be informed regarding their political options in order to make an informed choice when they vote. This means knowing the options available to them in terms of parties and candidates and what they stand for.

For this reason, it is crucial that equal opportunities are ensured, providing for a level playing field for electoral contestants. This includes the conduct of public rallies or events, the production of candidate/party paraphernalia, the distribution of electoral materials and other campaign activities. This should enable candidates, political parties and their supporters to freely present their views, programmes and attributes qualifying them to be elected.

It is equally important that electoral contestants are able to enjoy these rights free of violence, pressure, threats, intimidation or harassment, or incitement of acts of violence through negative campaigning or harsh political rhetoric.

It should be noted that the precise definition of campaigning can vary considerably depending on the observed country, notably in terms of time frames, rules and activities that the definition encompasses. Additionally, the nature of campaigning is changing quite rapidly, with a substantial increase in the use of online campaigning to supplement “traditional” physical campaigning such as rallies, meetings, door-to-door canvassing, billboards and leaflets, etc.

Campaign rules

Rules pertaining to campaigning should be enshrined in the electoral legislation and may include other regulations adopted by public authorities (such as EMBs). Although particular aspects of campaigning may be the object of specific regulations, primary legislation should include key provisions on the right to free and fair campaigning (namely, the electoral law or Constitution). Aspects such as media coverage and financing of campaign activities can often be governed by specific regulations or other secondary legislation. In addition, it may occur that contestants ratify a specific code of conduct for

the conduct of the campaign, although it is not necessarily legally enforceable.

Among other important aspects, the legislation should provide for equitable treatment by public authorities and equal access to state resources. Administrative actions, including sanctions or measures aimed at limiting the right to campaign, should not be arbitrary.

However, reasonable restrictions can be imposed on a number of activities during the campaign period. For instance, this includes the prohibition of campaigning immediately before voting day (often referred to as the “electoral silence” period), a practice that is frequently found in the ENEMO observation region. This can also include a ban on the publication of public opinion polls for a given period before election day. Nevertheless, campaign rules should not over-restrict freedoms of association, assembly, expression and movement.

Whenever regulations pertaining to campaigning are adopted by state administrative bodies or EMBs, they should respect the principle of equality of opportunity for all candidates and political parties. They should be enforced by the relevant authorities under principles of impartiality and consistency in order to ensure a level playing field. This means that all regulations and any possible restrictions should be applied equally to all contestants and should not be implemented in a manner that excessively limits their opportunities to campaign freely.

Observing campaign events and campaigning online

Long-term observers are tasked with attending campaign events, which include rallies, public meetings with voters, debates, etc., although CT analysts (namely the election campaign analyst) may do so as well. Other common forms of campaigning include billboards, door-to-door canvassing, distribution of campaign materials (which are generally required by law to be marked with the party/candidate along with mention of the printing company that produced them) and other types of campaigning outlets. Over the years, the importance of social media and online campaigning has significantly increased, and it has become a highly relevant campaigning outlet that should not be overlooked by the mission (see Section 10.7).

When it comes to campaign events, observers should prioritize objectivity and political balance by attending the events of several different electoral contestants across the political spectrum during their period of deployment. This should include both opposition and governmental parties, but also independent candidates when possible. The purpose of attending campaign events is essentially to:

- Assess whether contestants and their supporters are able to gather freely and express themselves, enjoying the principles of freedom of assembly, expression and movement
- Assess the overall atmosphere of the event and whether it is peaceful, and without use of harsh rhetoric, inflammatory language, negative campaigning, black PR, etc.
- Assess the holding of the event in terms of form and content: relevant formal

aspects can include the approximate size of the event (in number of participants), demographics (including in terms of minority groups, such as women, youth, PWDs, etc.) and the type of event (rally, concert, meeting with voters, etc.); in terms of content, this includes the rhetoric used, subjects introduced, policy themes mentioned, party platforms presented, etc.

- Assess whether campaigning rules, requirements and conditions are consistently implemented and respected; in particular, observers should pay attention to the behaviour of the police or security forces at events, and the extent to which they facilitate or hinder the gathering.
- Assess whether there is evidence of the use of state resources, such as official vehicles, which may have been used by a ruling party for the event. Additionally, observers should take note of cases where state employees may have been pressured to attend or bussed to the event, in order to bolster numbers.

It is important to note that when attending campaign events, observers should not act in a manner that could be interpreted as a political or partisan attitude, and they should **maintain neutrality at all times**. Additionally, observers should measure possible safety risks and prioritize their and their assistant's physical security at all times. **Should signs of danger arise, observers and any other mission staff should leave the premises/location immediately.**

With regard to online campaigning, particularly campaigning on social media, this aspect is covered more thoroughly in Section 10.7 of this chapter. However, observers should note that the media analyst of the mission may require information from LTO reports covering social media outlets when they are used as a means to campaign. This includes keeping track of posts, videos from campaign events, political advertising, slogans or other means of communication used through the official channels of parties and candidates, such as their social media pages. Since most of the time these are in the local language of the observed country, LTO assistants should assist in gathering information of potential interest to observers and the core team.

In terms of content, observers should pay attention to possible negative campaigning, black PR, and hateful or inflammatory posts and comments. This should provide an additional indication of the tone of the campaign, and whether electoral contestants are infringing the principle of fair campaigning. Sanctions may additionally be included in the legislation when it comes to issues such as defamation, slander or public insult, although some countries distinguish social media space from the general public space while others do not.

Vote buying, misuse of administrative resources, abuse of office

Within their legislations, different countries define (or fail to define) the notion of “vote buying” or “bribing of voters”. Generally, vote buying refers to the exchange of money or other benefits to voters to incentivize their support for a particular contestant (party or candidate), with the aim of manipulating election results.

In this regard, some legislations distinguish the notion of “direct vote buying” (money) from the notion of “indirect vote buying” (distribution of goods and/or services). In any case, such practices constitute a serious offence, and even allegations of vote buying can affect trust in the process or undermine the credibility of election results.

It is important to note that vote buying is a difficult phenomenon to observe, as it is generally hidden and observers rarely witness it in plain sight. However, observers should report on and follow up on possible allegations of vote buying, in particular by checking whether complaints have been submitted and whether the respective authorities are investigating these allegations.

Other important issues that may occur during electoral campaigns are the misuse of administrative resources and abuse of office. This tends to be one of the prime problems with an election campaign and includes state funds being used by ministries, the use of state vehicles, pressure on statement employees and abuse of incumbency when state officials are actively involved in campaigning.

These issues are of great importance in the framework of the mission’s observation, as the fairness of a campaign can be severely undermined where state resources (“administrative resources”) are used as a means to campaign for one candidate or political party.

For instance, the use of public buildings for campaign events, which can also be seen as state resources, should be available on an equitable basis and offered to all contestants. Incumbents should refrain from using benefits or advantages granted by their elected office as part of an election campaign, including state vehicles and state funds. Public officials and civil servants should only participate in campaign activities during their personal time and not during working hours, and should not use equipment such as official vehicles for this purpose. Civil servants and state employees should not be compelled to attend campaign events either.

LTOs play an important role in observing these issues at the local level, including any abuse of state resources for campaign purposes and allegations of vote buying. While this can be challenging to adequately observe, CT analysts and LTOs should monitor campaign spending patterns wherever possible with a view to detecting any transgressions of spending limits, billboard space of campaigning venues being provided on uneven grounds, misconduct by public officials abusing their mandate or other infringements affecting principles of equality among contestants. Given the difficulties in verifying some of these practices, or alleged practices, LTOs should also report allegations that they consider to be potentially true but must clearly indicate in their reports that these are only allegations and have not been verified or substantiated.

Generally, key issues when it comes to observing and assessing an electoral campaign include:

- Whether freedoms of expression, assembly, association and movement are provided for in the legislation, free of any form of discrimination, and whether there were any unreasonable restrictions to these rights during the campaign.
- Whether all electoral contestants were able to exercise these rights equally, and were given equal treatment by national and local authorities.
- Whether the conditions for a level playing field in the campaign were ensured, and whether campaign regulations were respected and enforced consistently and in an impartial manner.
- Whether electoral contestants signed or agreed upon a code of conduct, and if so, whether it was respected.
- Whether there were cases of allegations of violence, intimidation or pressure, or any forms of incitement to violence.
- Whether potential incidents were acted upon promptly, consistently and efficiently by the relevant bodies (including law enforcement agencies).
- Whether there were any restrictions on the ability of vulnerable groups to campaign, including women candidates, national minority candidates, people living with disabilities and young people.
- Whether electoral contestants mostly used “traditional campaigning outlets” (such as billboards, door-to-door canvassing, rallies, distribution of campaign materials, etc.) or online outlets such as social media, online platforms, etc. for their campaigns.

10.6.2. Campaign finance

It is important to distinguish between two notions that are often intertwined but easily confused:

Political finance, which refers to the general funding of political parties regardless of whether it is during an electoral cycle or not. This is the proper term for what can otherwise generally be defined in layman’s terms as “money in politics”.

Campaign finance, which refers to the funding provided to political parties or candidates

for the purpose of the election campaign (either through private donations or public funding), and how these funds are spent by the parties or candidates on campaign expenses.

The mission is required to focus on campaign finance, as it is specific to the election period and the observed election. However, it should also bear in mind the broader political finance context, as this may directly affect the ability of parties and candidates to compete. Also, political parties and candidates may incur a number of financial expenses before the official start of the election period.

Most importantly, depending on the context, the terms *political finance* (as the broader notion) and *campaign finance* (as the narrower notion) cannot be interchanged.

When it comes to campaign finance itself, its influence on elections and the potential outcomes of an election cannot be underestimated. This also means that there is a crucial need for campaign financing to be regulated in order to ensure a level playing field. Transparency regarding income and expenditures of parties and candidates should be viewed as a necessary precondition for regulation, as it allows effective oversight and enforcement by the relevant bodies.

Therefore, provisions regulating the financing of electoral campaigns and political party funding should be governed by principles of transparency and accountability. Legislation, and adherence to and enforcement of the legislation, should ensure that all aspects of political finance and campaign finance are transparent and accountable.

Where state funds are provided for campaign purposes, they should be disbursed on a fair and equitable basis. However, and although the regulations in vigour may also try to ensure a somewhat level playing field, possibly by having spending limits, it is not a requirement or realistic that all parties will have the same level of resources. There will inevitably be large national parties with higher amounts of resources, and smaller or newer parties that are less well resourced.

As a good practice, electoral contestants (candidates and political parties) should be obliged to disclose funding sources and expenditure by providing reports and information on their accounts regarding their campaigns.

When it comes to raising funds for their campaigns, conditions and restrictions imposed on electoral contestants should be reasonable and should apply equally to all candidates and political parties.

Examples of reasonable restrictions on campaign funding include limits on foreign donations and/or bans on anonymous sources. Limits on campaign spending may also be applied with the aim of facilitating a level playing field and avoiding the dominance of a single electoral contestant. However, any limits of this nature should not be excessive to the point where they may prevent effective campaigning – not least because unrealistically low spending limits may have the effect of encouraging circumvention of

the regulations.

Often, EMBs have responsibility for supervising and enforcing campaign finance regulations. However, it is not uncommon in the ENEMO observation region (and many other countries) to have separate institutions working either in cooperation or under the supervision of EMBs when it comes to campaign finance oversight. For instance, this may be the case with anti-corruption councils or independent financial oversight bodies in the respective country.

Campaign finance, and political finance more generally, is an area where there are few agreed-upon international standards. To some extent, the GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) framework from the Council of Europe does provide some insight, and a number of principles can allow for guidance in the mission's assessment³⁵. Generally, however, the following are considered good practice:

- An obligation for electoral contestants to disclose funding sources and provide detailed reports and accounts of their campaign expenditure
- Equitable and fair disbursement of state funding for campaign purposes (where applicable)
- Restrictions on donations and campaign expenditure should be reasonable and equally applied to all electoral contestants
- Limits on campaign spending can be relevant to prevent the dominance of a single electoral contestant. However, they should not be used as a means to prevent effective campaigning
- The specific institution in charge of campaign finance oversight and/or enforcing the legal provisions pertaining to campaign finance regulations should be clearly stated in the law
- Sanctions provided for infringement of campaign finance regulations should be enshrined in the legal framework and should be proportionate, applied consistently without discrimination and should not be arbitrary

Additionally, the importance of the role played by civil society when it comes to monitoring campaign finance (and political finance, more generally) has increased over the years. A number of watchdog organizations closely follow income and expenditure declarations, or conduct investigations into the matter with the aim of increasing public transparency and the accountability of elected officials. The role of CSOs is crucial in that regard, as are political finance oversight bodies in general.

³⁵ For instance, GRECO regularly publishes reports and studies on corruption and human rights, but also issues documentation such as codes of conduct of public officials, anti-corruption trends, challenges, good practices, activity reports and thematic studies: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco>.

Key aspects to assess regarding campaign finance include:

- Whether the legal framework provides for adequate and effective regulation of campaign finance, ensuring sufficient transparency and accountability.
- Whether the legal framework contains a requirement for electoral contestants to disclose both income and expenditure.
- Whether the legal framework explicitly states the responsibilities of the oversight body in charge of enforcing campaign finance regulations, whether this body disposes of sanctions enshrined in the law, and whether these sanctions were effectively applied in a consistent, impartial and effective manner.
- Whether the legal framework provides limits on income sources, received amounts and expenditures, and whether any restrictions are reasonable without excessively limiting opportunities to campaign.
- Whether there is public financing of political parties for their ongoing activities, and campaigning specifically (and if so, how this funding is allocated and whether conditions are equitable).
- Whether there are reporting requirements for electoral contestants requiring them to publish information on their campaign income and expenditure in a transparent and accountable manner (available for public consultation), and whether these requirements were respected by all electoral contestants.
- Whether there are concerns from stakeholders regarding the transparency of campaign finance and the full disclosure of income and expenditure by electoral contestants, or whether there are concerns pertaining to “shadow funding” (i.e., undisclosed revenue or expenditure) of electoral campaigns.
- Whether civil society organizations are monitoring campaign/political finance during the elections.

10.7. Media

The right for electoral contestants to communicate their messages and stances in the media is essential to a genuinely democratic electoral process. Journalistic freedom and journalists' reporting, in general, are also instrumental in enabling a democratic society. This is fundamental in order for voters to receive a broad and diverse array of information, allowing them to make an informed choice. Media in this sense play a crucial role in providing conditions for political parties and candidates to engage with voters during the electoral cycle.

The media are responsible for producing content and news regarding electoral programmes and campaign platforms, covering campaign events and debates among candidates, and providing general information on the process, including preparations for the elections and electoral procedures, as well as election day developments such as the voting process, turnout and results.

The importance of the media in the electoral cycle should therefore not be underestimated. They have a responsibility for providing adequate coverage of the elections in a balanced, fair and professional manner, with a view to informing the public on the diversity of political currents and crucial issues in the electoral process.

Accordingly, media regulation is also of great importance in the electoral process. The mission should assess the normative framework in terms of media freedoms and whether the regulatory framework enables freedom of expression, but also in terms of coverage rules and whether they provide for equitable grounds in the electoral campaigns. The mission should pay particular attention to whether all electoral contestants have reasonable access to media, whether the media provide balanced and fair coverage of the campaign and the range of contestants, and whether state media is impartial in its coverage.

10.7.1. Media and electoral campaigning

10.7.1.1. Media environment

When observing the media environment, the mission should assess whether:

- > State authorities are not unjustifiably limiting the activities of the media
- > Authorities are not preventing journalists from adequately reporting news, and do not unduly limit the promotion of pluralism and freedom of the media
- > Authorities are effectively protecting journalists from attacks, pressure or intimidation and enable a safe work environment, free from fear of political retribution for their reporting
- > There are no forms of physical violence against journalists, nor any illegal actions interfering with media freedom and the freedom of journalists to report (and otherwise, that any possible cases are investigated and prosecuted accordingly)

- > The environment is pluralistic, containing a diversity of viewpoints and political opinions to inform citizens

The above points are crucial aspects of the general media environment and should be assessed as a prerequisite for further analysing media conduct and campaign coverage.

10.7.1.2. Media regulations

In general, the legal framework for media coverage of election campaigns should not unduly limit the principle of freedom of expression. Media regulations should avoid being overly restrictive or unnecessarily hinder the activities of the media. They should therefore be proportional, evenly applied, and necessary to ensure a fair and democratic environment.

However, there are a number of legitimate instances where limits may be imposed on media. This includes, for instance, regulations such as an “electoral campaign silence” or limitations on public opinion polls immediately prior to voting day. Reasonable limitations also include provisions prohibiting the publication of material inciting hatred, whether for racial, religious or other discriminatory motives.

Media regulations should be targeted towards ensuring that all electoral contestants enjoy reasonable and unrestricted access to the media, along with coverage that is equitable. This principle also applies to advertising space, which should be provided under the same conditions, and the proportion of coverage. For instance, the media should not disproportionately cover official activities of incumbents and should make a clear distinction between reports on official duties and reports on campaign activities.

State-owned/public media have a particular responsibility in providing balanced, impartial and equitable coverage during the campaign period. State-funded media should ensure equal access conditions to electoral contestants as part of their accountability to the public. This is a crucial point and a very important reference for a mission in terms of findings.

It is reasonable for privately owned media to have fewer obligations in that regard. In that sense, it is not uncommon to see media that support a particular party or candidate as part of their editorial line. Nonetheless, the regulations in place should ensure standards of professionalism and the principle of balanced and fair coverage. This includes the distinction between news reporting facts and editorial pieces that are based on opinions.

Analysts should note that there is no universal media regulation model in electoral processes. Provisions may therefore take different forms and vary significantly. Some countries use a self-regulatory model based on ethics of professionalism and journalistic standards, while others use statutory regulation and various types of media oversight institutions to regulate media conduct.

10.7.1.3. Media oversight bodies

Media oversight bodies may be responsible for monitoring the implementation of media regulations, particularly when it comes to media coverage during the electoral process.

There are at least three main models for this type of oversight body:

- 1) **Self-regulation**, where media outlets usually have codes of conduct and abide by the rules they have collectively set forth
- 2) **An oversight body** responsible for overseeing the activities of the media on a permanent basis or specifically during the electoral period
- 3) **A branch of the election management body** in charge of organizing the electoral process. It may occur, depending on the observed country, that EMBs issue a code of conduct for media coverage.

Regardless of the model, the oversight body should operate impartially, independently, transparently and efficiently to ensure compliance of all outlets with the media regulations in force. It should also hold responsibility for administering complaints and sanction possible violations.

There should be a functional system providing a framework for processing media-related complaints. Sanctions imposed by oversight bodies should be dissuasive, proportional and gradual (ranging from corrections to retractions of content to fines and possibly further administrative sanctions). In any case, decisions made by media oversight bodies should be appealable. Generally, although sanctions should be gradual and proportionate, they should avoid excessive criminal liability or other drastic measures that could have an intimidating effect on the media environment. This could lead to fear of journalists, self-censorship or other negative consequences affecting media freedom.

10.7.1.4. Online media and elections

Given the rapid development of Internet-based means of communication over the years, online media (particularly social media) have significantly expanded the opportunity to produce and receive information. This holds the potential to increase the engagement of citizens and facilitate their broader participation in the public sphere, including during the electoral process.

The Internet has enabled faster and more direct outreach of citizens than traditional media. Social media in particular, which are generally free aside from paid political advertising, allow political parties, candidates, EMBs and CSOs to engage directly with citizens by publishing election-related content. The amount of information and political news and the number of influencers (on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) have also

drastically increased. The amount of online-only media in the form of web portals, blogs, podcasts and Internet TV (such as YouTube) has also substantially increased, as have the number of social media apps allowing for the creation of groups broadcasting political content (WhatsApp, Telegram, Viber, etc.).

As such, the role and importance of the online sphere during electoral processes has become an increasingly relevant aspect of assessment for ENEMO IEOMs. Specifically, the mission should pay attention to the way that online media and other web platforms are used by electoral contestants during their campaigns.

Many of the normative provisions that usually apply to traditional media also apply to social media. However, due to the growing influence of online media, including social media, countries have struggled to identify and adequately regulate aspects specific to these types of outlets. Issues such as a lack of accountability of anonymous pages, a lack of transparency regarding paid political advertising (such as Google and Facebook ads), online hate speech and disinformation/misinformation (“fake news”) have posed a challenge to public authorities during elections.

The most pressing issue remains the fact that unlike traditional broadcast media, online media often have no statutory obligation to maintain impartiality, balance and fairness in relation to the coverage of elections. This extends to notions such as “electoral campaign silence” (see above), which is highly unlikely to be enforced on social media. Additionally, through such platforms, a variety of actors who are not journalists are enabled to share news and publish content. On the one hand, online media and online journalism are bound by regulations, professional ethics and specific legal provisions, while on the other, different types of user-generated content such as private Facebook pages and political party websites cannot be held accountable for such rules. Posting by individuals, commenting or content sharing generally remains extremely difficult to regulate properly (if not impossible beyond defamation and hate speech) without affecting the right to freedom of expression.

A number of international instruments³⁶ allow for restrictions on certain types of speech online, particularly regarding harmful content, but only according to specific guarantees and safeguard mechanisms to prevent undue limitations to freedom of expression.

³⁶ Such as:

- > Article 19 of the ICCPR
- > The Council of the European Union, EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014
- > The UN General Assembly: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, A/66/290, 10 August 2011.

10.7.2. Assessing media and elections

In line with the above, the mission should focus on assessing media in terms of impartiality, fairness, balance and equality, as well as the enforcement of media regulations by respective media oversight bodies. The conduct of the media during an election campaign may be part of media-specific legislation or be included in the electoral legislation. In either case, those provisions should be the object of an assessment by the mission.

When it comes to traditional media, the mission should focus on the following aspects:

- Whether the legal framework provides for an environment allowing access to media, proper conditions and adequate oversight.
- Whether electoral contestants were given fair access to the media and on equitable grounds.
- Whether media coverage of electoral contestants was generally balanced and unbiased, and whether the rules on electoral campaigning coverage were respected.
- Whether media coverage of elections and election campaigns was sufficient to inform voters, and whether voters had the opportunity to make an informed choice through adequate information and diversity of sources/opinions.
- Whether there were any cases of hate speech, inflammatory language, defamation or breaches of professional standards of journalism (including accurate and non-biased news reporting).
- Whether any media outlets demonstrated preferential support for specific political parties or candidates.
- Whether incumbent officials benefitted from an advantage through the use of their institutional mandates, granting them an unfair edge during the campaign.
- Whether the “electoral campaign silence” was respected in the media sphere (if applicable).
- Whether the coverage and formats used by the media in covering elections were adequate (debates among candidates, talk shows, interviews, etc.).
- Whether possible complaints about media coverage were properly adjudicated, in line with the provisions of the law.

When it comes to online media and social media, although ENEMO does not have a comprehensive methodology or extensive resources, ENEMO IEOMs have started using tools such as CrowdTangle to provide a qualitative assessment of election-related social media content (see Section 10.7.3 below).

This is achieved by using the software to determine the level of activity of electoral contestants' official social media accounts. CrowdTangle makes it possible to measure the number of posts and interactions on those pages, and therefore to determine which contestants had the highest presence and outreach in that regard. This should be complemented by a qualitative analysis of the dominant topics in the campaign that these accounts reflected.

Additionally, the mission should pay attention to the regulatory framework regarding Internet access, freedom of expression online and whether news coverage by media (including web versions of traditional media) is free from online censorship. The mission should also follow possible cases of hate speech, defamation, "black PR" or targeted discriminatory speech (for instance, against women or minorities). Analysts should determine how widely the Internet was used as a means of campaigning by electoral contestants and assess the level of outreach to citizens (including platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, messaging applications, etc.).

When it comes to online/social media, the mission should focus on the following aspects:

- Whether the regulatory framework is adequate, allowing for online freedom of expression but also providing a framework to effectively sanction hate speech, defamation and other possible abusive content.
- Whether electoral contestants used paid political advertising online, if so, to what extent, and whether this was properly labelled as such.
- Which electoral contestants had the most visibility online, and assessing the tone and themes of their campaigning.
- Which types of online/social media were used the most, including messaging applications and most prominent platforms.
- Whether other key above-mentioned aspects applicable to traditional media were also respected when it comes to online/social media.

10.7.3. Monitoring social media

Spreading fake news and toxic narratives has become a global problem, one for which the society doesn't have an answer yet. Disinformation, trolling, online violence, etc. have become an unavoidable part of electoral campaigns among politicians. Unfortunately, due to social media's global reach, spreading a harmful narrative has become the dysfunctional new "normal" for political actors across the globe.

By influencing and shaping public attitudes via social media, computational propaganda tools and techniques have become a worrying threat to democracies all over the world. Society and national and international institutions and organizations are still searching for an adequate answer to this phenomenon.

Social media has significantly changed the nature of political communication. It has enabled foreign interference in national elections and wider involvement of third parties in electoral campaigns and has therefore strongly challenged the way we understand the election process, democracy and media. We are living in a reality in which the truthfulness of information is no longer a key criterion for its dissemination. There aren't any spatial and temporal boundaries to the duplication of information, fake news and disinformation.

Due to all these facts, understanding social media and how big its influence is on citizens' attitude and informed choice, and which online tactics politicians use to run their electoral campaign, is crucial for election monitoring observers.

The following paragraphs represent an introduction to the social media monitoring of ENEMO election observers through the use of the CrowdTangle platform. This section represents the basis for further learning about social media monitoring and digital communication.

10.7.3.1. Definition of CrowdTangle

CrowdTangle is a public insights tool from Facebook, through which social media monitors are able to track and analyse **public content** of social media. CrowdTangle tracks **interactions**, which are defined as **reactions, comments and shares**.

Insights from CrowdTangle data can be shared publicly, but you may not share the raw data publicly (such as CSVs)³⁷. For more information about CrowdTangle please visit the official CrowdTangle web page: <https://www.crowdtangle.com/>.

³⁷ Fan C, *Understanding and Citing Crowd Tangle Data*, <https://help.crowdtangle.com/en/articles/4558716-understanding-and-citing-crowdtangle-data>

Steps to follow when using the CrowdTangle platform:

» **Identifying actors and creation of the dashboard**

Before starting to conduct social media monitoring, monitors must be familiar with the socio-political background of the country in which the elections are being held. This means that social media monitors must have a clear picture of who the political actors are (which parties or candidates, media), which CSOs are influential, etc. Knowledge of these facts is a prerequisite for the creation of **a dashboard at CrowdTangle**. The dashboard enables social media monitors to build the lists of the public accounts and pages that are relevant for the topic of the monitoring (**political parties, media, CSOs** and *other* potentially important actors for the electoral campaign). Creating lists of these accounts and pages will make the job of social media monitors easier as they will be able to follow all the online activities of political actors in one place. Social media monitors will also gain insight into the level of performance of political actors on Facebook, how popular their posts are, how people react to them, etc. Of course, by following these pages and accounts, social media monitors will be able to identify potential violations of the electoral campaign, such as the spreading of hate speech, online violence against women in politics, etc.

Apart from the above-mentioned pages and accounts, social media monitors must be aware of the existence of third parties or so called “influential” pages and accounts that spread “memes” and satirical content with the aim of impacting the political choice of citizens. Unfortunately, memes and satirical content seem to be a more readable and popular source of information than the real news, due to its shortness and visual identity. There are many online violations in these kinds of posts, as political actors (especially women) are usually presented in an inappropriate way, focusing on women’s naked bodies, their sexuality, etc. The aim of such violations is to discredit political actors and to humiliate them as people and politicians and devalue their political ideology. Such cases must be identified by social media monitors and reported to the core team so that they can report these kinds of online violations to the relevant state institutions.

Finally, in identifying actors to monitor, social media monitors must pay attention to, and be sure that, Facebook pages of political parties and candidates (which they follow) are their official Facebook pages. This can be judged by how active the particular Facebook page is in posting and the number of people who have liked the Facebook page (there are usually hundreds of thousands of likes). The number of likes of pages is important as this could indicate that the particular Facebook page is fake and not the official page of the party or candidate and therefore it is irrelevant for monitoring.

TO CONCLUDE: *There are three categories of actors to be monitored through social media: direct participants of electoral campaigns, state political actors and other actors relevant for the electoral campaign.*

Actors to monitor:

Direct participants of electoral campaigns: political parties or candidates


State political actors: Government, ministries, president, prime minister, etc.

Other actors relevant for electoral campaign: media, CSOs, mem pages and other third parties

» Creation of the dashboard

Once the actors of an electoral campaign have been identified, social media monitors can proceed with the creation of the CrowdTangle dashboard. Social media monitors should be guided by the following steps:

1. Open the dashboard created for the specific election monitoring
2. From the left-hand menu, select the “Lists” option and then “+ Create List”
3. Choose the type of list you want to create
4. Name and save the list (e.g., “political parties”, “national media”)
5. Add accounts. Entities can be added by typing the name or copying and pasting the Facebook account URL.
6. Make sure you have added all the pages and accounts to the dashboard. The created dashboard can be edited and therefore some pages and accounts can be added or deleted, if necessary.



» Intelligence

Crowd Tangle’s value lies in the fact that it provides to social media monitors comparative analysis of political actors’ performance. This is possible due to the Crowd Tangle’s option Intelligence.



It is possible to gain the following information by using the Intelligence option:

1. Performance trends of one account or page over a certain period of time
2. Comparative analysis of performance trends between pages or accounts and within different periods of time
3. Information on which account or page has the best performance over a certain period of time and why (for example, after some public debate by political actors)

10.7.3.2. Monitoring of online activity of actors

There are several online activities and behaviours that social media monitors should identify in their monitoring, and which are defined as campaign violations through social media. Such cases pertain to the spreading of disinformation, fake news, misinformation campaigns, trolling, hate speech, online violence against women and vulnerable groups, electoral silence, etc.

It is important to pay special attention to **foreign actors' engagement** and **interference** in electoral campaigns. Social media monitors are advised to use different kinds of letters (such as Cyrillic or others) to check the existence of some particular pages and accounts, which potentially can be created with a view to interfering in the elections of a particular country.

In monitoring online activities, social media monitors should also give attention to the existence of sponsored ads on Facebook and coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Due to their importance, a special chapter will be devoted to these topics.

» Campaign violations

Campaign violations imply infringement of established rules by domestic legislation strictly correlated to the campaign and candidacy.

This section refers to violations of electoral campaigns on social media. Below, a detailed explanation is given of what kinds of campaign violations exist and how social media monitors can identify them, who the actors of online violence are and to whom they are directed, and how social media should report and analyse online violence in the context of electoral campaigns.

Apart from the fact that freedom of expression is fundamental and political speech is the most protected form of speech, according to human rights and constitutional law, it is important to emphasize that political parties' usage of social media has become a dangerous tool that can seriously disrupt democratic processes and decision-making.

The reason for that is the fact that the social media environment is not regulated by the law and there aren't any ethical obligations that must be applied in using social media.

There are several aspects of online electoral campaigning that help increase the number of campaign violations:

- 1. Broadcasting regulation:** there aren't any restrictions on the amount of political representation of political actors on social media as is the case with traditional media. There aren't any restrictions either when it comes to the content of political actors' posts on social media. There is one interesting example of misuse of social media that ENEMO identified during the electoral campaign for parliamentary elections in Serbia in 2022, which was predominantly conducted through social media due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The example pertains to a promotional video of President Aleksandar Vučić's Serbian Progressive Party, which features an underaged girl. This video provoked criticism of Vučić from the perspective of child abuse for political purposes. Consequently, the Serbian Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM) issued a decision on 1 June 2020 banning the broadcast of this video. Although this decision applied only to electronic media and did not cover the use of social networks, this case was particularly sensitive from the perspective of children's rights, and based on observations, the controversial video was not removed immediately from the Facebook account of the Serbian Progressive Party and was still there on 9 June 2020. It is important to emphasize that according to Article 30 of the Serbian Law on Public Information and Media, social media platforms are not media and therefore are not regulated by this law. Bearing this in mind, it is problematic that regardless of the content, posts on these platforms cannot be banned by any regulatory body. In this case, the only action that could be taken was public appeal to the subject who was the creator of the particular post. This case represents a great example for social media monitors to examine to see if there are any differences between the videos promoted through traditional media and the ones promoted through social media.
- 2. Main topics of political actors:** social media monitors should pay attention to the topics that political actors are writing about on social media. These topics could include the pandemic and how the government is coping with this crisis situation, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and attitudes of political actors that they share on social media about EU integration, NATO, etc. It is important that social media monitors identify the usage of hate speech between political actors, and the above-mentioned topics could potentially be reasons for the use of hate speech towards a particular political actor(s).
- 3. Spreading disinformation, malinformation, etc.:** there are situations when political actors spread malign narrative about their political opponents or people from public discourse, such as NGO leaders, who oppose their ideology. There have been some cases in Montenegro when NGO leaders were attacked through social media by the then ruling party. The posts called upon citizens not to trust analysis by this leader, underestimating his professionalism and giving him inappropriate descriptions of his physical appearance, etc. Such examples must be reported by social media monitors, as they represent serious online violence, through which they want to impact

the outcome of the elections. Further details on the spreading of disinformation and the tactics used for this are provided below.

4. **Targeting:** in addition to the previous paragraphs, it is crucial to pay attention to which demographic groups the key messages of political actors are directed toward. This is of great importance because political actors sometimes concentrate their efforts on one group of people in order to increase the influence on them and manipulate their political choice.
5. **Violation of electoral silence:** many political actors use social media to communicate with voters even in the period when the law obliges them to adopt electoral silence. This is reflected in the live appeals of political actors through social media channels. This represents misuse of social media as the political actors take advantage of the fact that social media are not regulated by the law. Social media monitors' duty is to identify these kinds of misuse and to record such acts in their reports.
6. **Campaign spending limits:** procedures and rules on spending on advertising vary by country. For tracking costs on sponsorships through social media, it is problematical that these costs are not always transparent, which represents fertile ground for potential financial misuse. Social media monitors should use Ad Library and Ad Library Report to track this aspect of election campaigning. Further explanation about the usage of Ad Library will be provided in the continuation of this section.

All that is mentioned above opens the door for campaign violations and manipulation of citizens' political choice.

Key terms:

- **Misinformation** is false, inaccurate or misleading information, regardless of the intent to deceive.
- **Disinformation** is the deliberate creation, distribution and/or amplification of false, inaccurate or misleading information intended to deceive.
- **Malinformation** takes truthful or factual information and weaponizes it for persuasion. For example, this might include content that was released as part of a hack-and-leak operation, where private messages are shared publicly with the goal of undermining an adversary.
- **Propaganda** is information designed to promote a political goal, action or outcome. Propaganda often involves disinformation but can also make use of facts, stolen information or half-truths to sway individuals. It often makes emotional appeals, rather than focusing on rational thoughts or arguments. Propaganda can be pushed by other actors, but in this report, we focus specifically on state-sponsored propaganda.
- **Hate speech** is the use of discriminatory language with reference to a person or group on the basis of identity, including an individual's religion, ethnicity, nationality, ability, gender or sexual orientation. Hate speech is often a part of broader information manipulation efforts. It is particularly present in election contexts where the goal of information manipulation is to polarize political discourse and/or suppress the

political participation of a particular group³⁸.

Tactics:

Information manipulation makes use of a variety of tactics to spread, amplify or target messages to different audiences on social media. Many of these tactics exploit the features of digital and social networking technologies to spread different kinds of content. While media manipulation is not new, digital tactics can change the scope, scale and precision of information manipulation in various ways.

- **AI-generated technology** is used in information manipulation to create fake profiles or content. Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, such as generative adversarial networks (GANs), use machine learning “neural networks” to create images or videos that look like real people but are completely fake. This includes “deepfake” videos, which use AI technologies to create realistic-looking videos that are entirely false.
- **Manipulated visual content** is used in information manipulation to photoshop images or edit videos. This can involve so-called “cheap fakes”, which do not use AI-generated technologies but rather alter videos with a lower level of technical sophistication.
- **Search engine manipulation** uses tools from digital advertising – such as keyword placement – to exploit gaps in search results. These strategies attempt to place disinformation at the top of search engine queries, so that individuals looking for accurate information are more likely to come across disinformation.
- **Fake websites** are used to create the substance behind an influence manipulation campaign by creating “fake news” websites or content farms that publish large amounts of false, misleading or inaccurate stories, sometimes counterfeiting real news organizations.
- **Trolling** is the bullying or harassing of individuals to provoke an emotional reaction in the target. While anyone can be trolled online, certain communities experience trolling differently – and often more severely. This includes women, individuals with diverse gender identities, racial or ethnic minorities and people of colour.
- **Computational propaganda** involves the use of “bots” and other forms of automated technologies to amplify propaganda and other harmful content online. Bots are pieces of code designed to mimic human behaviour by liking, sharing, retweeting or even commenting on posts. They can be used to falsely amplify certain kinds of content or accounts online.
- **Fake or “sock puppet” accounts** involve accounts, run by real people, that generate inorganic engagement. Like bots, fake or sock puppet accounts can like, share, retweet or comment on posts to falsely amplify certain kinds of content or accounts online. But rather than being automated, fake or sock puppet accounts are run by real people.

38 Arnaudo D, Bradshaw S, Ooi HH, Schwalbe K, Studdart A, Zakem V, and Zink A, *Combating Information Manipulation: A Playbook for Elections and Beyond*, 2021, page 6-7

- **Hack-and-leak operations** involve hacking into private or sensitive information sources and strategically leaking information to the public in order to undermine the trust or integrity of a person or idea.
 - **Account takeovers** involve hacking into the accounts of real people in order to impersonate them or spread mis/disinformation to large audiences.
 - **Advertising and microtargeting** involve using online advertising platforms to collect data about users and target them with persuasive messaging.
 - **Censorship** involves blocking, redirecting or throttling access to certain kinds of information online³⁹.
- » **Coordinated inauthentic behaviour and influence operations**

Influence operations are defined as coordinated efforts to manipulate or corrupt public debate for a strategic goal⁴⁰.

Coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) is a subset of influence operations, defined as “any coordinated network of accounts, pages and groups that centrally relies on fake accounts to mislead Facebook and people using our services about who is behind it and what they are doing”⁴¹.

The people behind CIB coordinate with one another and use fake accounts to misrepresent themselves⁴². Apart from this, there are fake Facebook accounts that are made for the sole purpose of negatively commenting on opponents’ posts and spreading fake news. These fake accounts can be made by individuals who are not part of the electoral campaign but also by political actors who pay individuals to leave comments in which they express hate speech, disinformation and other non-ethnic narratives. Facebook users who are involved in CIB are often behind Facebook meme pages, groups and pages that are dedicated to culture and entertainment but use these pages to share political narratives and manipulate citizens and jeopardize voters’ right to free and informed choice.

It is important to note that the increase in negative phenomena such as inauthentic and manipulative behaviours and abuses, particularly during periods of intensified political and social engagement, i.e., elections, is a global trend. Indeed, international research has shown the rise in popularity of right-wing political ideologies as they are more successful in engaging their Facebook followers than their competitors⁴³. They often use sensational rhetoric and hate-mongering as campaign techniques, utilizing social media to largely undisputedly articulate their ideology and spread their messages⁴⁴.

39 Arnaudo D, Bradshaw S, Ooi HH, Schwalbe K, Studdart A, Zakem V, and Zink A, *Combating Information Manipulation: A Playbook for Elections and Beyond*, 2021, page 740 40 Facebook, Threat Report, The State of Influence Operations 2017–2020, p. 6.

41 Idem.

42 Gleicher, N., *Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior in UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia*, Facebook, 2019 in Zrnovic M, Vukcevic I, Simonovic V, *Reshaping the Electoral Run Through the Usage of Social Media in Montenegro*, 2020, page 9

43 Larsson O. A., *Right-wingers on the rise online – insights from the 2018 Swedish Elections*, Kristiania University College, School of Communication, Leadership and Marketing, 2019 in Zrnovic M, Vukcevic I, Simonovic V, *Reshaping the Electoral Run Through the Usage of Social Media in Montenegro*, 2020, page 9

44 Idem.

Taking these facts into account, the responsibility of social media monitors is even bigger in preserving the integrity of the electoral process. Identifying the relationship between social media and the electoral process is the key to high quality social media monitoring. Therefore, ENEMO calls all observers to identify as many harmful narratives as possible and to report them to the core team.

More about coordinated inauthentic behaviour and influence operations can be read in Facebook's report at: <https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/IO-Threat-Report-May-20-2021.pdf>

10.7.4. Reporting and assessment of social media influence on the electoral campaign

All the information and data that social media monitors have gathered during monitoring should be systematically and methodologically organized. It is recommended to split data in accordance with the time frame for monitoring (pre-campaign period, E-day and post-election period or the time between two rounds of elections if that is the case).

It is recommended that social media monitors develop a database to maintain a record of different elements of their campaign violations monitoring efforts. Based on all the information and data, social media monitors will be able to conclude which strategies and tools were used for campaigning on social networks, including the nature of content (paid or not, true or fake, etc.) and type of content (fake, memes, photos, video, etc.). It is always good and recommended to conduct comparative analysis on the campaign strategies and tools of different political actors, or the same political actors but within different electoral campaigns (for example, comparative analysis of elections between 2019 and 2022). This analysis can even be done for a comparison of strategies during two cycles of the elections. The Intelligence option within CrowdTangle is useful a tool for collecting this type of data and conducting comparative analysis.

Indispensable parts of databases are the details about advertising, the total spent on online ads and the target audience. Due to the large number of online paid ads, monitors might not be in a position to observe and assess all of the ads produced by electoral contestants, particularly political paid ads of third parties.

Moreover, what the different platforms include in their ad libraries varies from country to country. For instance, in some countries, only ads placed by registered contestants are listed, while in others, third-party and "political issue" ads are also featured. Ad Library and Ad Library Report are recommended tools for this type of data gathering.

At the end of monitoring, social media monitors should provide an overall assessment of the social media influence on the electoral campaign as well as the level of foreign interference in the electoral process and election results. Also, based on the data collected from social networks, monitors should be able to determine the similarities

between the online and traditional forms of campaigning and to point out any significant differences.

Useful links for fact checking:

- 4.1. FotoForensics: <https://fotoforensics.com/>
- 4.2. Image recognition for content moderation and fraud detection (TinEye): <https://tineye.com/>
- 4.3. Generator of fake portraits and fake faces of non-existent humans: <https://thispersondoesnotexist.com/>
- 4.4. Metadata2Go.com is a free online tool that allows you to access the hidden exif and metadata of your files: <https://www.metadata2go.com/>

10.8. Participation of women

ENEMO missions integrate a gender perspective into all of its election observation activities by taking into account the way election processes affect both women and men. In general, women and men should have an equal right to participate in all aspects of public life. Therefore, in order to be in line with international standards, women, as well as men, must be able to fully enjoy all of their political rights.

Careful consideration should be given by the mission to equal rights and opportunities for women and men in the electoral process. This concerns all aspects of the process, not only voter registration and voting, but also the right to stand for election and to campaign freely and free from any forms of violence, harassment, pressure or intimidation.

Women should also be well represented in submitted electoral lists, as well as within political parties, including leadership positions. In addition, they should have equal access to positions within the election administration, at all levels. Therefore, analysts should assess women's participation in elections as voters, candidates and elected representatives, but also the role of women in leadership positions in the government, state institutions and the election administration, along with how the legal framework and media structures affect women, especially as candidates.

It is very important for the mission to take into account the legal framework when it comes to women's representation (for instance, gender quotas, parity in public administration, etc.), but also the socio-political and cultural environment. In many countries where ENEMO observes, it is not uncommon to find that cultural traditions, discriminatory practices or even laws hinder women from gaining equal access in politics. Although women may be equal under the legislation, they may be subject to many other forms of discrimination, direct or indirect, or face cultural preconceptions limiting their opportunities for political participation. Therefore, attention should be paid to whether adequate measures are in place for empowering and enabling women to participate.

Many aspects of an electoral process can have consequences for women's participation and representation. For instance, the electoral system in place can work to the disadvantage of women. In that regard, proportional systems with closed lists generally facilitate the access of women in parliamentary or local elections. Likewise, if political parties have no mechanisms in place to facilitate women's active participation, it may be more challenging for women than men to be selected as candidates. "Family voting" in some countries can hinder women's right to secrecy of voting.

These are a few examples of issues that will require the mission to comprehensively assess how the above-mentioned aspects affect women, along with their political and electoral rights. Generally, the mission should analyse how the political, legal and social structures affect women (as well as men) in the electoral process.

Analysts should also note that the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) affirms that "temporary special measures aimed at accelerating the de facto equality of men and women shall not be considered discrimination". This allows countries to have policies and measures that reserve seats or provide quotas for women. The mission should assess how these mechanisms are implemented, and the extent to which these measures are effective in achieving their aims.

When it comes to women's participation, the mission should pay attention to:

- Whether political rights of citizens are restricted on unreasonable or discriminatory grounds, and whether all eligible citizens were equally provided with an opportunity to enjoy their political rights as voters and/or candidates.
- Whether there are any laws, regulations or practices that can result in indirect discrimination or disadvantage to women.
- Whether women are well represented in electoral lists as well as in EMBs, or whether there is a lack of representation of women.
- Whether there are any affirmative action measures in place, such as gender quotas, and whether these mechanisms are effective (additionally, whether these measures were respected by election stakeholders at all levels).
- Whether women candidates were subject to any forms of discrimination, pressure, intimidation or harassment, and whether they were able to campaign freely without violence towards them.
- Whether women voters were able to freely exercise their voting right, in secrecy and free from any forms of violence, harassment, intimidation, etc.

10.9. Participation of minorities

In countries where there are minority populations of different national, ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic backgrounds, it is essential to consider the right and opportunity for such groups to take part in the electoral process.

As part of the mission's assessment, the participation of national minorities should be considered an integral part of the overall election observation methodology. Analysts should focus on collecting quantitative data on national minority participation for the mission's reports, particularly when it comes to representation of national minorities as candidates, voters and possibly their representation in the election administration.

Special measures may be undertaken by the observed country to increase the participation of national minorities. For instance, some countries have laws recognizing the rights of minority groups, including the right to enjoy their own culture and language. States should aim to produce election materials, including ballot papers and voter education, in minority languages. The mission should therefore assess whether voter education and information are available to national minority communities.

Analysts and observers should attentively follow campaign developments and analyse possible issues regarding the representation of national minorities. Additionally, analysts should determine whether national minority candidates (and national minority parties) were given the same opportunities to participate in the election, including the right to campaign and participate in the distribution of seats.

The impact of the election system on the participation of national minority communities should also be assessed. The analysis should take into account the formula for translating votes cast into seats, as well as the possible impact of electoral boundaries and quotas on the representation of national minorities.

In addition, the mission should consider whether the legislation in the observed country provides adequate definitions of national minorities and their rights. Where legal provisions are unclear, analysts should assess whether this leaves space for possible abuse, manipulation or further discrimination of specific groups.

The mission should pay particular attention to:

- Whether the legislation provides for a specific definition of national minority groups and their rights, including specific electoral rights.
- Whether the electoral system disadvantages national minority groups, and/or whether the electoral district boundaries leave space for discrimination.
- Whether candidates belonging to a national minority faced challenges to their registration in the election, and whether there were any obstacles to the registration of voters belonging to national minorities.
- Whether there were any challenges or obstacles to the possibility of national minority representatives campaigning freely, and whether they were able to campaign on equitable grounds, including access to media.
- Whether the mission observed any cases of hate speech in the campaign, or violence/intimidation towards national minorities as groups or as individuals.
- Whether voter education and election materials were provided in national minorities' languages.

10.10. Inclusion of people living with disabilities (PWDs)

Citizens with disabilities should have an equal right to participate in government and in the electoral process. Restrictions on the right to suffrage and the right to stand as a candidate on the grounds of physical disability are at odds with international standards, namely the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

In general, voters with disabilities should not face obstacles in enjoying their political and electoral rights, and authorities are required to take adequate measures to ensure their unimpeded access to electoral commissions, to voter registration offices, to polling stations, assisted voting, etc.

Unfortunately, in many countries where ENEMO observes, access for PWDs is very often limited. In particular, the set-up of polling stations is often deemed by observers to be unsuitable on election day, and/or often additional assistance is required, especially for individuals with mobility disabilities or with visual impairments. Many countries fail to ensure an adequate set-up at all premises for facilitating the access of PWDs. Nonetheless, the mission should analyse possible measures and steps taken to improve conditions for PWDs, whether these are infrastructural improvements to premises (such as ramps, elevators, etc.) or equipment (magnifying glasses, arrangements for Braille voting, etc.).

Additionally, PWDs are rarely addressed in electoral campaigns, although some political parties and/or candidates may at times include policy propositions as part of their campaign platforms. The mission should analyse whether issues related to the access of PWDs are mentioned in the campaign, and whether campaigns are inclusive of PWDs, or if there were any instances of discrimination towards them.

Particular issues to pay attention to include:

- Whether the legislation contains specific provisions pertaining to the rights and access of PWDs.
- Whether voting procedures and materials are easy to use for voters with disabilities.
- Whether polling stations and voter registration premises are accessible to PWDs (for instance, being located on ground floors of buildings, properly equipped, etc.).
- Whether special materials were developed to help voters with visual impairments to have a secret vote (without the assistance of another person).
- Whether assisted voting is in place but with appropriate safeguard mechanisms to prevent abuse and violation of the secrecy of the vote (the person providing assistance should be chosen by the voter, must sign adequate documentation, protect the secrecy of the vote, etc.).
- Whether the campaign was inclusive of PWDs, with specifically targeted messages, or on the contrary whether they faced instances of discrimination.

10.11. Complaints and appeals

The complaints and appeals process is an important aspect of elections, and an effective and timely remedy should be ensured in cases of violations of the law. More broadly, the complaints and appeals process is a relevant indicator regarding the overall rule of law conditions in the observed country, along with the level of public confidence in the judiciary and its integrity. Where elections are highly disputed or contested, this can be an extremely important factor when it comes to the integrity of the process.

The level of complaints is not necessarily indicative of the general quality of an election process, but it can indicate that a number of issues may require further analysis by the mission. In particular, attention should be paid to whether an effective remedy was

ensured, and whether legal redress was provided in these cases.

10.11.1. Right to legal remedy and principles

In general, crucial principles include transparency, due process and equitable consideration of complaints. All procedures related to the adjudication of complaints should be clearly set out in the electoral legal framework. Additionally, the time frames for lodging complaints should be sufficiently short, without unreasonable delay, in order to ensure effective legal redress where necessary, while also allowing sufficient time for complainants to adequately prepare their case.

The right to appeal to election bodies and courts should be established in the legislation, in order to allow for clear rules defining the roles of each level of election commissions and courts. The hierarchy in the complaints process should ensure that all complaints are addressed in an organized and consistent manner, and decisions should be appealable. Where complainants are required to lodge their complaint to election bodies first, the law should always allow the right to appeal to a court of higher instance.

The right to a fair trial should of course also be guaranteed in domestic law. In the case of a crime that may have an impact on an electoral right (for instance, electoral fraud), any decision to prosecute should be based on the available evidence and be free from political consideration. It should be noted that failure to prosecute electoral offences can significantly undermine confidence in the electoral process and may encourage further offences due to perceived impunity.

The mission should also analyse the complaints and appeals system, including by verifying whether it excludes parallel handling of complaints, i.e., that the system excludes parallel jurisdiction for the same complaint. Otherwise, this could result in two different instances (for example, an electoral commission and a court of law) rendering a conflicting decision on the same case.

In some countries, it may occur that provisions on complaints and related procedures are included in a separate piece of legislation other than the electoral law. Whenever this is the case, the legal analyst should bear in mind that they may be required to refer to other texts than the main electoral legislation (such as a code of administrative procedure, criminal code, etc.).

10.11.2. Procedures and time frames for complaints

For each period of the electoral process (pre-election, election day, post-election, etc.), the legislation should specify reasonable time frames for the submission of complaints and appeals and for decisions to be rendered.

Generally, the time frames should be short but should offer an adequate balance

between the time constraints of the election process and ensuring the right to a legal remedy. There should also be sufficient time for any decision to be meaningful and provide effective redress. This is particularly relevant for complaints related to candidate registration or voting rights, since in this case a candidate or a voter should be able to enjoy the legal remedy before the end of the candidate registration process and before election day, respectively.

The procedures for addressing electoral disputes may vary significantly among countries, but they should always provide for a hierarchical right of appeal. For instance, electoral complaints may initially be handled by the election administration, followed by possible appeals submitted before a court. However, depending on countries, complaints may be dealt with only by the election administration or, on the contrary, by the judiciary only.

In general, the level of confidence in the complaints' resolution process is enhanced when it is possible to appeal to a court, because election administrators may have a conflict of interest in considering an election dispute. The adjudication process can be significantly undermined where there is a lack of public confidence in the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

The legal analyst may require LTOs to follow the number of complaints (and possibly follow up on appeals) submitted in a given area of responsibility, in order to better inform the mission about the level and nature of electoral complaints.

The mission may take steps to verify the basis and motivation of complaints and should follow how effectively they are addressed. However, it may happen that electoral contestants or other electoral stakeholders approach the mission (whether the CT or LTOs) with claims of violations, irregularities or allegations of fraud. At times, they may even claim that they have supporting evidence, although they have not formally submitted documentation to the competent authorities. The mission should take note of these claims, but it cannot adjudicate or support any complaint. Instead, the mission should encourage complainants to use the established institutional mechanisms and legal remedies available to them.

Important issues for the mission to consider include:

- Whether the legislation in the observed country provides stakeholders, particularly citizens and contestants, with the right to an effective remedy in cases of violation of their political rights.
- Whether the system and procedures in place for adjudicating complaints are effective, transparent and implemented impartially.
- Whether the time frames for lodging complaints and considering disputes are reasonable and effective and allow the possibility of timely legal redress.
- Whether the judiciary generally enjoys the trust of the public and is perceived as independent.
- Whether decisions on complaints or appeals were taken impartially, were reasonably motivated based on the available evidence and were not in contradiction of the law.
- Whether there is a right to appeal to a court.
- Whether decisions on complaints and appeals are published in a timely manner and available for the mission to consult (either publicly or upon request).
- Whether electoral contestants (political parties and candidates) have a proper understanding of the complaints and appeals process, and whether they chose to use official mechanisms to lodge complaints in cases where they believed their rights had been infringed.

Further reading:

- OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “International Standards and Commitments on the Right to Democratic Elections: A Practical Guide To Democratic Elections Best Practice”, 2002: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/3/16859.pdf>
- National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Applying International Election Standards: a field guide for election monitoring groups”: <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Applying-International-Standards-ENG.pdf>
- Election Observation and Democratic Support (EODS), “Handbook for European Union Election Observation”, third edition, 2016: https://www.eods.eu/library/EUEOM_Handbook_2016.pdf
- OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Guidelines for

Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections”, 2013: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/8/104573.pdf>

- OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Handbook for the Observation of Voter Registration”, 2012: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/e/92058.pdf>
- OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Handbook on Media Monitoring for Election Observation Mission”, 2012: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/0/92057.pdf>
- OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Handbook for Monitoring Women’s Participation in Elections”, 2004: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/f/13938.pdf>
- OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Handbook on Observing and Promoting the Electoral Participation of Persons with Disabilities”, 2017: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/c/339571_0.pdf

Useful links:

- The Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE Project): <https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ei/eid/eid06/default>

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter X – Observing the pre-election period

- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding the political background?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding the legal framework and electoral system?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding election management bodies (EMBs)?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding voter registration?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding the registration of candidates and political parties?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding the electoral campaign and campaign finance?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding the media, including online and social media?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding the participation of women?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding the participation of (national) minorities?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding the participation of persons with disabilities (PWDs)?
- What are the key relevant aspects to assess regarding complaints and appeals?



CHAPTER XI

OBSERVING THE ELECTION DAY

11.1. Opening and set-up of polling stations

The preparatory process and pre-opening procedures require polling commission members to perform a set of various tasks before the voting starts. Polling commissions are responsible for the complete functioning of the polling station during the voting. However, before the voting process itself, preparatory activities must be undertaken by the commission in order for the voting process on election day to be efficient. It is important to understand that delays to the opening of polling stations can undermine the right to vote.

Polling commissioners should arrive at the polling station before the opening of the polls on election day and should check whether the appropriate conditions for voting at the polling station are in place before the beginning of voting in accordance with the requirements of the law. Access to polling stations is a necessary condition for voting, and authorities of the country hold responsibility for facilitating freedom of movement and the access of voters to polling stations. Arrangements should also be made for people with disabilities to have access to their designated polling station.

Upon their arrival at the polling station premises, polling commissioners should verify that voting precincts are spacious enough to allow the polling station to function adequately, i.e., there is enough space for all polling station members to properly oversee the voting process, and sufficient space for setting up voting booths.

The minimum number of commissioners present should be met, in accordance with the electoral law of the observed country, and they should proceed to the examination of all listed electoral materials. Often, a lottery process is undertaken to determine which commission members will fulfil specific tasks, such as sealing ballot boxes, keeping control coupons from ballots, handling the identification and registration of voters during the voting process, etc.

The polling commission should check that ballot boxes are properly installed, in line with the legal provisions, with enough booths to ensure the secrecy of the vote, and remove material related to electoral campaigning if it is located within the vicinity of polling stations.

Following all undertaken actions and procedures in accordance with the law, the commission should once again check whether all conditions for the start of voting have been met, and whether there are any objections to any of the actions taken. The absence or existence of objections, with their content and the name of the objector, should be entered in the protocol of the work of the commission.

Accredited political party/candidate representatives, along with domestic and international observers, should be allowed to observe all stages of the opening process.

Other specific steps or procedures may apply to the polling station opening process, depending on the specific requirements of the law.

Important aspects to observe regarding the opening and set-up of polling stations pertain to:

- Whether the procedures for the opening and set-up of polling stations are properly established in law, and whether the provisions allow for transparent safeguard mechanisms to protect the integrity of the process.
- Whether there were a sufficient number of commissioners present on time before the opening of polling stations.
- Whether polling officials acted in an impartial manner and in accordance with the law.
- Whether the opening procedures were properly followed in a transparent and accurate manner, or whether some steps were omitted (unintentionally or intentionally) during the process.
- Whether all necessary electoral materials are present, including the right number of ballot papers, ballot boxes and voting booths, in accordance with the legislation.
- Whether the set-up of the polling station is adequate, in line with the law, and allows for proper access and conduct of voting.
- Whether party/candidate representatives, and domestic and international observers (not only limited to ENEMO observers), were able to observe all aspects of the opening and set-up process.

11.2. Voting

It should be noted that the points below regarding voting apply to most countries in the ENEMO observation region. However, specific countries may have varying approaches, procedures and legal provisions that should be specifically taken into account on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, these specific aspects should respect the general principles explained below.

11.2.1. Standard voting principles and procedures

As a general rule, procedures for voting should be consistent and applied without discrimination for all voters, and allow voters to cast their ballots in an organized and efficient manner. The number of polling commission staff should be adequate to ensure that all tasks can be undertaken properly throughout the duration of the process. Polling commissioners should have received sufficient training in order to ensure that they undertake their tasks professionally and impartially, and they should systematically act in an objective and impartial manner.

In several countries, a “campaign silence” period prohibits campaigning on election day and on the day before election day. Electoral campaigning or the use of party symbols should be banned inside polling stations. Likewise, public authorities should act in a neutral and impartial manner on voting day.

Accredited political party/candidate representatives, along with domestic and international observers, should be allowed to observe all stages of the voting process. No unauthorized individuals, including members of state security forces, should interfere during the voting process. Under exceptional circumstances, and for security reasons, they may momentarily be present, but they should leave the polling premises immediately once the issue has been resolved. Under no circumstances should they obstruct or interfere in the voting process itself, nor should they contribute to a climate of intimidation.

In order to ensure the right to vote and the free expression of their will, voters should be free from any form of intimidation, pressure, undue influence or coercion. Voters should also be free from any form of violence or the threat of violence. Possible cases of vote buying (direct or indirect) also compromise the free expression of the will of the electorate and can affect trust in the results and the integrity of the process.

There should be a sufficient number of ballot papers for all registered voters at the polling station to vote. However, a surplus number of ballot papers should have been provided to the polling commission to cover possible cases of spoiled ballots. In order to safeguard the integrity of the ballot and prevent possible fraud related to ballot papers and other sensitive electoral materials, mechanisms should be in place to ensure that ballot papers are adequately supervised and secured at all times, including during transfer to the polling station and storage. These measures should be transparent and polling station

commissioners should be held accountable. Such mechanisms can include the use of an official stamp or the signatures of polling station commissioners.

To avoid possible confusion among voters or delays/mistakes during voting and counting, the design of the ballot paper itself should be as simple as possible, user-friendly and clear for voters to understand and fill in, and for commissioners to count. Political parties/candidates running in the elections should be fairly and equally represented on the ballot papers, i.e., in equal size on a ballot paper, and the order of contestants should have been determined in a fair manner (for instance, through a lottery system). Some countries, particularly in the ENEMO observation region, have more than one official language. When this is the case, ballot papers should be available in all official languages.

Voters should be required to identify themselves and prove their eligibility through documentation constituting valid proof specified in the law. Upon entering the polling station premises and registering themselves by providing the required identification documentation, voters should be provided with the number of ballot papers to which they are entitled. This number of ballots should be the same for all voters. No individuals should be able to vote on behalf of another person (proxy voting) unless this is defined by law under specific circumstances.

An opportunity to seek an effective solution should be allowed to any eligible voter who was prevented from voting by a decision of the polling commission or excluded from the register.

As a general practice, there should be adequate prevention mechanisms to avoid an individual voting again at the same, or at another, polling station (for instance, marking the voter list to indicate that a voter has voted, signature of the voter on the voting register, marking voters' fingers with special ink and/or registering their fingerprints electronically, etc.). Cases of voters casting a higher number of ballots than allowed should be prohibited in the law (i.e., multiple voting).

All voters should be able to vote in secret (secrecy of the vote). Authorities are responsible for guaranteeing this right through the provision of polling booths allowing ballot papers to be marked privately. Before being placed into a ballot box, ballots that were filled in by voters should not be inspected, or contain any identifying marks that could enable the ballot paper to be traced back to the voter. Additionally, voters should be free from any form of intimidation in this regard and never be coerced into revealing whom they voted for. Voting simultaneously with another person in the same polling booth (i.e., "family voting" or "group voting") and voting before entering a polling booth ("open voting") should be prohibited.

Only under exceptional circumstances and under the specific conditions set out in the law can a voter be assisted. For instance, this may include voters who are unable to vote unaided under regular procedures, such as voters with visual impairments or a person living with other disabilities. As a general principle, assisting in marking a ballot paper should be deemed reasonable only for voters who would not otherwise be able to cast a

ballot. Appropriate regulations should ensure that this type of assistance is undertaken in good faith and protects the secrecy of the voter's choice.

11.2.2. Special voting procedures and new voting technologies

Special voting procedures may be applicable in cases where voters are unable to attend regular polling stations to vote. These procedures may allow voters to vote in a different location to their designated polling station (i.e., absentee voting, which usually requires an absentee voting certificate). Additionally, special voting procedures may be allowed for special polling stations (for instance, in detention facilities, military barracks, etc.). Other forms of special voting may include:

- **Mobile voting**, where polling commissioners transport a mobile ballot box to voters who cannot attend their designated polling station, whether they are ill or elderly voters
- **Out-of-country voting**, where citizens living abroad can cast their ballots at special polling stations, which are generally their country's embassies, or by post
- **Postal voting**, where voters cast their ballots by post before election day
- **Early voting**, for voters who cannot attend their designated polling station on voting day

The above special voting procedures should always be conducted under the principles of integrity, transparency and accountability, and in a controlled environment to avoid possible fraud or abuse.

It is also relevant to note that some countries are progressively shifting to new voting technologies, such as electronic voting and/or biometric registration of voters. The introduction of these technologies brings both new benefits and additional challenges. On the one hand, they have the potential to provide for faster counting, limit human error and space for fraud, and help streamline voter registers. On the other hand, these technologies can have negative consequences for public trust and affect confidence in the process or results. Accountability is harder to ensure and the integrity of data may be compromised, for instance through cyber-attacks and hacking attempts leading to possible manipulations. They can also potentially compromise the confidentiality of personal data. This generally requires the mission to have a balanced assessment, and to approach these technologies and their implementation with caution.

When it comes to assessing new voting technologies, the IEOM often does not have the capacity to fully assess all of the technical aspects of electronic voting or the use of biometrics. However, the legal analyst, in cooperation with the election administration analyst, should assess the legal framework regulating these technologies and their implementation, respectively. In addition, LTOs can play an important role by reporting on the practical implications of these technologies at the local level and help assess the level of reliability, confidence and stakeholders' preparedness for their use. Likewise, STOs can provide information on the practical implementation of these technologies on election day. In general, the mission should focus on assessing transparency, the quality of functioning

and implementation, the reliability of the system and trust within the context of the observed country. It is also important to remember that, in essence, the same standards apply for elections conducted using new voting technologies.

To conclude both subsections on voting, key principles to observe when it comes to the voting process are:

- Whether all eligible voters were provided with the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, and there were no restrictions on their freedom of movement, or whether the right to vote was restricted in any way.
- Whether voting was conducted in a peaceful and orderly atmosphere, in order for voters to freely make their choice, and there were no incidents or cases of violence or intimidation.
- Whether election commissioners performed their duties effectively, impartially and without interference, in a transparent way and in line with the law.
- Whether the principle of equal suffrage was respected.
- Whether arrangements for voting established equal requirements and opportunities for all voters.
- Whether voting procedures were conducive to a transparent and efficient voting process.
- Whether all appropriate steps were taken to guarantee the integrity of the ballot and to prevent fraud.
- Whether election oversight actors, including party/candidate representatives, citizen non-partisan observers, international observers and the media were able to carry out their duties without interference, and were able to observe all aspects of the voting process free from pressure or intimidation.
- Whether the right to a secret ballot was breached.
- Whether the ballot paper is suitable for use by all voters.
- Whether voters had difficulties regarding access to the polling station (in particular, for PWDs).
- Whether there were issues due to overcrowding, excessive delays, queues or other technical issues.

- Whether voters with special needs were provided with impartial assistance support.
- Whether there were any unauthorized individuals present within the polling station during voting.

11.3. Closing and counting

Closing and counting procedures should be established by law and should provide sufficient safeguards to ensure a transparent, timely and accurate counting process.

The time for closing polling stations should be fixed, and any possible decision to extend voting hours should be based on consistent and objective criteria and justified by the circumstances. It is important to note that all voters waiting in line at the time of closing of polling stations should be allowed to cast their ballot.

Polling station staff should be required to follow procedures according to specific instructions and in line with the provisions of the law. These steps and procedures may vary from country to country, but generally procedures for closing include immediate sealing of ballot boxes and securing unused ballot papers and any spoiled/damaged ballot papers.

Counting procedures and algorithms also vary from country to country. However, a number of principles and practices should be respected. As a general rule, the counting of votes should take place shortly after the closing of the poll, in order to limit risks and opportunities for tampering with the ballots. The process should be open and transparent, calm and orderly, and conducted in a professional and accountable manner.

Only authorized polling station staff members should be involved in the closing of the polls and the process of counting of votes. However, all stages of the closing and counting process should take place in the presence of party or candidate representatives and/or observers, as well as international and domestic observers if present. They should be allowed to observe all phases of counting and tabulation, without obstruction and free from any form of pressure or intimidation.

Standardized documentation and forms should be used to record the counting and input data. These forms are often referred to as **results protocols**. In principle, observers are entitled to request a copy of the results protocol for the polling station being observed. The exact information and the order in which it is inserted in these protocols may vary from one country to another, although generally these include the following:

- The number of voters in the voters' list (voters who are registered at that polling station)
- The number of voters who voted (the total number, which can sometimes be broken

down into subcategories such as the number of voters who voted at the polling station premises and those who voted through conditional voting, mobile voting, postal voting, etc.)

- The number of valid ballots received by the polling station commission
- The number of invalid ballots
- The number of blank ballots
- The number of unused ballot papers
- The number of damaged ballot papers
- The results of the counting per electoral contestant (candidates and/or parties, depending on the type of election and electoral system in the observed country)

Following the counting process, the polling commission is often required to carry out a number of reconciliation tasks (see table above). This includes ensuring that the number of valid votes added to the invalid votes does not exceed the number of voters indicated as having voted in the voter register.

There should be opportunities to seek legal remedy in the event of objections against decisions or counting activities by commissioners. Following the count, all polling materials should be secured and transported in an appropriate manner.

Generally, important issues to observe pertaining to the closing and counting process include:

- Whether the procedures for the closing of polls and counting of votes are established in law, and whether the provisions provide transparent safeguard mechanisms to protect the integrity of the process and accuracy of results.
- Whether closing, counting and tabulation procedures were properly followed.
- Whether officials acted in an impartial manner and in accordance with the law.
- Whether the counting of votes and recording of results was transparent and accurate.
- Whether party/candidate representatives and domestic and international observers (not only limited to ENEMO observers) were able to observe all aspects of the counting and tabulation process.
- Whether party/candidate representatives and observers were issued with a copy of the results protocol upon request.
- Whether the results were immediately and publicly posted at the polling station or counting centre upon completion of the process.

11.4. Transfer of electoral materials

It should be noted that counting does not always take place at the polling station but may instead take place in a district, regional or other territorial counting centre following the transfer of sealed ballot boxes. Although the counting of ballot papers at polling stations can have the benefit of enhancing accountability and transparency, counting centres can create a more controlled environment for counting and limit risks where the results of individual polling stations are known. However, if ballot boxes are indeed transferred to counting centres, it is essential that the process is secure, supervised and accounted for at every stage.

In any case, during the process of transferring materials, party and/or candidate representatives and observers, as well as domestic and international observers, should be allowed to accompany the ballot boxes while they are being transferred. After the opening of the sealed ballot boxes, the total number of ballots inside should be counted, and the number of ballots inside the ballot boxes should be reconciled with the number of ballot papers that were issued to voters. The number of ballots inside the ballot boxes should not be more than the number of voters who cast their ballot.

The process for aggregating results depends not only on whether the ballots are counted at the polling station or a regional counting centre but also on whether the observed election is based on a single national constituency or regional constituencies. Depending on the electoral system used, protocols can be transferred from polling stations to territorial/district election commissions to regional election commissions to the central election commission (or another national commission), with results aggregated at each appropriate level.

During the process, it is important to be able to verify that the ballot boxes were not tampered with and were not diverted to an unauthorized location prior to delivery to the higher-level commission.

Upon arrival at the higher-level commission (district, territorial, etc.), the same principles as for the counting and tabulation process at polling stations should apply. Polling station staff should be required to follow procedures according to specific instructions and in line with the provisions of the law. The process should be open and transparent, calm and orderly, and conducted in a professional and accountable manner.

Only authorized commissioners and staff members should be involved in the tabulation process and intake of electoral materials from polling stations. However, all stages of the process should be open to party or candidate representatives and/or observers, as well as international and domestic observers if present, without obstruction and free from any form of pressure or intimidation.

Important issues to observe regarding the transfer of electoral materials include:

- Whether the procedures for tabulation and transfer of materials to the higher-level commission or counting centre are established in law, and whether the provisions provide for transparent safeguard mechanisms to protect the integrity of the process and accuracy of results.
- Whether the tabulation and transfer procedures were properly followed.
- Whether election officials acted in an impartial manner and in accordance with the law.
- Whether the tabulation of votes and recording of results were transparent and accurate.
- Whether party/candidate representatives and domestic and international observers (not only limited to ENEMO observers) were able to observe all aspects of the process.
- Whether there was any risk of tampering during the process, delivery of materials to an inappropriate location or intervention by unauthorized individuals in the process.

11.5. Election day complaints

As a network of international observers, ENEMO is not entitled to file complaints on the conduct of the electoral process. Election day is no exception to this rule. However, it is important for observers to examine the register of complaints at polling stations on election day, whether from civil society observers or from voters (depending on which stakeholders are allowed to file complaints in the observed country).

Likewise, it is relevant for the core team, particularly the legal analyst, to assess the level of election day complaints to the best extent possible. Although this information may not be entirely available on election day or collected in time for the publication of the mission's statement of preliminary findings and conclusions, it is important to analyse for further reports (particularly the final report).

In particular, attention should be paid to the scope and nature of election day complaints. The mission should follow complaints closely, particularly those related to the registration and identification of voters at polling stations, especially if a number of citizens were denied the right to vote, or there were complaints about possible fraud or manipulation. The higher the number of complaints, the greater the relevance of the mission's assessment in this regard.

11.6. Preliminary turnout and preliminary results

The preliminary turnout and preliminary results are generally the responsibility of EMBs, which should ensure that the procedures for the tabulation and publication of results have been clearly established in advance.

In particular, EMBs should ensure that detailed results are published at every stage of the aggregation and tabulation process as soon as they are available, indicating how many votes were won by each political party/candidate and the number of invalid votes.

The results process should be fully accessible to political parties/candidates and their representatives, citizens, international observers and the media. EMBs should have the capacity to show both the number of votes cast and the results of the election, and be held accountable for any discrepancies in the published results.

It is possible that partial results are announced during the course of the tabulation process. If published, they should always be clearly referred to as representing only a proportion of the votes cast. EMBs are expected to announce preliminary results as soon as the process of tabulating results is completed at a regional or nationwide level. There should be a reasonable deadline for the announcement of preliminary results.

Procedures should be established within the law to allow stakeholders to legally challenge the results, within an appropriate time frame, to an independent body (for instance, courts). Complaints lodged should be considered under the principle of impartiality and objectivity, and decisions should be grounded in the evidence provided without political consideration. Where results are successfully challenged, for example due to violations of voting procedures, voting may be repeated at the polling stations affected within a suitable time frame.

11.7. Assessment of the election day environment

In order to assess the general conduct of election day and the electoral environment, it is important to analyse whether elections can be determined as genuine and enjoying the confidence of the public. The security of the ballot should be ensured, along with the free expression of the will of voters. Any interference, intimidation or coercion of voters should be assessed as highly problematic and at odds with the above-mentioned principles.

In some particularly sensitive contexts, including in the ENEMO observation region, aspects of an election process may conflict with deeply rooted and long-standing tensions. ENEMO IEOMs are sometimes deployed to countries affected by conflict and social tensions, where a risk of electoral violence exists. Electoral violence can be defined as acts or threats of intimidation, pressure, or psychological or physical harm inflicted with the aim of affecting an electoral process or the outcomes of an election.

The mission should take into account how conflict dynamics can affect the electoral

process in general, and election day conduct in particular, especially where there is a perceived risk that elections could be manipulated or poorly organized.

The core team should observe and report on these tensions, especially if they manifest themselves on election day. This includes possible electoral violence that may arise due to critical flaws in election day conduct (or other issues leading up to election day).

LTOs also play a crucial role in informing the core team of warning signs and rising political or social tensions in their areas of responsibility.

Likewise, STOs, through their reports, should indicate whether the atmosphere was calm, peaceful and orderly at polling stations observed or whether they noticed signs of pressure, intimidation or violence towards voters, candidates, election commissioners or others.

A number of groups are more likely to be subject to pressure, intimidation or harm during the electoral process and on election day. This, regrettably, often includes vulnerable groups such as ethnic or national minorities, women, people living with disabilities, internally displaced people (IDPs), elderly voters, etc. In extreme cases, such a negative atmosphere can lead to the disenfranchising of certain groups, who refrain from voting due to intimidation or fear of intimidation.

Generally, the mission should assess election day conduct in the context, by assessing potential societal divisions, risks of electoral/political violence, overall concerns related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, the stakes of the observed elections, and other variables such as gauging the strength of state institutions and broader phenomena such as inequality and corruption.

In that regard, election day should systematically be assessed within the broader environment in which elections are taking place.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter XI – Observing the Election Day

- What are the fundamental aspects to observe when it comes to the opening and set-up of polling stations?
- What are the fundamental aspects to observe when it comes to the voting process?
- Which are the main types of special voting procedures?
- What are the fundamental aspects to observe when it comes to the closing and counting process?
- What are the fundamental aspects to observe when it comes to transfer of electoral materials to the higher level electoral commission?
- What are the fundamental aspects to follow when it comes to election day complaints?
- What are the key principles which should be respected regarding the announcement of preliminary turnout and preliminary results?
- How should the mission proceed to assessing the election day environment and election day conduct?



CHAPTER XII

OBSERVING THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD

12.1. LTOs' role in the post-election period

In general, as part of the IEOM's observation of the post-election day period, LTOs should be instructed to conduct several tasks essential to the mission's assessment.

These should include:

- Checking whether results are posted and published at all EMB levels in the AoR.
- Observing the work of counting or results tabulation centres if the process is still ongoing.
- Meeting with interlocutors and seeking their insights on election day conduct and the post-election period, as well as their opinions on potential improvements to the framework and conditions for elections.
- Following any potential complaints or appeals submitted and how they are adjudicated.
- Observing the general post-election day environment, including the observation of possible public contestation of results, post-election protests or political tensions, provided that security conditions to do so are met.

- Following and reporting on election-related incidents such as violence, intimidation or harassment, particularly towards voters and/or candidates and CSOs (notably if they are checking on results).

The core team should provide further guidance and instructions to LTOs on how to report on the post-election environment. LTOs should include information on the post-election period in their final reports before departing from the observed country.

12.2. CTs' role in the post-election period

In addition to necessary aspects to assess which may be context-specific to the observed country, the mission should follow at least three crucial areas of the electoral process in the post-election period: (1) the announcement of results; (2) the complaints and appeals process; and (3) post-election developments in the observed country.

12.2.1. Assessing the announcement of results

It should be noted that the process for establishing and announcing results can vary greatly depending on countries, election type and electoral system used. However, generally, results are usually announced in two main phases:

At the regional/territorial level, EMBs collect polling station protocols and then tabulate initial results by constituency, and either pass on aggregated results to the higher-level commission or issue preliminary results. EMBs may also receive complaints and, depending on the system in place, either decide on them or forward them to the relevant electoral commission or court.

The final results should be issued by the responsible EMB or relevant authority and should follow the collection, aggregation and validation of hard copies of all protocols, relevant documentation, and resolution of ongoing electoral complaints and appeals.

One of the issues that can be encountered by ENEMO IEOMs, and international observation missions in general, is that they may have already departed from the observed country before final results are declared.

On the one hand, this may be due to the fact that a mission may not have the resources to stay in the country long enough for results to be officially announced. On the other hand, it may be partly due to the fact that the publication of final official results can be a very complex and lengthy process.

To the best extent possible, the presence of the core team should be ensured until the

final official announcement of results and their publication. If this is impossible for the reasons given above, the mission should continue following this process upon returning to CT members' home countries. Ideally, the final report should never be issued before the final election results have been published, as the results and the announcement process can significantly affect the overall assessment.

When it comes to the announcement of results, issues for the core team to consider include:

- Whether the procedures for tabulating and publishing results were clearly established in advance of the election.
- Whether the results process was efficient and fully transparent and could be fully observed by party/candidate representatives as well as by domestic and international observers.
- Whether the final results were verifiable, i.e., were published in a manner that enables traceability from those announced at the polling station level, to the tabulated figures per district/region, to the nationally tabulated and announced results.
- Whether the announced results were comparable to the results recorded by domestic observers who conducted comprehensive statistical observation of election day (such as parallel vote tabulation).
- Reading media reports, as well as the reaction of political parties and candidates to the announcement of the results.
- Following up on potential reports of claims by political parties that results are inaccurate or that protocols have been tampered with.
- Following all official formal complaints submitted to the competent bodies responsible for administering electoral complaints and appeals (including EMBs or the respective court).

12.2.2. Assessing the complaints and appeals process

The mission should closely follow the complaints and appeals process during the post-election period. In particular, the core team should assess whether the right to an effective legal remedy was ensured, in line with the national legislation and international standards, and the legal analyst of the mission should observe and analyse the complaints and appeals process in the post-election period.

Complaints concerning the election process or results that are submitted by candidates or voters should be administered in a timely manner, equitably and according to due process. Complainants should have unimpaired access to the appropriate documentation that they may need to present their case. The decision by the competent body should be provided within a reasonable and effective time frame, and all rulings should be recorded, published and enforced accordingly.

Procedures for challenging the validity of election results should be determined in the legislation and contain provisions allowing the results to be challenged within an appropriate time frame. Possible complaints should be dealt with impartially, and decisions should be based on the available evidence and made without political motives. If results were successfully challenged and the complaint was satisfied, for instance due to proven violations of voting procedures, voting should be repeated in the polling stations affected within a reasonable time frame. However, repeat voting may not be mandatory if the total number of registered voters in the polling stations concerned are of an insufficient number to change the allocation of mandates.

It may happen that other types of electoral complaints, such as those related to media coverage or campaign finance, may also be filed after election day. Where this is the case, the mission should also follow up adequately on those cases.

Issues to be considered include:

- Whether procedures for contesting results or challenging election day-related decisions are clear, effective and adequately enshrined in the legislation (and whether those provisions are in line with international standards).
- Whether the right to an effective legal remedy was ensured.
- Whether there were any electoral contestants who challenged the validity of election results, and whether they were granted satisfaction.
- Whether cases were dealt with in an impartial manner, and decisions of the relevant bodies were based on available evidence and impartially considered without political motives.
- If legal redress was provided, whether it led to repeat voting in a given constituency (or constituencies), and what the outcomes were in terms of attribution of mandates.

12.2.3. Assessing post-election developments

CT members and observers should bear in mind that the post-election period is by nature sensitive in any election. Ideally, the official results announcement only confirms what was already pre-established or known through preliminary results, parallel vote tabulations by domestic observer groups, surveys or exit polls. However, in other cases, official election results may be an issue of contention, especially if the losing parties or candidates do not accept them.

Where the post-election environment is tense, the failure of losing parties to promptly and publicly recognize defeat can lead to a volatile situation that could potentially include acts of violence, retribution and political instability.

The mission should follow and report on possible public protests or demonstrations, and whether they are peaceful or not. In these situations, candidates and political parties bear a public responsibility to appease tensions and encourage their supporters not to act violently or irresponsibly.

The mission should closely follow any cases of violence, harassment, intimidation or forms of political retribution after elections, along with any political demonstrations or protests. However, the security of mission participants should remain a priority. Any findings of this type from the post-election period should be included in the final report. Post-election developments are particularly important for the background section.

The final report should not only take into account possible problematic aspects and the final announcement of results, but also review the outcome of the election in terms of mandates. The mission should look at whether all candidates/parties that were elected are duly installed in office. If this is not the case, this is an issue that merits mention in the assessment. Even after returning to their home countries, CT members should continue to monitor whether the results of the election were respected, and whether the elected members were rightfully allowed to take up their positions.

When it comes to post-election developments, issues to consider by the core team include:

- Whether there was any post-election day violence or concerns that this could take place.
- Whether there were any public protests or an uprising against the outcomes of the election.
- Whether election stakeholders accepted the conduct of the election day and the results of the election.

- Whether there were any legal proceedings aimed at deregistering an elected candidate.
- Whether there were cases of intimidation of elected candidates or attempts to put pressure on candidates to stand down.
- Whether all duly elected candidates/parties were rightfully allowed to take office in accordance with the final election results.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter XII – Observing the post-election period

- What are the role and key tasks of LTOs during the post-election period?
- What is the CT's role and what should they assess in the post-election period?
- Which post-election developments can be problematic?



CHAPTER XIII

CLOSING THE IEOM

As the end of the mission approaches, the CT and LTOs will start conducting activities specific to the final phase of their deployment. The LTO coordinator is obliged to inform and remind LTOs on behalf of the CT of their final activities, which include holding final meetings with interlocutors, preparing the final report, attending the LTO debriefing and evaluating different aspects of the mission.

Along with LTOs, CT members will schedule final meetings with their interlocutors, analyze LTO final reports, prepare and hold the LTO debriefing, prepare the mission's final report, and evaluate observers and the mission. Additionally, certain CT members will coordinate the archiving of documents, including all reports and mission files, as well as financial documentation and other materials that were used for the purpose of the mission.

13.1. Final meetings

CT members and LTOs will do their best to organize final meetings with crucial interlocutors, such as EMBs, parties and candidates, CSOs and media representatives. These kinds of meetings are especially useful in concluding the observation by discussing the mission's findings. ENEMO observers should use the opportunity to hold quality final meetings with stakeholders who read the mission's reports and are open to discussion on certain segments of the report.

In order to prepare the final reports of mission members, LTOs and CT members should ask different interlocutors to list some recommendations for improvement of the segment of the electoral process they are actively involved with. LTOs and CT members should decide on which recommendations can and should be included in the mission's reports, based on their observation and findings obtained during the mission.

Final meetings with interlocutors should also be seen as a good opportunity to thank interlocutors for their open cooperation, if the cooperation was satisfying and useful. Finally, these kinds of meetings should additionally nurture any potential cooperation ENEMO observers might have in future IEOMs in the respective country.

13.2. Debriefings and departure from the country

After concluding the work in respective AoRs, LTOs should submit the final report to the CT. The final report will include all key findings and conclusions from their region, as well as recommendations the team identified as necessary to ensure progress in specific areas of elections. All LTOs will return to the capital and attend the LTO debriefing. Observers will have the final opportunity to reflect on the mission as a whole and to discuss important aspects of the mission with the CT members and other LTOs.

Before the end of their engagement, all observers need to submit all required documents, including signed contracts, timesheets and receipts as well as all financial and other documents the mission needs to conclude the mission. After the debriefing, LTOs will return to their home countries, while CT members will stay in the country of observation for the remaining deployment period, in accordance with the time frame defined in their contracts. CT members will be obliged to contribute to the preparation of the mission's final report after their return to their home countries.

13.3. Evaluation of the mission

Evaluation of the mission members is prescribed in ENEMO's policies and procedures. The staff members hired in EOMs shall be subject to evaluation after the end of the IEOM. At the end of the mission, LTOs and STOs evaluate each other's work, as well as the work of the CT. The CT evaluates LTOs based on team performance and individual performance. CT analysts are evaluated by the mission leadership. Performance evaluation reports are to be completed in a fair, objective and timely manner. Standardized evaluation forms are included in the Compendium containing all templates for the missions.

A staff member who has received negative evaluation shall not be considered for future missions. The CT should communicate the evaluation of their members to each member organization and provide them with a final evaluation of LTOs' and STOs' performance in the IEOM.

All mission members undergo **evaluation**, as follows:

- STOs are evaluated by LTOs,
- LTOs are evaluated by the CT,
- CT is evaluated by the mission leadership.

The purpose of evaluations is to track performance and, ultimately, to standardize the level of competence and professionalism of teams and individual members across missions. All evaluations are available in ENEMO's database and are used by the CT during the selection of LTOs. During the selection process, advantage is given to the candidates who received higher evaluation.

However, in the cases below, **mission members (CT members, LTOs and STOs) may be suspended in accordance with their evaluation.**

Temporary suspension may be imposed in case of low evaluation of the mission member, such as:

- When their language skills were not sufficient for the mission member to perform adequately,
- When some of the basic skills were evaluated as inadequate, e.g. teamwork, professionalism, etc.,
- Other cases that resulted in low evaluation of the mission member, that may be improved in future.

Temporary suspension may be imposed for:

- one (1) year, or one mission in case there were no ENEMO missions in the following 12 months,
- two (2) years, or two mission in case there were no ENEMO missions in the following 24 months.

Table 9: Overview of reasons for suspension

| One (1) year suspension | Two (2) year suspension |
|--|--|
| Low evaluation of teamwork, professionalism, communication, etc. | Not appearing for the mission without prior announcement or justified reason |
| Low understanding of ENEMO's methodology | Not appearing for the mission without prior announcement or justified reason |
| Low understanding of ENEMO's methodology | Disrespecting the instructions of superior(s) |
| Low reporting skills | Breaching the contract |
| Other reasons | Insufficient language skills that prevent proper communication and work |
| Unjustified risk taking | Using insulting and offensive language towards other mission members |
| Other reasons | Other |

Permanent suspension may be imposed when the Code of Conduct was not followed, especially in cases of discrimination and harassment and misusing funds of the mission.

Member organizations will be penalized for each suspended mission member by lowering their quota for nominating STOs within a certain period.

Table 10: Overview of conditions and penalties for member organizations caused by suspensions of their nominees

| Number of suspended mission members | Lowered quota |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| One (1) | 20% in the following year, or one year in the case there are no missions in the following year |
| Two (2) | 40% in the following year, or one year in the case there are no missions in the following year |
| Three (3) | 60% in the following year, or one year in the case there are no missions in the following year |

The process of suspension may be initiated by the CT, CEO and Governing Board. Each individual and organization who is a subject of the suspension process should be given the opportunity to present a written statement to the Governing Board and the CEO within seven days since the beginning of the suspension process. The CEO and the Governing Board will conduct all necessary research to decide on the suspension, including interviews with all individuals who may dispose of relevant information on the case.

The Executive Director can impose the suspension measure after consultation with the Head of the mission, while this decision can be contested by the Governing Board. Mission members and member organizations subjected to the suspension process will be notified on the result of the process as well as the decision within 14 days of the beginning of the process.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter XIII – Closing the IEOM

- Which tasks and activities should LTOs undergo before departure from the observed country?
- Which important activities should the CT conduct before departure from the observed country?
- What happens once the mission's deployment has ended?
- Which mission members undergo evaluation and by whom are they evaluated?
- What are the grounds for temporary suspension and permanent suspension of a member of the mission?



CHAPTER XIV

DOES IT END HERE?

14.1. Following up on ENEMO recommendations

ENEMO attaches particular importance to follow-up measures undertaken to improve electoral processes and, specifically, to ENEMO's role in following the implementation of its recommendations.

One of the key elements of the final report is the recommendations offered for consideration by the observed country's authorities and election stakeholders on how the overall electoral process or specific aspects can be improved. Those recommendations should be considered as a basis for follow-up activities and advocacy by ENEMO.

With these aspects in mind, when drafting recommendations it is important for the core team to ensure that the recommendations they propose are clear, relevant and attainable. It is also important to be clear about which institution/stakeholder their recommendations are targeted at.

Election observation is not an end in itself but is intended to assist observed countries with improving the electoral environment, norms and process, and better implementing election-related international commitments. The usefulness and success of an IEOM should also be measured in the long term by the consideration and implementation of these recommendations. Therefore, the impact and purpose of an IEOM can be multiplied through an effective follow-up process whenever possible.

Due to limited resources, ENEMO is often unable to sustain broad or systematic follow-up efforts. However, IEOMs should, when possible, lead to follow-up activities in the form of round table events, seminars, webinars, dialogues, etc.

ENEMO has been exploring ways to intensify follow-up efforts and make follow-up more

meaningful and more systematic through increasing its participation in post-election events and organizing round tables (see below).

It should be emphasized that ENEMO does not seek to act alone, but rather to find synergies with other election observation missions or international organizations, as well as providing support to domestic CSOs, especially ENEMO member organizations. Collaborative efforts can also help compensate the limited resources that ENEMO has to properly follow up on its IEOM recommendations.

14.2. Electoral reform and advocacy activities

In addition to IEOMs per se, ENEMO has developed a practice, whenever possible, of conducting follow-up events promoting its work, assessments and recommendations.

There are varying approaches to electoral reform. The most often seen conventional approach is also the one that most often comes under criticism: politicians in power evaluate how a new or reformed electoral system can better serve their chances of retaining power more effectively, and therefore tend to adjust rules and policies according to their own political agenda. This is generally referred to as “reform by elite-majority imposition”.

The second approach is the one that ENEMO favours, better known as “elite-mass interaction”. In this case, although most decision-makers may oppose change, they are forced to accept it by pressure from the public, including civil society and the international community. Recently, there has been an increasing amount of attention paid to the notion that the obstacle in some countries is not knowing how to approach reforms. Who should lead? How to gain consensus? What steps are required in order to provide the information needed to approach some reforms? In a sense, while IEOMs offer many recommendations, it is not always clear that the institutions in a country know how to approach them, even if they are inclined to do so.

This is where ENEMO’s “voice” can count, as an international civil society organization, as it combines the benefit of being a part of the international community while still being a civil society, apolitical, non-partisan organization composed of citizen observers. ENEMO has consistently advocated in favour of electoral reforms that are:

- **Comprehensive**, in that the reform should not be limited to an accumulation of specific or minor election-related aspects, but actually address issues holistically rather than contain only technicalities
- **Inclusive**, in that the reform should offer the opportunity for all key electoral stakeholders to contribute through their inputs, whether it be government parties, political opposition, election administration, domestic and international observers, associations, interest groups, experts, etc.
- **Transparent**, in that the reform should be conducted through a process where issues

are openly discussed and amendments are made in good faith, while informing electoral stakeholders and the public

Over the 2018–2022 period, ENEMO has engaged in advocacy activities and organized events promoting electoral reform and/or presenting recommendations of the IEOMs in Ukraine (2019–2020), Moldova (2020–2021) and Montenegro (2021). This includes events that were either organized directly by ENEMO and included mission participants or were held by the election administration or international organizations in the observed countries that enjoyed the participation of ENEMO IEOM experts.

In the future, ENEMO aims to expand on the practice of advocating its recommendations at events by presenting highlights from its mission assessments and emphasizing the relevance and importance of its recommendations. The capacity to do so also depends on the willingness and openness of the authorities of observed countries, as well as financial support from ENEMO’s donors to conduct this type of activity.

Wherever possible, events held by ENEMO should be inclusive of its member organizations in the country, by consulting and coordinating post-election activities with them.

14.3. Understanding democracy from a broader perspective

As mentioned above, mission participants should understand that election observation is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end related to the broader notion of democratic development.

Of course, democracy requires genuine elections, political freedoms and sustainable and fair processes, along with well-functioning institutions. In that regard, IEOMs and their outcomes are an integral building part of these processes. The methodological work put into IEOMs should be seen as a bridge supporting other measures aimed at deeper democratization in the world. Fundamental human rights, rule of law, social equality and equality of opportunity, gender equality and inclusiveness are fundamental building blocks in any democratic society.

Increasingly, however, socio-economic inequality, new trends of populism and authoritarianism, technological advancements affecting our ways of communicating and globalization make it so that democracy is constantly challenged and evolving. Democracies around the world are continuously reacting and adapting, leading innovations and reforms in order to meet these challenges.

Democracy in that sense is not so much a final achievement, but rather a constantly evolving path towards an objective. Unfortunately, the world has seen that countries once thought to be on an unstoppable trajectory towards democracy can go off track. Some countries that yesterday had promising democratic indicators are today starting to go backwards. It is also clear that the idea that democracy is under threat is an increasingly shared opinion in public discourse. Accordingly, in times of instability, societies can no

longer afford to understand democracy simply as a form of political regime consecrated through elections, policies or outcomes. Democracy also needs to be thought of as the road towards a fulfilment of democratic values that we, at ENEMO, stand for.

Further reading:

- OSCE Office for Human and Democratic Rights (ODIHR), “Handbook on the Follow-up of Electoral Recommendations”, 2016: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/8/244941.pdf>
- Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, “The Limits of Electoral Reform”, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013.
- International IDEA, “Electoral Processes: Navigating and Emerging from Crisis”, Global State of Democracy Thematic Paper, 2021: <https://www.idea.int/gsod/sites/default/files/2021-11/electoral-processes-gsod2021.pdf>
- Frank Bandau, “The Electoral Crisis of Social Democracy: postindustrial dilemmas or neoliberal contamination?”, August 2021: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14789299211032461>

Useful links:

- The Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE Project): <https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/lf/eml/default>
- Freedom House: <https://freedomhouse.org/>

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter XIV – Does it end here?

- What does it mean to follow up on ENEMO recommendations?
- Why is electoral reform important in between elections?
- What kind of advocacy activities does ENEMO conduct after the electoral process?
- Is democracy only about holding elections?



ENEMO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

PART IV



CHAPTER XV

IEOM INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION

15.1. Communication within the mission (internal communication)

The internal communication during the mission must ensure proper, efficient and timely sharing of information between all the members of the EOM, the Network, the Governing Board and the CEO. This is regulated in general in ENEMO's Communication and Visibility policy, and the Core Team is responsible for setting up proper communication channels in line with those general provisions. Every mission should comply with the principles of respect among all mission members, efficiency, coordination and team spirit.

ENEMO has a **zero tolerance approach towards any forms of harassment, abuse, actions at odds with the Code of Conduct, or other unacceptable behavior within the mission.** ENEMO strongly encourages **open and transparent communication, with a problem-solving approach, and a healthy work environment.**

The general principles for ensuring proper communication within the mission are explained below, in accordance with the abovementioned policy.

15.1.1. Communication within the Core Team

The rule is that communication within the Core Team should be conducted on a regular basis as an open communication flow between Core Team members regarding IEOM related issues.

Each local staff member assigned to the Core Team is obliged to communicate in the first instance to their immediate superior on a daily basis.

The Core Team can communicate to local staff assigned to LTOs and STOs for the purpose of collecting additional information in the case of security issues or breach of the Code of Conduct of any member of the team (international or local) and other circumstances. Communication can be done by any means (email, phone, personally).

15.1.2. Communication between the Core Team and the LTOs

The Core Team communicates with the LTOs on a daily basis. Any member of the Core Team may communicate with the LTOs, while the LTOs should communicate primarily with the LTO Coordinator/Logistic Officer and shall reply to any Core Team member that has addressed them.

An LTO cannot address the mailing list of the network in the name of the IEOM.

15.1.3. Communication between the Core Team and member organization(s)/Network

The Core Team is required to communicate with member organization(s)/Network for the following purposes:

- LTOs/STOs list of nominees;
- Any security issues related to Core Team, LTOs of STOs during the IEOM;
- Logistics issues;
- Evaluation of LTOs/STOs nominees and final evaluation of LTOs and STOs performance in the IEOM;
- All statements produced by the Core Team (press releases, preliminary statements and final report).

15.1.4. Communication of the Head of Mission with the CEO and the Governing Board

The Head of Mission communicates with the CEO regarding election related issues and receives instructions/approvals about the work of the Core Team. In situations where the CEO must ask for approval from the Governing board, the answer to the Core Team must be delivered within 48 hours. If the matter requires an urgent answer, this timeframe can be shortened to 24 hours.

15.1.5. Communication of the Core Team with STOs

The Core Team can communicate with the STOs with the purpose of collecting additional information in the case of security issues or breach of the Code of Conduct of any member

of the team (international or local). Communication can be done by any means (email, phone, personally). STOs should not communicate with Core Team members, except in security related situations or when instructed by their LTO.

15.1.6. Communication between LTOs and STOs

LTOs communicate with STOs on a daily basis. STOs should communicate primarily to their LTOs. LTOs/LTO teams cannot address the mailing list of the Network in the name of the IEOM.

15.1.7. Code of ethics⁴⁵

ENEMO promotes a concept of gender, ethnic, national and religious equality and inclusion of people with special needs.

Within the process of selection of the staff members, ENEMO provides equal opportunities regardless of the candidates' race, color, gender, age, health (i.e. disability), religious or other background, unions' membership, national or social background, family status, welfare, sexual orientation or other personal characteristics.

ENEMO respects the generally recognized principles in regards to preventing conflict of interest, nepotism in the process of selection of its staff and during its functioning.

ENEMO fosters an atmosphere which provides opportunities for individual growth and staff development and promotes an organizational culture that respects the diverse and distinct individual contributions of all staff members.

All staff members shall be treated with fairness and equity, and as individuals with rights to be honoured and defended. Their rights to freedom of association, conscience and expression shall be respected and protected, but shouldn't jeopardise ENEMO image.

ENEMO is sensitive to the culture, customs, and the tradition of the countries in which it is implementing its projects.

ENEMO staff members promote ENEMO mission, objectives and its work while maintaining the positive image of ENEMO in the public.

⁴⁵ This sub-section is in direct reference to ENEMO's Code of ethics, included as part of ENEMO's Employment policy.

15.2. Representing ENEMO (external communication)

Ensuring ENEMO media visibility is one of its most important activities. ENEMO uses different public relations activities in order to enhance and maintain its reputation among specific audiences or to establish a level of awareness of its presence in the host country. All core team members are responsible for ENEMO’s reputation and representation in the public, especially the head of the mission and the press officer.

ENEMO ensures its visibility on various levels and by using different methods – direct communication and meetings, establishing contact with media, organizing public events, disseminating press releases, and maintaining ENEMO’s web page and social media accounts. Each of these methods is equally important for ENEMO’s visibility and representation in the public and each of them is briefly described in the continuation of this section.

The use of the ENEMO logo and branding and regulated in the Policy on Communication and Visibility. In particular, it makes reference to ENEMO’s brand book, which contains the mandatory provisions on:

- ENEMO’s visual identity, in particular the logo and its uses, but also visibility materials such as banners, publications, webpage and social media;
- Description of the official memorandum (letterhead) template;
- Online presence of ENEMO, including website structure and regular updating of online content;
- Other important provisions.

15.2.1. Relations with the host country

To achieve its goals and to get a wider picture of the political situation in the country, the ENEMO core team schedules a set of meetings with various stakeholders in the host country, governmental authorities, the diplomatic community, domestic political parties, domestic CSOs, international organizations and media outlets. Core team members should always be accompanied by assistants/translators who provide simultaneous interpretation at meetings.

There are several factors that determine who will be present at the meetings on behalf of ENEMO:

1. **level** of the meeting – all the stakeholders are important for ENEMO observation mission and work. However, the selection must always be a subject of great importance, especially when it comes to meetings at the highest level (president or prime minister). These kinds of meetings are always reserved for the head of the mission and deputy head of the mission.
2. **topic** of the meeting – the core team should establish contacts and cooperation within the diplomatic community, ministries, CSOs, media, central Election commission,

etc. Not all the core team members attend all the meetings, but just the ones needed for their area of expertise.

15.2.2. External communications and ensuring the visibility of the mission and donors

15.2.2.1. Communication strategy

At the beginning of the mission, ENEMO develops a **communication strategy**, which is part of its broader communication strategy, which contributes to the overall organization's branding and visibility (inter)nationally and understanding of ENEMO's mission and vision, which consequently helps sustain or increase support from donors, volunteers and fundraisers.

The communication strategy defines the objectives, the products that ENEMO needs to communicate (reports, statements, etc.), developing messages for relevant target groups and audiences, best tools, and channels for communicating to those audiences and resources needed.

The objectives of ENEMO's communication strategy are to:

1. present and explain ENEMO's role in the country and election process, to present the composition of the mission and the methodology to be used; principles of independence and non-foreign interference in the work of ENEMO
2. increase the level of visibility of ENEMO and of the mission in the country
3. create multi-stakeholder platforms to facilitate networking opportunities and cooperation with stakeholders (EU, OSCE/ODHIR missions, central election commission, international organizations, local NGOs and other institutions)
4. advocate and influence policymakers
5. enhance the understanding of the importance of fair and genuine elections
6. contribute to the development of a positive attitude towards democratic processes
7. disseminate ENEMO public statements and documents (interim report, preliminary statement and final report) to media outlets and other interested parties
8. develop and maintain good relations with the media

15.2.2.2. Communication with the donors

Communication with the donors is divided into 3 segments:

- Communication with the respective donors **prior to the mission**;
- Communication with the respective donors **during the mission**;
- Communication with the donors in regard to the **administrative and contractual issues**.

Communication with the donors on the ground prior to an IEOM is the responsibility of the Executive Director and the President of ENEMO.

Communication with the donors on the ground during an IEOM is the responsibility of the Head of Mission, Deputy Head of Mission and President of ENEMO.

Communication with the donors in regard to administrative and contractual issues is the responsibility of the Executive Director, Project Manager and President of ENEMO.

Initiating communication with prospect donors for the IEOM and maintaining regular contact is the responsibility of the Executive Director and the President of ENEMO. Introducing the Head of Mission to the donors on the ground is the responsibility of the Executive Director and the President of ENEMO. Communication with the respective donors scheduling weekly, bi-weekly and/or monthly meetings with the donors is the responsibility of the Head of Mission and Deputy Head of Mission.

15.2.3. External communication tools and channels

15.2.3.1. Press release and press conference

The ENEMO mission uses press releases and press conferences in the following situations:

1. **to raise awareness and announce the arrival of the ENEMO core team in the country** – information on the invitation of the host country authorities; ENEMO explains the structure and role of the core team, LTOs and STOs; tasks of ENEMO EOM; duration of the mission; number of polling stations to be covered; methodology to be used; principles of independence and non-foreign interference in the work of ENEMO
2. to announce the arrival of STOs in the country and provide brief details on STO briefing – when and where it will be held and whom it will gather
3. to raise awareness of **ENEMO's documents (interim report, preliminary statement and final report)** and its key findings and conclusions
4. extraordinary situations – interviews, if violence occurs, etc.

15.2.3.2. ENEMO web page and social media networks

The ENEMO web page and ENEMO social media accounts play an important role in the visibility of ENEMO and its reach to the public.

Administering, updating and publishing of information on the ENEMO webpage is the responsibility of the CEO. However, during the missions, administering, updating and publishing of information on the ENEMO webpage should be done in cooperation between the respective Core Team of the mission and the CEO.

Therefore, the ENEMO web page must be continuously maintained and administered. This means that all the information regarding the mission's activities must be published on the ENEMO website. Information that must be on the website is as follows: (1) information that ENEMO has deployed a particular mission, information about the composition of the core team, the duration of the mission and activities in the mission; (2) announcements about future ENEMO events such as press conferences, briefings, etc.; (3) press releases regarding organized events highlighting key findings; (4) information regarding the reports published with the link for their download.

Taking into account the growing influence of social media, all the above-mentioned information must be shared at ENEMO social media official accounts. All the (press) conferences should be broadcast live via the main social network platforms (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube), reaching a wide public that way. It is recommended to use a boosting mechanism in order to reach a wider public.

15.2.4. Publication and broadcasting of reports and statements

15.2.4.1. Interim report and preliminary statement press conference and press release

The core team decides when to release its interim report and preliminary statement with regard to the current events in the electoral process and its assessment of the time needed to produce a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the electoral process. The interim report is usually published one week before election day, while the preliminary statement is published within 48 hours maximum of election day and the closure of the polling stations.

Publishing the interim report doesn't always require organization of a press conference. On the other hand, findings of ENEMO's preliminary statement are always presented at the press conference usually the day after election day. The press conference is always attended by the head of the mission, the deputy head of the mission and experts, who deliver a summary of the preliminary statement and main findings and conclusions from their field of observation as ENEMO experts. At the end of the press conference, the core team announces the issue of its final report, after which the floor is opened up for questions.

15.2.4.2. Final report event and press release

The final report is usually issued no later than two months after the recognition of the election results. When project budgets allow, ENEMO can organize **a round table** to present its final report to all the relevant stakeholders – the representatives of the central electoral commission of the country, local CSOs, including ENEMO's partner organizations, other NGOs, media and donors. Organization of the round table ensures the positioning of ENEMO as an independent international organization as well as leaving space for the

opening quality discussion on the key findings and recommendations for improvement.

Professional interpretation is provided at all ENEMO events, and information is always sent to journalists in advance, inviting them to attend the event. Also, each event is followed by press releases, which are widely distributed to national media outlets and other interested parties. The purpose of the press releases is to increase the visibility of the ENEMO mission and its work on the national and international level. The press releases are always produced in English and translated into the local language/s. Information regarding the mission's events can be given to media outlets by the mission's press officer only.

Table 11: Timeline and topics of communication actions within IEOM

| Ordinal number | Press release/press conference | Date/Period of the announcement | Topic description |
|----------------|--------------------------------|---|---|
| 1 | press conference | upon Core Team's arrival in the country | announcement of the mission |
| 2 | press release | on the day of the conference 1# | announcement of the mission |
| 3 | press conference | one week before E-day | interim report |
| 4 | press release | on the day of the conference 2# | interim report |
| 5 | press release | two days before E-day | STOs arrival in the country and STO briefing |
| 6 | press conference | one or two days after E-day | preliminary statement |
| 7 | press release | one or two days after E-day (on the day of the conference 3#) | preliminary statement |
| 8 | round table | at least one month after E-day | final report |
| 9 | press release | on the day of the round table | round table conclusions and final report findings |

In the table are presented regular tools for mission media coverage. Press releases and press conferences on any other topic are considered as extraordinary press conferences and press releases. The range of extraordinary topics includes: violence, foreign interference in the electoral process, etc. The ENEMO mission doesn't have to use both tools all the time, especially when the press release is sufficient.

15.2.5. Interviews and interacting with media

As mentioned above, the press officer is the only person from the core team who is allowed to provide information to the media. The information that the press officer is allowed to share pertains to the composition of the ENEMO mission, its duration and other similar information, the official ENEMO attitude on some particular election-related event, etc.

The press officer and other observers of the ENEMO mission (CT member, LTO, STO) are obliged to: (1) maintain an impartial attitude and in no case outline personal preferences when it comes to the outcome of the election; (2) not give statements to the media regarding the monitoring of the electoral process or their findings.

The press officer, as part of their duties, is obliged to maintain good relations with the media and to ensure that host media are informed in good time about all ENEMO activities.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter XV – IEOM internal and external communication

- What are the fundamental communication principles within an ENEMO IEOM?
- How should the mission operate when it comes to communication among mission members?
- What are the objectives of ENEMO’s external communication strategy during an IEOM?
- What are the methods for ensuring the visibility of ENEMO during the mission?
- Which materials should be broadcasted by the IEOM and through which channels?
- What are the factors which determine which of the mission members attend specific meetings?
- What are the three different segments of communicating with donors of the mission?
- What is ENEMO’s stance on interviews and interacting with the media?



CHAPTER XVI

FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICAL PROCEDURES

There are a number of logistical activities that follow the implementation of the mission from its start until its closure. Coordination of the logistical and administrative activities of the mission is essential for its implementation, especially in a situation of crisis when the current events require prompt reaction. Logistics activities are the responsibility of the logistics officer of the mission, and they consist of: (1) pre-deployment activities; (2) activities in the host country; and (3) pre-closure activities.

16.1. Logistical activities

16.1.1. Pre-deployment activities

1. finding the office in the host country – the premises of the ENEMO office in the host country must be in a secure neighbourhood. Also, the landlords cannot be involved in the election process or engaged in politics. The premises must have a label indicating that they are ENEMO offices
2. timely accreditation of the core team
3. arrangement of flight tickets for core team deployment and local transportation in the host country
4. providing information to the core team about the address of the office premises and helping the core team to find accommodation in the host country (if needed)
5. providing information to the core team about procedures for entering the host country related to obtaining a visa (if needed), medical testing or vaccination required by the host country
6. providing practical information to the core team about the host country, such as: the national currency used in the host country, exchange rate, temperature, weather conditions, electrical outlets in use, healthcare system and available medical institutions for international observers, etc.

16.1.2. Activities in the host country

1. Recruitment of local staff engaged to assist core team members during the mission. When possible, it is desirable to recruit local staff prior to the arrival of the core team in the host country. For this reason, evaluations of local staff from previous missions are considered (if ENEMO had a mission in that country before) and those who had great evaluations are being contacted again. However, all the applicants for the position of translator/assistant to the core team must be interviewed. The logistics officer schedules these meetings.
2. Office equipment – it is desirable that the logistics officer finds an equipped office, but if the premises have no furniture, the logistics officer must rent or purchase (depending on the mission budget) furniture, a printer, a scanner/photocopier, etc. Moreover, the logistics officer must ensure continuous maintenance of the office premises and provision of office supplies.
3. Organization of the LTO and STO deployment to the host country – this activity refers to the purchase of flight tickets and organization of local transportation in the host country that would deploy LTOs and STOs to their AoR. Local transportation can be by train, bus, van, taxi or private vehicle. In some cases, when the AoR is too far from the capital, the transportation is by plane.
4. Organization of the accommodation for LTOs and STOs in the capital and AoRs.
5. Organization of LTO and STO briefing – this activity refers to finding the hall for the briefing, and organizing coffee breaks and lunch for the participants.
6. Providing the core team, LTOs and STOs with equipment for the mission such as a laptop and smart mobile phone with a national SIM card.
7. Providing general information to LTOs and STOs regarding the host country, such as: the national currency used in the host country, exchange rate, temperature, weather conditions, electrical outlets in use, healthcare system and available medical institutions for international observers, etc.

16.1.3. Pre-closure activities

Pre-closure activities pertain to:

1. reconciliation of ENEMO material – all the material provided to the core team, LTOs and STOs must be returned to the logistics officer. Mobile phones and laptops must be returned to the factory settings with no mission or private material in them. LTOs and STOs sign a receipt that they have returned the undamaged cell phone to ENEMO
2. organization of the local transportation for all observers to the airport for travelling back home
3. ensuring that all the utilities bills of the office are paid and that no damage was done to the premises, tidying up and leaving the office

16.2. Financial procedures

ENEMO applies a **no-cash policy**. This means that all the costs that are incurred in the mission must be paid through bank account exclusively. In order for the payment of the costs to be justified, they must be supported by (1) a contract (together with the observer registration form), (2) an invoice, or (3) a receipt, on which the account number is clearly visible.

If observers (CT, LTOs or STOs) are unable to receive payments of fees or per diems, due to regime restrictions or other types of prohibition, ENEMO provides prepaid credit cards for them. The amount of fees or per diems will be transferred to these credit cards. Upon arrival of the observer in the mission country, s/he receives the credit card. The validity of credit cards is limited, usually to one month, so they should withdraw per diems in that period of time, exclusively. This kind of credit card has multiple effects, such as: (1) keeping on track with the no cash policy; (2) decreasing bank fees for the organization that transfers the funds; (3) all reimbursements, such as for local transportation, PCR or insurance costs, can be done by using this credit card account, which consequently decreases the costs of the bank fees notably.

Only exceptional costs can be paid in cash. This exclusion pertains to retail receipts in the amount of not higher than 100 euros.

16.2.1. Contractual arrangements with the core team, LTOs and STOs

16.2.1.1. Contractual arrangements with the core team

ENEMO enters into a service agreement with each core team member. Their engagement period covers the pre-election period, E-day and post-election period in order to monitor election campaigns and the situation in the country after E-day.

16.2.1.2. Contractual arrangements with LTOs

At the very beginning of the mission, the core team organizes an LTO **briefing**. Among other things, LTOs finish administrative tasks at this event, such as **signing the contract** and providing ENEMO with a **passport copy** and signed **observer registration form (ORF)**.

ENEMO enters into **service agreements** with long-term observers (LTOs) for a period of five weeks minimum and eight/nine weeks maximum. The engagement period depends on several factors, including: (1) length of the mission; (2) length of the electoral campaign; (3) whether the election process includes one or two election rounds.

LTOs receive **per diems** for the period they are engaged in the mission. Per diems are supposed to cover accommodation costs, food and other daily expenses. The amount of

per diems is defined in line with the approved budget.

16.2.1.3. Contractual arrangements with STOs

Contracts with short-term observers (STOs) must be signed by three parties – the authorized person of the ENEMO member organization, the STO and the authorized person of the ENEMO organization, which covers the position of Executive Director of ENEMO. The contract defines the rights and duties of all three parties. Together with the contract, the STO signs the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers.

The contract defines a five-day-long STO engagement period, which includes travel, staying in and returning from the mission country. Once the contract is signed by all three parties, the STO receives a **per diem** for each of these five days, which should cover the daily costs and food for the STO while staying in the mission country. The accommodation costs are excluded from the per diems, as ENEMO provides accommodation to its observers, regardless of the per diems they receive.

16.2.1.4. Calculating fuel consumption – ENEMO logbook

The purpose of the ENEMO logbook is to record vehicle mileage and fuel expense. It includes sections to record: (1) date of the trip, (2) start and end time, (3) destination (description of the trip purpose), (4) odometer value when the journey was started and odometer value when the journey has ended to record miles travelled, and (5) distance driven for working and distance driven for private car use. The ENEMO logbook is always customized for country mission prices. Fuel price depends on whether diesel or petrol is used.

Based on the data entered in the logbook, the eligible fuel cost is calculated with the following formulas:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{Total distance}) - (\text{Private distance}) \times 0.1 \text{ l/km} \times \text{fuel price in national currency/l} = \text{___ km} \\ & \times 0.1 \text{ l/km} \times \text{fuel price in national currency/l} = \text{_____} \end{aligned}$$

The ENEMO logbook is considered eligible if it satisfies the following conditions: (1) that it is supported by fuel receipts; (2) the reported data are accurate; (3) that it is signed by observers and the driver.

Table 12: Example of ENEMO logbook

| Date | Start Time | End Time | Destination | ODOMETER value when the journey has started | ODOMETER value when the journey ended | Distance driven for business use | Distance driven for private use |
|------|------------|----------|-------------|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |

16.2.2. Brief overview on which costs ENEMO covers for its observers

ENEMO will cover LTO expenses related to the activities in their respective AoR in consonance with the approved mission budget. Expenses include the following: (1) fees for local staff of LTOs – interpreter and driver; (2) transportation costs; (3) fuel costs; (4) copying costs; (5) telephone costs.

By applying a no-cash policy, ENEMO pays all the aforementioned costs through the bank accounts of LTOs. At the very beginning of the mission, ENEMO transfers funds to one LTO in the team to cover their fuel, copying and telephone costs that will be incurred during the mission. All the payments are made in euros. Only exceptional costs can be paid in cash. All cash payments must be approved by the finance officer and accompanied by the cash payment receipt and original invoice or receipt.

16.2.2.1. Financial, administrative and logistic reconciliation – closure of the mission – LTOs’ and STOs’ obligations

Logistic reconciliation

LTOs and STOs must return to the logistics officer the **mobile phone, phone charger** and **SIM card** that they received for use in the mission. Mobile phones must be returned to the factory settings with no mission or private material in them. LTOs and STOs sign a receipt that they have returned the undamaged cellphone to ENEMO.

Financial reconciliation

All observers are obliged to submit the (financial) documentation to the finance officer at the end of the mission.

LTOs are obliged to record their expenses during the mission in line with the instructions provided by the finance officer. LTOs must submit all documents to the finance officer

for auditing – contract, ORF, passport copy, timesheets, ENEMO logbook, invoices and receipts. All the aforementioned material must be submitted as hard copies and sent to the finance officer by e-mail. Once the finance officer has approved the documentation, s/he prepares an overview of all the payments and costs incurred during the mission. Before final payment, the finance officer sends a **payment balance document** to LTOs, and once they agree and sign the documents, the finance officer can make a final payment.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter XVI – Financial and logistical procedures

- What are the pre-deployment mission activities which should be conducted by the CT?
- What are the logistical activities which need to be conducted once the mission arrives in the country?
- What are the pre-closure activities which should be conducted before departure from the observed country?
- What is ENEMO's no-cash policy?
- What are the respective contractual engagements within a mission?
- Which types of documentation are mission members obliged to submit?



CHAPTER XVII

SECURITY

Ensuring the safety of the ENEMO mission and its observers is crucial for ENEMO. Therefore, ENEMO takes several steps before and during the mission. The first is assessing the risks that could jeopardize the safety of the observers and implementation of the mission. Potential risks include occupation of part of the territory and riots in the country, election-related violence, natural diseases and disasters, etc. Based on the assessment made, ENEMO proposes the form of mission implementation, pertaining to the physical presence of ENEMO observers in the country or online election monitoring with limited physical presence of ENEMO observers in the host country.

17.1. Security procedures

Security planning is entrusted to the security officer of the mission, who is in charge of preparing security plans and security policies. Upon his/her arrival in the host country, the security officer establishes contact with police officials who are in charge of the security of international observers.

Once they are deployed in the mission, ENEMO observers are responsible for their own safety, but the ENEMO security officer must always:

1. provide ENEMO staff members with comprehensive briefings including the main safety, security and health risks, areas of deployment, advice on behaviour, the attitude to be adopted in accordance with the cultural and social environment, advice on contact to be made with local authorities at the state level in order to ensure security for teams at all times and detailed training in terms of security equipment
2. advise the ENEMO observers on security arrangements, including private security around premises, the provision of escorts, mission visibility and observer code of conduct

3. plan and carry out, where appropriate, security and safety checks of HQ premises and accommodation, observer accommodation in deployment areas, car parks, etc.
4. advise the IEOM on the safety and security conditions relevant to the deployment of observers and possible evacuation in the case of emergencies

Moreover, ENEMO and its security officer are obliged to establish an IEOM security operations centre capable of tracking observers' vehicular movements and providing facilities for constant communication between EOM HQ and observers and to maintain a communications logbook for the EOM security operations centre. Also, it is necessary for the security officer to establish a network of contacts in the host country with security officers at the EU delegation, NDI, OSCE, United Nations security officers and other diplomatic missions who could provide support or help in situations that endanger the safety or health of ENEMO observers.

It is required that the security officer has daily contact with all the observers in the field, ensuring that security procedures are always enforced by all EOM members, and it is recommended that appropriate courses of action be taken by the CT in the case of infringement of these procedures.

Even though ENEMO carries out a risk assessment daily and is prepared for the reaction to any potentially dangerous situation, ENEMO observers must be aware of all potential risks that could happen in the field. Therefore, ENEMO observers must behave in all situations in accordance with ENEMO instructions.

17.2. General instructions

- It is crucial for all mission members to understand all security and emergency procedures. Mission members should ask questions in any case where further clarification is needed.
- Personal safety is an individual responsibility. Remember, you are responsible and accountable for your personal safety.
- Violent attacks are usually preceded by surveillance of the target or targeted areas. Watch out for someone observing your premises or your movements.
- Golden rule of security: the best way to be safe is to avoid trouble in the first place rather than trying to extract yourself later. This means you should develop a strong sense of security awareness and adjust your behavior, as well as to take into account the surrounding environment.
- Be aware of your surroundings and keep a low profile. Some individuals or groups may regard observers with suspicion, or hostility.
- Follow your instincts. If you are in an uncomfortable situation or feel you may be in any danger, leave immediately.
- Dress down if necessary and behave with moderation. Do not display jewelry, cash, keys, or other valuables.
- Know the location of nearest emergency exit.
- Before going out, make sure all closures on your bags are shut. Put your wallet in a

front pocket or under clothing. Only carry the cash you need and divide it (e.g., some in bag, some in pocket).

- Be aware and alert of your surroundings.
- Whenever possible, avoid walking alone at night and in general.
- Always keep your mobile phone charged.
- Do not leave laptops or other equipment unattended.
- Assume all conversations are being monitored.

For LTOs, upon arrival to their Area of Observation (AOR), the LTO team needs, within the first week, to visit the Police station in town (were the LTO team is based) and to establish contact with police officials and to provide the CT with information about the contact person in the police who will be in charge for the security of international observers. For the teams based in the capital, this contact can be established by the CT and needed information will be provided to LTOs during the briefing.

17.3. Instructions for travel by vehicle

- Fasten your seatbelt at all times.
- Make sure your driver has a quality car (ask for proof of technical order). If you are not happy with the vehicle (you suspect it is not safe, or in order), or the way he/she drives, feel free to replace your driver.
- Ensure you have the phone number of the driver and all other members of your deployment team.
- Do not drive inside large crowds or protests. If there is no clear path out, park the vehicle and search for a safe location.
- At polling stations and potential flashpoints for violence, ensure that the vehicle is positioned for a quick departure and that the driver is standing by the vehicle.
- Ensure you are in command of the vehicle - insist upon safe driving speeds and safer roads.

17.4. General incident management guide

- If in a safe location, remain there. Attempting to move may expose you to more danger.
- Move only if you are at a direct risk of harm.
- Upon reaching a safe location, communicate your situation to the ENEMO CT. Provide as much detail as possible.

17.5. If a member of your team is injured

- Provide first aid if you are able, or call an Ambulance. Inform the CT immediately after this.
- Move the injured person to a medical facility for stabilizing treatment as quickly as possible (better through an Ambulance, but is not possible, then by car).

- Prior knowledge of the capability and location of medical resources in your deployment area will help you manage a medical emergency.

17.6. In case of a security problem or accident, take the following steps

- If there are any injuries, call the medical emergency number for the city you are in, or the number indicated in your travel insurance.
- If involved in a traffic accident, call the police.
- If you witness any violence, leave the area.
- In any case, notify LTO coordinator.

17.7. Evacuation plan

- Once deployed to your AoR, assess the exit routes which would be the easiest way to leave the city.
- The airways are always safest and fastest, but not all AoR s have an airport, or the airports may not be operational at that moment.
- Alternative routes and transportation should be considered, trains are not very safe, but still remain an option.
- One of the suggestions is to return immediately to the capital city by car.
- While evacuating, keep in constant communication with the CT.
- ENEMO CT staff have working cell phones and contact cards. Please keep the phone charged and with you at all times.

IMPORTANT By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to answer the following questions:

Chapter XVII – Security

- What are the main security principles which should be respected during the mission?
- What is the role of the security officer?
- What are the applicable security instructions for travel by vehicle?
- What do to in case of an incident if you or your teammate is injured?
- What should your evacuation plan consist in?

ANNEX 1. Glossary

| Term | Explanation |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| A | |
| Absentee voting (certificate) | The special voting procedure at some countries that allows a voter to vote at a place other than the PS at which he/she is registered. The voter normally receives an absentee voting certificate that allows him/her to vote at another PS in the same electoral district/constituency. |
| Abstain (from voting) | A decision of a voter not to vote/ participate in elections or a referendum. |
| Absolute majority | Usually a majority of more than 50% of the total voters' turnout. Some systems consider 50% of the total number of registered voters to be an absolute majority, whereas others use this term when one electoral contestant wins more votes/seats than its opponents. |
| Accountable | Being responsible for your actions/words, usually to the citizens, or those that voted. |
| Accreditation | A document issued by the EMB that provided the authorization for observers to monitor some segment of the electoral process, or which allows them to enter electoral sites (PS, tabulation center, DEC/ CEC, etc.). |
| Activist (party/candidate activist) | A person who is actively involved with, or supports a party, or a candidate, usually during the elections and campaigning. |
| Affiliation (to a party/candidate) | To belong to, or be in a certain way connected to a specific group, usually a party, or a candidate. |
| Airtime | The length/amount of broadcasting time that someone electoral contestant receives on TV or radio. |
| Anonymous ads, Campaign material | Anonymous ads are usually prohibited during a campaign. Party and candidate should submit financial report indicating donators of their advertisement campaign. |

| | |
|--|---|
| Appeal | A legal document, submitted to a Court, or a higher level authority that seeks to change, or challenge a decision made by a lower level authority. |
| Appoint | To (s)elect someone formally to a specific job/position. |
| Assistance to voters | A voter who is unable to fill out a ballot paper independently have the right after notifying the chairperson or another member of the polling station election commission to require the assistance of another voter, except for members of the election commission, candidates, their proxies and official observers. |
| AoR/AoO (Area of responsibility, Area of observation) | A specifically designated region that falls under one's jurisdiction/work (usually used to describe the size of the region covered by an LTO, or STO team). |
| Authorized persons (of a party/candidate): Agent Proxy Authorized Representative | A person who represents a political party or a candidate in different aspects of the electoral process. This person is normally authorized to represent the contestant in different segments, including the voting on behalf of the contestant, campaigning, observing, PR, etc. |
| B | |
| Ballot box | Normally a plastic (see-through) box where voters put their marked ballot paper/s. The ballot box is usually sealed with stamps, or other means and closed until the start of the counting process. |
| Ballot (paper) | Usually a piece of paper/plastic/card, or similar material with a serial number/stamp and names of electoral contestants, or referendum questions, where voters mark their desired choice, by putting an adequate mark. Ballots are later folded and placed into the ballot box. |
| Ballot (box) stuffing | A violation of the voting procedure, when one or more persons put multiple ballots into the ballot box illegally. |

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Bias | Bias is usually considered to be the opposite of impartial/objective, or in electoral sense – a situation when a person/entity is subjective in making decisions, or favoring one, or a group of electoral contestants compared to the other (normally used to describe non-ethical and/or non-professional media reporting). |
| Bloc | Another term for a Coalition, usually a temporary alliance of two, or more electoral contestants (parties) that run jointly in elections. |
| Bodies of Local Self-Government | “Local self-government” denotes the legal guarantee and practical implementation of citizens’ right to participate in the conduct of specific public affairs within “local communities”. |
| Booth (polling booth) | A special type of a cubicle/cabin for voters, which allows a voter to mark the ballot/vote in secret. Normally more than one booth can be found in each PS. |
| Bribery/vote buying | To give funds, gifts, and other material possessions to the voter in exchange for votes. |
| Broadcasting | Distribution of audio or video content to a dispersed audience via any electronic mass communications medium, including internet, TV, radio, etc. |
| By-elections | By-elections are held to fill vacancies in the legislature which arise before the end of the legislative term. |

| C | |
|---|--|
| Campaigning (political/electoral) | Any public activity of a political party/candidate that aims to gain support, promote its programs/views and members is normally called Political campaigning. Electoral campaigning happens during a formal period of time before elections (usually 30-60 days, sometimes more), when electoral contestants are allowed to gain and use special funds for the purpose of promoting themselves to voters through different means (including ads, rallies, concerts, debates, media and other events) in order to gain support of the electorate for their electoral platform, or to promote one of the choices available to voters in a referendum. |
| Campaign headquarters | An office of party or candidate where election campaign is organized. |
| Campaigning Finance | Raising and spending of money intended to for gathering votes through an electoral campaign. |
| Candidate list | The list of candidates indicating surname, first name and patronymic, year of birth, educational background, permanent place of residence, principal employer (occupation), position, party affiliation, and the nominating subject, etc. |
| Casting (a vote/ballot) | Voting is often referred to as “casting a ballot”, or “casting a vote”. Namely, it is a formal procedure, described in detail in the relevant Law that allows eligible citizens to show support to an electoral contestant of their choosing, or to choose one of the options in a referendum. |
| CEC (Central Election Commission) or other terminology, such as SEC (State Election Commission) in some countries | Normally an independent state body established by the Law as the highest EMB in charge of implementing the legal obligations and organizing elections, often additionally regulating the legal provisions through its decisions/regulations. The CEC is usually in charge of accrediting observers/authorized persons and registering electoral contestants at the national level. |

| | |
|---|--|
| Challengers | Candidate/party proxy or authorized representative at the CEC who has the right to challenge the results of election. |
| Civil (public) servants | Persons that work in public institutions/civil service, paid from the public budget (local, regional, or national) and normally employed in accordance with the laws that regulate civil servants and state/public employees. |
| Coalition | Another term for a Bloc – usually a temporary alliance of two, or more electoral contestants (parties) that run jointly in elections. |
| Code of Conduct | A set of rules and procedures that the relevant authority, or entity should follow during its work (during elections, or in general). Most commonly used for media and journalists, or for political parties in electoral campaigns. |
| Constituency or election district | An administrative electoral unit with clear geographic boundaries of where elections are to be held. Usually used in majoritarian electoral systems, with many constituencies (depending on the number of seats in the Parliament), similar in size. |
| CoEC (Constituency Election Commission) | A second level EMB that is usually formed by the CEC, in accordance with a relevant law to organize and implement elections in a specific Constituency. (often referred to as DEC, TEC, etc.) |
| Conduct of election | When elections are called, parties, candidates and their supporters attempt to influence policy by competing directly for the votes of constituents in what are called campaigns. |
| Constitution | The highest legal act/norm of a country that normally regulates and promotes basic state values, principles the rights of its citizens, etc. All other laws must be in line with the Constitution to be valid (constitutional). |

| | |
|--|--|
| Coupon (control coupon) | A special part of the ballot paper that is detached from the ballot by a member of the PEB, before a voter places his/her ballot paper into the ballot box, in some countries. Control coupons are set aside and counted separately in order to compare the turnout of voters and number of ballots casted in a PS. |
| CT (Core Team) | A group of experienced individuals, selected for a specific EOM to organize and oversee all aspects of the mission and prepare the official reports, based on the input from LTOs, STOs and other individuals. |
| CoE (Council of Europe) | The Council of Europe is an international organization, whose stated aim is to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Europe. https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/home |
| Counting procedure (tabulation) | Counting of votes is often referred to as Tabulation of votes and it represents a formal, legally prescribed procedure of determining the total number of votes cast in every PS for each electoral contestant/candidate, or a referendum option. Normally, the first counting is conducted by the PEBs at 240 PSs, although some countries have a separate Counting Center established for this purpose (e.g. Albania). |
| Criminal liability for violation of electoral rights of citizens | Penalties for election related offences are: forgery of election documents; preclusion of the right to vote, illegal destruction of election documentation; intentional violation of the secrecy of voting; violation of election funding campaign of candidate, political party (block); voting at polling station more than once. |

| D | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Decree | A decree is usually an order/decision issued by the high-level institution (Court, President, Parliament...) of a country, which has the power of a Law. In elections, the term is usually used when, e.g. the President of a country issues a decree to hold Parliamentary elections on a certain date. |
| DEC (District Election Commission) | Exist on the permanent basis used for the preparation, organization and conduct of the elections. DEC is a legal entity. The district election commission is the higher-level commission in respect to all polling station election commissions located within the territory of the respective territorial election district in connection with the elections. |
| Delimitation | Drawing of boundaries, particularly of electoral precincts, states, counties or other municipalities. It can be called redistribution and is used to prevent unbalance of population across districts. |
| Disclose (e.g. election results) | Means to publicly reveal, or announce relevant information. In elections, the term is normally used for informing the public about election related data, such as election results, candidate registration, voters' list, etc. |
| Discrimination | To treat a certain group/individual differently, or unequally. Normally used when one, or more groups/individuals are mistreated, or treated with prejudice/stigma by the authorities, for various reasons (sex, age, nationality, religion, disability, etc.). |
| Disenfranchisement | The state of being deprived of a right or privilege, especially the right to vote. |
| Disseminating (of false information) | Another term for spreading, usually materials, or information during elections, either by contestants, activists, media, or other instances. |

| | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| District (electoral) or Constituency | An administrative unit with clear geographic boundaries of where elections are to be held. Very often, administrative districts of a country do not coincide with electoral districts, formed only for elections. Usually used in majoritarian electoral systems, with many constituencies (depending on the number of seats in the Parliament), similar in size. |
| Draft resolution | A term used to describe decisions, opinion, or similar conclusions of an adequate authority, which have not yet been voted on (adopted). |
| E | |
| E-Day (Election Day) | The day on which voting in elections takes place. Normally one day and usually on weekend (Sunday), but in some countries this may differ. |
| Early Voting | Early voting occurs when voters can cast their vote before the official election day. |
| Election Code | The systematic collection of all laws that regulate elections in a country (normally Laws on election of the President, local elections, MPs, laws on financing of political parties/campaigns, voters' list and similar). |
| Election Observation Mission | To assess the conduct of an election process on the basis of national legislation and international election standards, an EOM monitors the entire electoral process. Election experts and long-term observers begin their work weeks before the actual election day, looking at candidate registration, the legal framework, the media situation, the work of the election administration, and the campaign environment. On election day, short-term observers monitor the opening of polling stations, the vote cast, and the counting and tabulation of results. After election day, observer remain in the country for another few weeks to monitor how possible election-related shortcomings and complaints are dealt with by the election administration and the judiciary. The findings of the observers are made public in reports. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Election program | The official program of an election contestant, which gives a brief overview of contestant's values, plans, principles, objectives and other information, aimed at motivating voters to support the contestant. Usually published in party/candidate's website and often formally filed at CEC during the registration process. |
| Electorate | All citizens of one unit (country, district, municipality...) that have the right to vote. Often referred to during elections as voters that voted, or those voters that support one fraction/contestant. |
| Electronic voting | System that enable votes in an election to be cast and/or counted electronically. |
| ENEMO (European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations) | An international network of leading non-profit, non-partisan and nongovernmental organizations from countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including European Union members, founded on September 29, 2001. www.enemo.eu |
| EU (The European Union) | The European Union is a political and economic union of currently 28 member states that are located primarily in Europe. www.europa.eu |
| Exercise the right (to vote) | A term used to describe that a person used their civil right to participate in the elections, i.e. voted (in contract to voters who abstained from voting). |
| Exit poll | An informal research used to foresee the outcome of elections, before the end of voting on E-Day, normally conducted by research institutions/agencies outside of PSs, asking voters to repeat their voting procedure with the same choice, in a non-formal manner. Not allowed in all countries. |

| F | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Family voting | A type of voting that is normally not allowed in most countries, where more than one person, usually one, or more family members vote together in one booth. Also used to define the instance when one, or more family members instructs other family members how to (for whom to) vote, or votes on their behalf. |
| Fine | To make someone pay an amount of money as a punishment for not obeying a law or rule/ sanction imposed for violation of the law. |
| First-past-the-post system | A type of electoral system where the candidate who receives the most number of votes wins elections, regardless of the majority, or voter turnout. This system is sometimes called the “winner takes all”. |
| First time voter | A term normally used during elections for persons who have just gained voting rights for the first time (usually due to coming of age for first elections after citizens turned 18, in most countries). |
| Found incompetent (by the Court) | A term that, in elections usually describes candidates, or voters whose rights to vote and/or be elected was taken away by the Court, most commonly due to a mental illness. |
| Folding (a ballot) | Most countries’ regulations determine in detail the exact way of folding a ballot after marking the desired candidate by voters themselves (usually 2 folds). There are countries that do not regulate this issue what often leads to the endangering of secrecy of voting principle. |
| Fraud | Intentional violation of electoral regulations, or related act aiming to rig elections, gain advantage over other contestants, affect elections’ regularity, or similar. |

| | |
|--|--|
| Franchise or Suffrage | A term often used to describe one's right to vote in elections (normally also to stand in elections/to be elected, but not always). May refer to local, regional, or national voting rights. |
| Freedom of expression, movement, peaceful assembly and association | The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association are, together with the right to freedom of expression, at the core of a democratic and open society. The rights are clearly stated in most human rights instruments, including the UN Declaration on Human rights (art. 21, 22) and the ICCPR, as well as in many regional rights instruments and national constitutions. |
| Free Mandate | A free mandate grants permission without any preconditions, meaning that the holder of the mandate is free and bound solely to the confines of their conscience. |
| Front-runner | Normally a person that leads the electoral race, or is expected to win elections (according to polls, or other data). A front-runner can also be the leader of a party, or a faction that is the most probable, or popular candidate within this contestant, with highest chances of running and winning in elections. |
| Fundraising | The process of gathering voluntary contributions/donations of money or other resources to the election campaign. Generally, one of the main focus of Election campaign team is to develop campaign finance. |
| G | |
| General roll | The list of voters who are eligible to vote in a particular electoral district and who are registered to vote, if required in a particular jurisdiction. |
| Gerrymandering | Gerrymandering is a term normally used to describe a manipulation of electoral districts, or their boundaries for political gain. Such shaping of physical boundaries of an electoral district aims to increase one, or more contestants' chances of winning elections. |

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Government | Normally the institution (group of persons) mandated by the Parliament to run the Country/State, while implementing state policies adopted by the Parliament for a specific term (usually 4 years between two Parliamentary elections). The chief of Government is usually called the Prime-Ministers, whereas other members are Ministers and civil servants/public employees of different categories and status. |
| Governor | An official appointed to run/govern a municipality, or some region. In some countries the term is the same as a Mayor, on other countries Governor runs a larger region than a city, whereas in some countries a Governor runs a special institution (e.g. central bank), or even a state. |
| H | |
| Harassment | Usually considered as person's offensive behavior that tends to intimidate, humiliate, or embarrass another person, and it is often expressed by a wide range of different physical, or verbal actions of the harasser. |
| Human Rights' (violations) | Universal rights and freedoms of all human beings, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), other Declarations and Laws/Constitutions of most countries. Any limitation of such rights is considered a Violation. |
| I | |
| Imperative Mandate | A political system in which representatives enact policies in accordance with mandates and can be recalled by certain amount of voters. |
| Incumbent | A person holding a designated position, role, office. Usually used in elections to describe a post that some state official held before elections (e.g. Incumbent President). |

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>Illegal acceptance of donations by a candidate or an electoral association (administrative offence)</p> | <p>If a person makes or accepts a political donation or reportable loan and is aware the donation or loan is unlawful the person may have committed an offence and may be subject administrative sanctions imposed by administrative court.</p> |
| <p>Independent candidate</p> | <p>A person running for elections who is not nominated by any political party.</p> |
| <p>Individual and legal entity</p> | <p>A legal person (in legal contexts often simply person, less ambiguously legal entity) is any human or non-human entity, in other words, any human being, firm, or government agency that is recognized as having privileges and obligations.</p> |
| <p>In-kind (contribution)</p> | <p>A non-monetary contribution, often meaning goods, or services offered free, or at a lesser price than usual.</p> |
| <p>International Observer</p> | <p>A person who is accredited to observe elections as non-citizens of the host country, normally as a member of an EOM of an international, or foreign organization.</p> |
| <p>Intimidation</p> | <p>An act of pressuring, threatening, or frightening someone, usually in order to persuade them to vote for a certain election contestant, or not to vote.</p> |
| <p>Invalid ballot (paper)</p> | <p>A ballot that is not be taken into consideration while tabulating results of elections, due to not being filled properly (e.g. 2 or more contestants circled), or not filled at all, or was found to be irregular for other reasons (e.g. being damaged by a voter, secrecy of ballot was compromised, issued improperly by the PEB).</p> |

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Invalidation of the vote | Election ballots can be deemed void for instance if the seal of the election commission is absent or the numbers of a territorial district or an election precinct indicated on them do not correspond to the number of the territorial district or the election precinct, where the vote count is carried out, or the ballot has been marked with more than one mark against the surnames of candidates, or they contain no marks at all, or the control coupon is not torn off, or it is impossible to determine the will of the voter. |
| IDP (Internally Displaced Person) | A person who is for some reason (usually an armed conflict) forced to leave his/her place of residence, but within country's borders. IDP does not fall within the legal definition of a refugee. |
| J | |
| Judicial district | A territorial boundary that falls under the jurisdiction of a specific Court of Law. Very often, electoral districts do not match the Court districts, what may cause confusion among electoral contestants and voters as to which Court to refer to when filing a complaint, or similar action. |
| Jurisdiction | An authority granted to a specific public body (e.g. Court) to conduct its powers within a defined field of responsibility, or a pre-defined territory. |
| Judicial recount | Court has the right order respective election commission (PEC; DEC or CEC) recount election results in the courtroom during proceedings. |
| K | |
| L | |
| Leaflets | Printed campaign material which candidate and the party that nominated the candidate must submit to the CEC one sample of each leaflet as print preelection campaign material, produced at the expense of the campaign fund and using their own property to the candidate. |

| | |
|---------------------------|---|
| LTO (Long term observers) | An observer that is a member of an EOM, deployed to concrete region/s of the country where elections are held, usually for a longer period (around 2 months) in order to observe all regional election-related activities and report to the LTO coordinator. |
| Local Elections | Local Elections usually take place to select local representatives in local government, such as mayors and members of local councils. |
| M | |
| Marking | To give the document authentic and official character, for example stamp and seal ballot paper by the respective member of commission. During election day, voters mark the ballot to express their will. Sometimes, PEB members or will mark ballots to distinguish them from other ballot papers, which represents a serious violation. |
| Materials (election) | All materials used by the EMBs to organize voting (ballot boxes, ballots, forms, spray, etc.). Should be mixed with campaigning materials (posters, leaflets, etc.) produced by parties/candidates and similar. |
| Mayor | The mayor is the chief executive of the local community at the village (or association of several villages), town or city level, elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. The village or township mayor leads the executive committee of the respective village, township or city council, and presides at its meetings. |
| Media coverage | Normally used to define the total amount of time, or space dedicated by a media to a specific topic, or a person/party. Not to be mixed with the mediareach (the share). |
| Minutes | In case of election observation, minutes is a term used for a report made by observers after each meeting, with an overview of most important topics discussed. |

| | |
|---|--|
| Mixed electoral system | An electoral system that combines two, or more different systems of voting (e.g. majoritarian and proportional) during the same elections. |
| Mobile ballot box | A special, usually smaller ballot box used by PEB members when visiting voters at home, or places other than the PS, which for some reason (illness, age...) are not able to come to the PS and vote. |
| N | |
| NDI (National Democratic Institute) | A nonprofit, nonpartisan NGO working to support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and accountability in government. www.ndi.org |
| National minorities | A term commonly used to describe a minority group within a country that is to be distinctive from the majority population due to historical differences of language, religion, culture, tradition, etc. |
| Negative campaigning | An electoral campaign led by one, or more election contestants in a manner of attacking and accusing other contestants, rather than promoting their program. |
| Non-Governmental Organization | Normally an association of citizens, or other organizations who share the same ideas, values, or work objectives, etc. and independent from the State/Government, and usually a non-profit entity. |
| Nominate (candidates) Nominee | To propose a person to be a candidate in elections, either by a party, citizen group, or other entity. A person designated/nominated to run in elections. |
| O | |
| ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) OSCE/ODIHR | Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is an executive structure of OSCE which provides support, assistance and expertise to participating States and civil society to promote democracy (especially democratic elections), rule of law, human rights and tolerance and nondiscrimination. www.osce.org/odih |

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Office Holder | A term that usually describes a person that is governing a public institution, or is a member of a public authority. During elections, this term is most commonly used to point out conflict of interest, or abuse of state/ local resources. |
| Official results protocol | Is a type of form/document issued by the CEC after the counting of votes, with all details regarding the tabulation of votes and with election results. |
| On equal bases | Every human being has the right to exercise his/her rights and freedoms on equal bases without discrimination of any kind. Any direct or indirect privileges or restrictions on race, skin color, political, religious and other convictions, gender, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence, or based on language or other criteria shall be prohibited. |
| Open vote | A voting system in which voters vote openly by queuing or otherwise, indicating the candidate of their choice. This is as opposed to a secret ballot, where a voter's choices are confidential. The system minimizes incidences of election rigging that comes with the secret ballot system as well as other electoral fraudulent-related practices. |
| Open ballot voting | A type of voting in some countries, where people vote publically for a candidate, as opposed to secret voting. |
| Opinion poll | Research of citizens' opinions, usually conducted on a representative sample, often conducted to foresee election results. |
| Ordinance | Normally a Decree, piece of legislation, or even a Law, usually enacted by a lower tire authority (e.g. Mayor, local council, etc.) that regulates certain matters of public interest. |

| | |
|---|---|
| OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) | The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is an intergovernmental organization, whose mandate includes issues such as arms control, promotion of human rights, freedom of the press, and fair elections. www.osce.org |
| Open list | Open list describes any variant of party-list proportional representation where voters have at least some influence on the order in which a party's candidates are elected. This is as opposed to closed list, which allows only active members, party officials, or consultants to determine the order of its candidates and gives the general voter no influence at all on the position of the candidates placed on the party list. |
| P | |
| Partisan | A person who strongly supports a concrete political party, candidate or position. |
| Parliament | Parliament is the body which exercises legislative power. It can also be referred to as the legislator. Generally, the Parliament has three essential functions: representing the electorate, making the laws, and overseeing the government. |
| Petition | A formal written request, typically one signed by many people, appealing to authority in respect of a particular cause. |
| Polling booth | A special place, normally a small cabin in each PS dedicated to protect the secrecy of voters' marking of a ballot. |
| PEC (Precinct Election Commission) | A special commission that is in charge of one PS, whose members are selected as independents, or as party nominees to conduct and organize voting on E-Day. |
| Polling station (PS) | A polling station is where voters cast their ballots in elections. In many countries, it is often a school or other public building. In exceptional circumstances, it may consist in another type of facility (for instance, barracks for military or detention facility for prisoners). |

| | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Political Party | A political party is an organized group of people who share the same ideology, or who have the same political goals, and who nominates candidates for elections and try to implement their agenda. Political parties are a key component of representative democracy. |
| Pre-Election Campaign | The pre-election campaign is undertaking of any activities to encourage voters to vote for or not to vote for a certain candidate. The pre-election campaign may be carried out in any form and by any means that do not contradict the constitution and the law. Pre-election campaign can be carried out via various forms including public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, public debates and discussions, distribution campaign materials etc. |
| Preliminary statement/Final report | A special form of a report prepared by an EOM (e.g. after E-Day), which aims to inform the media/public about the main findings and conclusions, usually as a summary, before the final report is issued. |
| Preparation and conduct of elections | Usually managed by Election management bodies of respective states. Preparation and conduct of election are complex issue including preparation of legal framework, recruitment of election administration members, transfer materials, organize trainings etc. |
| Principles of Electoral Law | Universal suffrage; equal suffrage; direct suffrage; secrecy of ballot and free expression of the will of voters. |
| Property and income statement | Normally an official document expressing all property and financial income of a candidate running in elections. |
| Proportional representation | An electoral system in which the number of seats held by a political group or party in a legislative body is determined by the number of popular votes received. |

| | |
|---|--|
| Provisional Results | Temporary results of elections, disclosed by the CEC after the tabulation process, but usually still subject to possible changes due to an appeal process, recount, or similar actions that may yet to affect the final results. |
| Proxy Authorized representative Agent | A person who represents a political party or a candidate in different aspects of the electoral process. This person is normally authorized to represent the contestant in different segments, including the voting on behalf of the contestant, campaigning, observing, PR, etc. |
| Proxy vote | Some countries allow voters to appoint, or authorize another person to vote on their behalf. Most countries require voting in person, but proxy voting is allowed in some countries, usually for voters abroad. |
| Public opinion poll | A research conducted by a professional agency, or organization, which tends to assess and project results on the national level about a certain issue (e.g. election results), through questioning a smaller and specific sample of the total population. Most countries have a deadline prior to E-Day after which no polls are to be disclosed publicly. |
| Q | |
| Quorum | The minimum number of members of some body, or assembly/board that must be present at a meeting/ session, in order for that meeting to be formally held and valid. |
| Queue | In electoral terms, a queue is a line of voters in front of a PS, waiting to vote. Queue is especially important before the closing of a PS, when PEBs determine how many people still need to vote, as this may affect the extension of time for closing the PS. |
| Quota | A proportional part or share of something that a person or group is entitled to receive or is bound to contribute. |

| R | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Rally | An event organized by a candidate, or party during the electoral campaign, aiming to gather and talk to the supporters and interested citizens. |
| To recognize a ballot void | Election ballots shall be deemed void if the seal of this election commission is absent or the numbers of a territorial district or an election precinct indicated on them do not correspond to the number of the territorial district or the election precinct, where the vote count is carried out, or the ballot have been marked with more than one mark against the surnames of candidates, or they contain no marks at all, or the control coupon is not torn off, or it is impossible to determine the will of the voter. |
| Recall | Withdrawal of an official's mandate/post by a court or another relevant institution. |
| Recount | Some countries have an obligatory and some an optional process for recounting votes, in order to double-check results for any inconsistencies, or due to an appeal submitted by electoral stakeholders. |
| Referendum | A procedure similar to elections, but where voters choose one of the options provided, instead of contestants. May be obligatory, or consultative, local, regional, national and similar, depending on the issue that is to be assessed based on voters' opinion. |
| Relative majority | The term is usually used to describe a situation when one contestant wins more votes than the other, but in a situation that none of the contestants have more than 50% of all votes. |
| Repeat election | Voting conducted again in the electoral precinct(s) where polling results are declared void, or voting conducted again in the entire multi-seat electoral district based on party lists where no party/electoral bloc has been awarded a seat. |

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Rig (elections) | A term often used to describe irregular elections, due to fraudulent, or illegal actions, or events that occurred during the process. |
| Run (in elections) | Similar to stand for election. This means to candidate, either independently, or as one's nominee for elections. |
| Run-off elections | A special, two-round voting system, used to elect one winner of elections in the second round, where only two candidates with most votes from the first round run in the second. |
| S | |
| Secret voting | Most countries require that the voting should be done in secret (normally behind the polling booth) and may lead to canceling of elections, or annulment of their results if this principle is not respected. |
| STO (Short-term) | Observers that monitor only the voting process in a number of PS, on Election Day (or several days in some cases). |
| Signature lists (sheets) | A list of voters' signatures collected in order to support a candidate, or a party to run in elections. Also used for initiating a referendum, or even registration of a party. |
| Simple majority | A term normally used for cases when one candidate wins 50% +1 vote of total votes cast. |
| Single-mandate constituency | An electoral district/unit, or a territory with clear boundaries, where only one electoral contestant after winning elections in that territory will be elected as a Member of the Parliament, Congress, etc. |
| Single Transferable Vote | A voting system considered to achieve proportional representation through the use of multiple-member constituencies and each voter casting a single ballot on which candidates are ranked. The preferential (ranked) balloting allows transfer of votes to produce proportionality, to form consensus behind select candidates and to avoid the waste of votes so prevalent under other voting systems. |

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Spoiled ballot | A spoiled ballot is usually a ballot paper that a voter has damaged by marking it incorrectly and in most countries can be replaced by PEB at voter's request. |
| Stand for elections | A person's right, or an intention to be a candidate in elections. |
| State authorities | All public authorities, formed according to the legal framework of a country, whose work is public and funded from state budget. |
| T | |
| Tabulate (election results) | Normally to gather and process election results in a manner that they can later be assessed, compared, counted, verified and certified (e.g. per party/candidate, per polling station, per district etc.). |
| TEC (Territorial Election Commission) | A second level EMB that is usually formed by the CEC or higher level IEMB, in accordance with a relevant law to organize and implement elections in a specific Territory. (often referred to as CoEC, DEC, etc.). |
| Threshold | The minimum share of the primary vote which a candidate or political party requires to achieve before they become entitled to any representation in a legislature. |
| To lodge a complaint | The right to an effective remedy should be guaranteed in the electoral legislation. The right to appeal decisions, actions, or inactions of election commissions and other authorities involved in the process is established to all participants in the election process. |
| To nominate a candidate | Candidates can be nominated either by parties or themselves. |
| Transparency | The level of openness of a certain institution, or an individual towards the public. Usually determines the level of information (decisions, reports, minutes, etc.) available to the public online, or through the use of Free access to information. |

| | |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Transparent and open elections | Elections are transparent when each step is open to scrutiny, and stakeholders can independently verify whether the process is conducted honestly and accurately. |
| Turnout (voters' turnout) | The exact number of voters that used their voting right on E-Day, or the percentage of voters that voted on E-Day compared to the total number of registered voters. |
| U | |
| UN (United Nations) | The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1945, to conduct its mission in line with the UN Charter. Currently has 193 Member States. www.un.org |
| Unmarked ballot | The ballot without stamp and seal made by respective Polling station member, or ballot which does not express will of the voter must be considered as unmarked ballot. |
| V | |
| Valid vote | A vote that was cast in line with the procedures and regulations, by an eligible voter, which is to be counted for tabulation of votes. |
| Verification | Presenting valid identification document of the voter to the PEB during exercising the right to vote, or signing the documents such as protocols by the PEB members to make them valid. |
| Violation | A deliberate, or accidental breach of procedures, or the Law – a serious irregularity. |
| Violence | Any action, or behavior intended to hurt people, property, animals, etc. |
| Vote buying | See Bribery. |
| Void ballot | Similar to invalid... A ballot paper that it is deemed invalid, for any reason by the PEB and thus not included in the election results tabulation. |
| Voting | A formal expression of will, or choice (through a ballot in elections) by voters. |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Voters' lists | Lists of all citizens eligible to vote in elections (usually citizens over 18, who have the residence in the electoral unit in which elections are held). |
| Voters' register | The official register (list) of persons registered and eligible to vote, made by CEC, or another state authority. Also known as the electoral roll. |
| W | |
| Will expression | In elections, the term is used to define whether voters/citizens have the possibility to freely express their choice for an election contestant during elections. |
| Writ | A formal written order issued by a body with administrative or judicial jurisdiction. |

ANNEX 2. Bibliography and useful links

Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Observers, 2005:

https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1923_declaration_102705_0.pdf

United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948:

<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966:

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>

UN Committee on Human Rights, General Comment no. 25, “The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right to Equal Access to Public Service”, 1996:

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/a/19154.pdf>

UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979: <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm>

Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE), Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (“Copenhagen Document”), 1990:

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/c/14304.pdf>

European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, 2002:

[https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2002\)023rev2-cor-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2002)023rev2-cor-e)

Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 1950:

https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf

OSCE, Istanbul Document, 1999:

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/5/39569.pdf>

Venice Commission, Guidelines and report on the financing of political parties, 2001:

[https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-INF\(2001\)008-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-INF(2001)008-e)

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), “International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for reviewing the legal framework of elections”, 2002:

<https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/international-electoral-standards-guidelines-for-reviewing-the-legal-framework-of-elections.pdf>

Council of Europe, Handbook for Civil Society Organizations, Using International Election Standards, 2016: <https://rm.coe.int/16806c791a>

Election Observation and Democratic Support (EODS), Compendium of International Standards for Elections, 2016:
<https://www.eods.eu/library/Compendium-EN-N-PDF.pdf>

Andrew Reynolds et al., Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2005:
<https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/electoral-system-design-new-international-idea-handbook>

Helena Catt et al., Electoral Management Design, Revised edition, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2014: <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/electoral-management-design-2014.pdf>

Larsson O. A., Right-wingers on the rise online – insights from the 2018 Swedish Elections, Kristiania University College, School of Communication, Leadership and Marketing, 2019:
https://www.academia.edu/40662323/RIGHT_WINGERS_ON_THE_RISE_ONLINE_INSIGHTS_FROM_THE_2018_SWEDISH_ELECTIONS

Gleicher, N., Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior in UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Facebook, 2019: <https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-in-uae-nigeria-indonesia-and-egypt/>

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), International Standards and Commitments on the Right to Democratic Elections: A Practical Guide To Democratic Elections Best Practice, 2002: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/3/16859.pdf>

National Democratic Institute (NDI), Applying International Election Standards: a field guide for election monitoring groups, 2013:
<https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Applying-International-Standards-ENG.pdf>

Election Observation and Democratic Support (EODS), Handbook for European Union Election Observation, third edition, 2016:
https://www.eods.eu/library/EUEOM_Handbook_2016.pdf

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections, 2013:
<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/8/104573.pdf>

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Handbook for the Observation of Voter Registration, 2012:

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/e/92058.pdf>

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Handbook on Media Monitoring for Election Observation Mission, 2012:

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/0/92057.pdf>

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Handbook for Monitoring Women's Participation in Elections, 2004:

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/f/13938.pdf>

OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Handbook on Observing and Promoting the Electoral Participation of Persons with Disabilities, 2017:

https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/c/339571_0.pdf

OSCE Office for Human and Democratic Rights (ODIHR), "Handbook on the Follow-up of Electoral Recommendations", 2016:

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/8/244941.pdf>

Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, The Limits of Electoral Reform, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013:

<https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695409.001.0001/acprof-9780199695409>

International IDEA, "Electoral Processes: Navigating and Emerging from Crisis", Global State of Democracy Thematic Paper, 2021:

<https://www.idea.int/gsod/sites/default/files/2021-11/electoral-processes-gsod2021.pdf>

Frank Bandau, The Electoral Crisis of Social Democracy: postindustrial dilemmas or neo-liberal contamination?, 2021:

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14789299211032461>

Milica Zrnovic, Ivan Vukcevic, Vladimir Simonovic, Reshaping the Electoral Run Through the Usage of Social Media in Montenegro, 2020

Daniel Arnaudo, Samantha Bradshaw, Hui Hui Ooi, Kaleigh Schwalbe, Amy Studdart, Vera Zakem and Amanda Zink, Combating Information Manipulation: A Playbook for Elections and Beyond, 2021

About the authors



Pierre Peytier from France has been involved in election monitoring, management and administration of multiple USAID, OSCE and EU funded democracy building programs since 2014. His career has focused on Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, in particular work with civil society organizations, political transparency and accountability, and electoral reform projects. He represented Kyrgyz NGO “Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society” in the ENEMO Secretariat from 2018 to 2022, and was several times Election and Campaign Expert, Political Analyst and Deputy Head of Mission in ENEMO’s 2019-2021 International Election Observation Missions to Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro and Albania. He also served as Head of Mission to ENEMO’s IEOM in Kosovo (2021) and Head of Mission to ENEMO’s IEOM in Serbia (2022).

In 2017, for the first time in Central Asia, in cooperation with the National Democratic Institute (NDI), he contributed to the implementation of SMS based reporting methodology of short-term observers with the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society. Pierre is the co-creator of the first voter advice application in Central Asia, “Shailoo Suramjeiloo” (implemented for the 2015 Kyrgyz parliamentary elections). He has trained international short-term observers for the US Embassy and various European and Central Asian civil society observation groups performing Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT).

Pierre holds a degree in Law and two degrees in Political Science. His research has focused on post-communist states and democratic transitions, and retrospective voting during economic crisis in Europe.



Zlatko Vujović is currently the Executive Director of the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations, and President of Governing Board of the Centre for Monitoring and Research CeMI (www.cemi.org.me), a think tank and election monitoring organization from Montenegro. Since 2017 he is a member of the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM) Board of Directors (www.gndem.org). He is assistant professor in the Faculty of Political Science at University of Montenegro. He graduated from Law School in Podgorica and got M.Sc. in

Political Science at the University of Montenegro. He has a Ph.D. in Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb.

He served as the Head of the International Election Observation Mission nine times (Kosovo in 2010 and 2013, and Ukraine in 2015, 2019, 2019, 2020, Armenia 2018, Serbia 2020, and Moldova 2021), as well as the LTO and STO in different EOMs run by ENEMO or OSCE – ODIHR. He was a teaching assistant at the Faculty of Political Science in Montenegro from 2006 till 2016. He led more than 11 domestic EOMs in Montenegro. He published articles in different international scientific journals, as well as been one of coauthors of a book published by international publishers like Palgrave, Routledge. His research interests include:

personalization of electoral systems, presidentialization of political parties, democratic transition and consolidation, as well as intra-party democracy.

He served as ENEMO's General Secretary during CeMI's Secretariat chairmanship from 2017 to 2022, and heads the ENEMO Chief Executive Office in the capacity of Executive Director since 2022.



Kristina Kostelac is a Master of Political Science with a special interest in public policy and elections, and a University Specialist in Project Management, EU Funds and Programmes. She has been observing elections in Croatia since 2011 and has international STO and LTO certificates. Since 2014, Kristina has observed elections with OSCE/ODIHR, European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) and European Union, most recently in Ghana, Nepal, Zimbabwe, Armenia, Ukraine, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo.

Besides preparing projects and observing elections, Kristina closely cooperates with Croatian civil society organization Gong, a pioneer of election observation in Croatia, and is engaged in numerous activities such as activism and research. In addition, she implemented numerous projects and organizes election observation in Croatia. In her free time, Kristina is a football referee and she has been engaged in this hobby for the past 13 years.



Teodora Gilic was born on September 7, 1992. She completed her basic studies in June 2014 at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Podgorica, as a student of International Relations. In October 2015, she graduated in the department of Political Science. During the 4th year of her studies, she volunteered at the Center for Monitoring and Research (CeMI). From January to November 2016, she worked in the Atlantic Council of Montenegro (ACM). In March 2017, Teodora was engaged in CeMI as Communication Officer. From September 2018, Teodora was in the position of Head of Finance and PR Department.

Since November 2018, Teodora has been a member of the Core Team of several ENEMO missions (Armenia 2018, Ukraine 2019, Serbia 2020, Ukraine 2020, Moldova 2021, Serbia 2022). In addition to many projects, Teodora was in charge of financial implementation of several EU projects. During her engagement, she attended several trainings related to financial implementation of EU projects, training for long term observers as well as training on comparative research projects, comparative research techniques, comparative qualitative analysis (QCA techniques). She attended a large number of conferences and seminars as well.

Teodora is currently Program Director of CeMI. Teodora was awarded a Chevening scholarship and is currently a student of University of Westminster at Social Media and Digital Communication MA Course.

**CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Национална библиотека Црне Горе, Цетиње**

ISBN 978-9940-8861-0-3

COBISS.CG-ID 23205892

ISBN 978-9940-8861-0-3



9 789940 886103 >

EUROPEAN
NETWORK
OF ELECTION
MONITORING
ORGANIZATIONS

ENEMO