The preliminary assessment of Election Day for the 2024 Local Elections by the ‘Pod lupom’ Coalition is that Election Day at the majority of polling stations proceeded in accordance with election rules.
The processes of setting up and opening polling stations, closing polling stations, and packing polling materials proceeded without significant differences compared to previous election cycles.
The voting process at regular polling stations, where new technologies were not piloted, was assessed more negatively than in previous elections, with a significant increase in instances of family voting, misuse of voting assistance, and voting without proper voter identification. Observers raised more complaints about not having unimpeded access to observe the voting process (at 7.4% of polling stations) and filed nearly four times as many objections concerning the voting process compared to previous elections (at 13.3% of polling stations).
The vote-counting process at polling stations without electronic identification and scanners was less satisfactory than in previous elections, with a possibility of influencing the election results at 3.8% of observed polling stations.
The ‘Pod lupom’ Coalition assesses that the pilot testing of new technologies was successfully implemented at 97.9% of observed polling stations. The voting process at polling stations where voter identification was conducted using electronic devices and where voting took place through ballot scanners was more successful compared to regular polling stations. Consequently, the number of polling stations where improper voter identification occurred was almost half as many at pilot polling stations compared to regular polling stations, and the number of instances of voting abuses decreased by one-fifth.
There is room for improving the implementation of new technologies by providing additional voter education on their use, conducting further testing of new technologies in real conditions, and offering additional training to election administration on the proper conduct of the voting process using these new technologies.
The Coalition recorded 161 serious violations of election rules, some of which could impact the election results at certain polling stations. The number of serious violations has increased compared to the 2022 General Elections. These violations include obstructing observation, lack of polling materials, and irregularities in the voting process such as family voting, misuse of voting assistance, photographing ballot papers, improper sealing of ballots, issuing more ballots than necessary, oversights in the work of polling station committees, and breaches of voting secrecy. Particularly concerning are the documented instances of illegal pressure on voters.
Additionally, 36 instances of violating the election silence were recorded, involving election campaigning on social media despite explicit prohibitions.
The recorded cases of election rule violations and isolated incidents require serious analysis and preventive measures for the future.
Voter Turnout in the 2024 Local Elections
According to data from the ‘Pod lupom’ Coalition, voter turnout in the 2024 Local Elections by 19:00 hrs was 47.1% (with a statistical margin of error of +/- 1.26% within a 0.95 confidence interval). This turnout is 2.9% lower compared to the previous 2020 Local Elections and the 2022 General Elections.
Several factors could have influenced the lower recorded turnout and should be considered:
- The integrity of the Central Voter Register (CVR) has been compromised, and the CVR is not public, while the number of registered voters has been continuously increasing.
- Political entities could not manipulate the voter register and turnout at 303 polling stations where electronic voter identification was tested.
Observation of New Technologies at Polling Stations
On Election Day of the 2024 Local Elections, four pilot projects introducing new technologies were implemented at 458 polling stations in 24 basic constituencies:
Voter authentication and results transmission (the so-called EU pilot) were conducted at 165 polling stations in 10 basic constituencies: Stari Grad Sarajevo, Domaljevac-Šamac, Tešanj, Doboj, Bijeljina, Trebinje, Gradiška, Goražde, Sanski Most, and Zvornik.
Optical scanners and automatic ballot counting (the so-called USAID pilot) were implemented at 145 polling stations in 6 basic constituencies: Vogošća, Mostar, Tuzla, Visoko, Stolac, Novi Grad, and Prijedor.
Biometric voter identification and authentication (the so-called OSCE pilot) were conducted at all polling stations in the Brčko District of BiH.
Video surveillance at polling stations (the so-called CEC pilot) was conducted at 10 polling stations in 5 basic constituencies: Zenica, Centar Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Istočno Novo Sarajevo, and Vlasenica.
On Election Day, Pod lupom monitored the implementation of voter authentication and results transmission, optical scanners and automatic ballot counting, and biometric voter identification and authentication. Out of 448 polling stations, the Coalition deployed its observers to 298 polling stations. The Coalition assesses that the pilot testing of new technologies was successfully carried out at 97.9% of polling stations, with the use of new technology abandoned at only 2.1% of polling stations where the previous voting method was resumed.
Opening of Polling Stations and Launch of New Technologies
In the first hours after polling stations opened, the equipment functioned properly, and the voting process proceeded smoothly at almost all locations. Exceptions were observed at one polling station in Doboj, where electronic voter identification malfunctioned but was later fixed, and at two polling stations in Tuzla where ballot scanners were malfunctioning and voting continued without the equipment.
The new piloted technology was properly set up and prepared for use at nearly all polling stations, with exceptions at only 1.3% of polling stations. Additionally, nearly all polling stations had a new technologies operator, who, along with the members of the election committee, was required to arrive an hour before the opening of the polling station to test and set up the new technology. The exception was again at 1.3% of polling stations.
One area that needs improvement is voter education on how to use the new technologies, as no instructions were displayed explaining how to use the piloted technology at 12.9% of polling stations.
New Technologies and Voting
At the majority of polling stations, the voting process utilizing new technologies proceeded without disruption. Field observers provided their assessment of issues voters encountered when using the new technologies and noted that the process was slower or there were occasional interruptions at a small number of polling stations.
Where scanners were used, the average time for scanning both ballot papers, from the moment the voter accessed the scanner to the end of the process, was 44.9 seconds.
In instances of electronic identification, an average of 11 voters were not successfully identified, based on an average turnout of 322 voters (3.4%).
Final Processes at Polling Stations
The electronic transfer of results was successfully completed at the majority of polling stations; however, 11.8% experienced issues with this electronic transfer.
When scanners were utilized, the average duration for transferring results for both levels of government was 92.6 seconds.
The chairperson of the election committee failed to inform all present that the electronic transfer of voting results had been completed using the new technology at 9.1% of polling stations.
The new piloted technology was not turned off and disabled for further use at 11.9% of polling stations.
At 3.7% of polling stations, the new piloted technology was turned back on again.
First Testing of PVT for the Assembly of Brčko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), sometimes referred to as rapid counting, is a proven methodology used by non-partisan citizen observers to independently verify official election results. PVT relies on a systematic assessment of the voting and vote-counting processes. Unlike exit polls, PVT does not ask citizens how they voted but relies on trained observers who collect data at polling stations. Pod lupom used this methodology to conduct a PVT for the Assembly of Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The goal is to implement PVT for the 2026 General Elections for the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, following its successful testing during the 2024 Local Elections.
ELECTION DAY
Observers’ Access to Polling Stations
Observers had unhindered access to most polling stations to which they were assigned. Initially, there were sporadic issues with access, which were resolved in a timely manner. Individual instances of problems with observing the election process were recorded at a few polling stations.
Unfortunately, from election cycle to election cycle, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of BiH or local election commissions fail to provide lists of observers to the polling station committees, resulting in challenges for Pod lupom observers in accessing polling stations due to procedural oversights. Such situations occurred this year in Ilidža, Olovo, Vogošća, Kalesija, Trebinje, Prijedor, and Banja Luka. Although the Coalition continuously highlights this issue, it has been recurring for ten years, compromising election observation missions.
Opening and Setup of Polling Stations
The opening of polling stations proceeded similarly to previous elections. At polling stations where new technology was being piloted, the opening was delayed compared to regular polling stations (5.6% of pilot polling stations vs. 2% of regular polling stations).
At 9.6% of polling stations, not all members of the election committee were present at 06:00 hrs.
At 3.1% of polling stations, some sensitive election materials were missing.
At 0.7% of polling stations, manual counting of ballot papers was not conducted before the opening.
At 0.2% of polling stations, voting secrecy was not ensured.
At 2.9% of polling stations, the list of all election committee members with the name of the political entity they belong to was not visibly displayed, which is illegal.
At 1.4% of polling stations, there is suspicion that the presidents and vice presidents of the polling station committees were party affiliates, which is illegal.
At 1.1% of polling stations, there is suspicion that positions were traded between political entities in election committees.
It is estimated that 23% of polling stations were not accessible to persons with disabilities using wheelchairs or other aids.
At 2% of polling stations, within 50 meters of the polling location, there were symbols or posters of political entities, religious symbols, or marks that could have discriminatory meanings.
At 1.8% of polling stations, the ballot box was not shown empty and then sealed before the opening of the polling station.
Most polling stations opened on time. 22% of polling stations opened with a slight delay of up to 15 minutes, and 2% with a delay of more than 15 minutes.
Voting Process
The voting process at regular polling stations where new technologies were not piloted was rated lower compared to previous elections, with a significant increase in the number of instances of family voting, abuse of assistance in voting, and voting without proper voter identification. Observers reported more significant difficulties in monitoring the voting process (at 7.4% of polling stations) and filed nearly four times more complaints about the voting process compared to previous elections (at 13.3% of polling stations).
The voting process at polling stations where voter identification was conducted using electronic devices and ballots were scanned was more successful compared to regular polling stations. The number of polling stations where improper voter identification occurred was reduced to nearly half at pilot polling stations compared to regular polling stations, and the number of instances of abuse during voting was reduced by one-fifth.
Irregularities in the voting process were recorded at 3.6% of polling stations (e.g., one person receiving multiple identical ballots, one person voting multiple times, one person voting on behalf of another).
At 2% of polling stations, there was an instance of cajoling voters to vote for a specific political entity, while pressures on voters were recorded at four polling stations (in Bijeljina, Banja Luka, Tešanj, and Kalesija) and at one additional polling station in Stolac where new technologies were tested.
Voting without verifying the required identification documents was noted at 6.8% of polling stations (1 to 10 instances of this type of electoral irregularity). At 49.8% of polling stations, voters were turned away from the polling station because they were not listed in the CVL excerpt (1-10 cases). At 1.1% of polling stations, more than 10 instances of this type of oversight were observed.
Instances of family voting were recorded at 51.6% of polling stations (1-10 cases of irregularities), while more than 10 instances of this type of irregularity were observed at 1.4% of polling stations,
One person assisted multiple voters in voting in the booth at 29.3% of polling stations (1-10 instances of this type of irregularity), while at 4 polling stations, there were more than 10 instances of this type of irregularity (1 regular and 3 where new technologies were tested).
At 91.9% of polling stations, voters using voting assistance from another person had proof, i.e., confirmation that they needed assistance. This was not the case at other polling stations, but the polling station committee can allow voting if they assess that the person is uncapable of voting independently.
Photographing ballots was recorded at 13.5% of polling stations.
Indications of organized transport of voters to polling stations were observed at 2.3% of polling stations.
Voting secrecy was compromised at 4.7% of regular polling stations and at 6.7% of polling stations where new technologies were tested.
Observers could not monitor the election process without interruption at 7.4% of regular polling stations.
Observers logged complaints at 13.3% of regular polling stations and 14% of polling stations where new technologies were tested.
Closing of Polling Stations
The closing of polling stations occurred without significant differences compared to previous elections. A notably higher rate of delays in closing was recorded at pilot polling stations (8.3% of pilot polling stations compared to 0.9% of regular polling stations).
Most polling stations closed on time; 11.3% of polling stations closed with a slight delay of up to 15 minutes, while 0.9% closed between 19:16 hrs and 20:00 hrs. The majority of voters present at or in front of the polling station at 19:00 hrs were allowed to vote, except at 4.1% of polling stations. At 1.6% of polling stations, entry was allowed after the polling station had closed.
Final Processes at the Polling Station
The vote-counting process at polling stations without electronic identification and scanners was less satisfactory compared to previous elections, with the potential to influence the election outcome at 3.8% of observed polling stations.
No significant irregularities were observed in packing polling material compared to previous elections or between pilot polling stations and regular polling stations. What is concerning is that the copies of the voting results (the so-called yellow copies) were either not posted or were illegible at 23% of observed polling stations, a significant increase by 16.7% compared to previous elections.
Counting Votes for Mayors
At 3.8% of polling stations, unused and damaged ballots were not packed in envelopes and secured with non-red pens in a protective bag.
At 3.8% of polling stations, after opening the ballot box, a stamp or pen was found on the table where votes were being counted.
At 0.5% of polling stations, the announcement of invalid ballots was not conducted in accordance with the CEC regulations.
At 3.8% of polling stations, ballots from the box did not have a stamp and the signature of a polling station committee member, as required.
There are suspicions of tampering with the votes on the ballots during the counting process at 0.5% of polling stations.
At 1.4% of polling stations, observers could not monitor the vote-counting process for mayors.
Counting Votes for Councils/Assemblies
At 4% of polling stations, unused and damaged ballots were not packed in envelopes and secured with non-red pens in a protective bag.
At 3.5% of polling stations, after opening the ballot box, a stamp or pen was found on the table where votes were being counted.
The announcement of invalid ballots was carried out in accordance with CEC regulations at all polling stations.
At 2.6% of polling stations, ballots from the box did not have a stamp and the signature of a polling station committee member, as required.
There are suspicions of tampering with the votes on the ballots during the counting process at 0.7% of polling stations.
At 1.4% of polling stations, observers were unable to monitor the vote-counting process for mayors.
Packing of Polling Material
At 2.7% of polling stations, irregularities were observed in the packing of polling material.
At 0.5% of polling stations, not all polling station committee members signed the Stock Form and the forms for aggregate results.
The yellow copies of the forms for aggregate results were not prominently displayed at 1.7% of polling stations, while they were displayed but illegible at 21.3% of polling stations.
Citizen Reports
On Election Day, the Pod lupom Coalition received 67 citizen reports concerning violations of electoral silence, pressures on voters (vote buying, coercion to vote), compromised voting secrecy, complaints about the voting process, partisan propaganda materials around polling stations, family voting, deceased individuals on voter lists, etc.
Thank You Note
The Coalition for Free and Fair Elections “Pod lupom” congratulates all civic and non-partisan observers of the electoral process for their successful work, thanking them for their exceptional engagement and contribution to the independent observation mission and for free and fair elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Coalition “Pod lupom,” composed of 49 civil society organizations, has actively organized the observation of the electoral process throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina for the 2024 Local Elections and congratulates all organizations on the successful implementation of the observation mission, which began significantly earlier. Each of these organizations contributed to the protection of the electoral process in their local communities and laid the foundations for sustainable independent election monitoring in the future.
We thank the media for their professional reporting, continuous support for Coalition activities, and their work to increase and improve transparency in the electoral process.
We also thank most actors in the electoral process for their collaboration, hoping that it will continue and intensify in the upcoming period.
Our special thank you goes to all citizens and voters for their support, confidence, and engagement in addressing electoral irregularities during the 2024 Local Elections.
